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The Social Costs of Inequality

Mark Kelman

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Marx's Vision of the Future

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Mailer's Birthday as Chic Politics

Benjamin Barber

HEW, the University and Women Teachers

Frances Barasch

A Critique of Socialist Planning

Luther Carpenter

A Fan Letter on Erving Goffman

Bennett Berger

Watergate

The Z Connection

Irving Howe

In the Corporate Style of Life

Joseph Bensman

And All That Money...

Michael Harrington

Ethical Problems of Psychosurgery

Doctors and
Philosophers Discuss
Brain Manipulation

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DISSENT, issued July 1, 1973, published quarterly, spring, summer, fall, and winter, by DISSENT Publishing Corporation, 509 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. Subscriptions: \$7.00 for one year; \$12.00 for two years; \$5.00 for students for one year; foreign subscriptions, including Canada, add \$1.00 for mailing costs per year. All payments from foreign countries must be made by United States money orders or checks payable in United States currency. Single copy, \$1.75. For special rates on bulk orders from organizations, teachers, etc., write directly to DISSENT. For information on newsstand and bookstore distribution write to: Eastern News Co., 155 West Fifteenth Street, New York, N.Y. 10001.

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274 GEORGE LICHTHEIM 1912-1973
by Dennis H. Wrong

COMMENTS AND OPINIONS

275 WATERGATE: THE Z CONNECTION
by Irving Howe

278 WATERGATE: ON POLITICS & MONEY
by Michael Harrington

279 WATERGATE: IN THE CORPORATE STYLE
by Joseph Bensman

281 NEW TRENDS IN THE UNIONS
by B. J. Widick

CORRESPONDENCE FROM ABROAD

284 A LEFT TURN AMONG GERMAN SOCIALISTS
by Henry Pachter

287 BAD TIMES IN INDIA
by A. G. Noorani

289 THE FRENCH LEFT—UNEASY RELATIONS
by Jean Bloch-Michel

ARTICLES

291 THE SOCIAL COSTS OF INEQUALITY
by Mark Kelman

299 THE CONSERVATIVE DRIFT IN
MODERN ECONOMICS
by Robert Lekachman

308 ON SOCIALIST PLANNING
by Luther Carpenter

323 MARX'S VISION OF FUTURE SOCIETY
by Shlomo Avineri

332 HEW, THE UNIVERSITY, & WOMEN
by Frances Barasch

340 HUMANISTIC SOCIALISM AND THE
ENGLISH TRADITION
by Ross Terrill

NOTEBOOK

345 BIRTHDAY-PARTY POLITICS
by Benjamin R. Barber

349 ORGANIZING A LABOR COLLEGE
by Patricia Cayo Sexton

BOOKS

353 A FAN LETTER ON ERVING GOFFMAN
by Bennett M. Berger

SPECIAL FEATURE

362 THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF
BRAIN MANIPULATION

382 **LETTERS**

George Lichtheim

1912–1973

I first became aware of George Lichtheim's powerful and distinctive gifts in 1953 and 1954 when he wrote under the name of "G. L. Arnold," although I had read him under his real name in *Commentary* on Middle Eastern and British politics as early as 1947. George wrote under both names through the 1950s, but G. L. Arnold disappeared after 1959 just before the publication of *Marxism: A Critical and Historical Study*, which won George a reputation as an important scholar and thinker never again to be described as a "journalist" in biographical notes. To those of us, however, who—aware of his double identity—had been reading him for over a decade in half a dozen British and American intellectual and political journals, he already was a uniquely authoritative voice on subjects ranging from such ephemera as the latest British Cabinet shift to the nature of Stalinism and its appeal to the elites of underdeveloped countries, or the intellectual history of Europe since the 18th century.

The number of ideas George advanced between the late '40s and the middle '50s—some of them in his first book, *The Pattern of World Conflict* published under the name of G. L. Arnold—that later became common intellectual parlance is truly remarkable: that the Cold War was essentially a sideshow to the struggles of the underdeveloped countries to achieve modernization; that socialism neither could nor should be identified any longer merely with the aims and interests of the industrial working class; that the managerial and technical intelligentsia represented the most rapidly expanding and politically significant stratum in advanced industrial societies; that Britain and the United States were beginning to suffer the "crisis of values" resulting from the disintegration of bourgeois civilization that had wracked continental Europe since at least 1914—to name only a few. George's skepticism toward all ideologies, his scrupulous concern with the historical pedigree of the ideas he articulated, and the casualness and ease with which he handled

complex social and philosophical theories—the absence of that straining for "brilliance" so common among American intellectuals—often resulted in his failing to receive the credit his originality deserved. But even before his major books appeared in the '60s (there were nine in all plus two essay collections) he was so prolific a writer that he unobtrusively implanted ideas in the minds of others who publicized them more flamboyantly. (As an editor, I discovered, as others had before me, that to ask George to write something was virtually to receive the completed manuscript in the return mail.)

Already an admirer, I made a point of getting to know George when he spent his first year in the United States as an editor of *Commentary* in 1957–58. The style and flavor of his writing were entirely congruent with those of the man himself. He was a superb talker—witty, effortlessly erudite, often seeming outrageously dismissive in his rejection of fashionable intellectual pretensions and inflated reputations. But there was a world-weary and melancholy, almost impersonal, quality to his apparent intellectual arrogance: the disasters of 20th-century European history had bred skepticism and hard-bitten yet sad realism into his bones. Perhaps I romanticized him, but he always seemed to me to be a kind of eternal refugee, both the actual exile that he had been from Hitler's Germany who eventually chose to live in England, and a symbolic exile from the shattered hopes of pre-1914 socialism and from the greatness of modern European culture which remains so uncertain of renewal after the historical disasters of this century. He recalled to me a remark of Clement Greenberg's that had startled me when I first read it: "It is possible that by 'world-historical' standards the European Jew represents a higher type of human being than any yet achieved in history."

I grieve the loss of a friend, but even if I had not known him personally I would regard the loss of the books and essays he had yet to write as an enormous and irreplaceable one.

DENNIS H. WRONG □

Irving Howe

Watergate: The Z Connection

These were our rulers, these the men who ran America—the Haldemans and Erlichmans, the Mitchells and Deans and Stanses. Breaking and entering, stealing, forging historical documents and letters in the name of political opponents, rifling psychiatric files, provoking turmoil and violence among dissidents, disposing of vast sums of money in squalid “operations,” and God alone knows what else—these were the methods of the Nixon men, the cheap-jack bosses who made decisions and the moral zombies who carried them out. It is almost as if Peter Verhovensky and Shigalov and Liputin, unsavory creatures of Dostoevsky’s *Possessed*, were transported to the advertising agencies and corporation boards of middle America, reincarnated with crew cut, grey suit, and a bag of “dirty tricks.”

Thinking about this spectacle one finds oneself, a little surprisingly, assailed by sentiments of patriotic indignation. To what depths of foulness has fallen the republic that once had been regarded as humanity’s “last, best hope”? Even those of us who have always been in the opposition, convinced that the ethic of capitalism corrodes the experience of democracy, must still feel some shame at what has happened to our country. From the lies and killings of Vietnam to the filth of the Nixon era: the republic does not thrive.

What were they thinking of, all those scoundrels who have since been implicated in Watergate and its equivalents? What did they have in mind when they so casually broke the law and transformed American politics, never very sa-

vory in the past, into a systematic exercise in hoodlumism?

I think Christopher Lasch is probably right in saying that Nixon sees himself as an agent of morality. Even the cut-throats of chicanery need some claims for the value of their work. No doubt, there were the ordinary motives of opportunism, the deceits of small ambition; no doubt, the incitements of petty and not-so-petty graft. But these can be assumed as a constant in all politics. Yet I am inclined to suppose that the Watergate crew was not driven primarily by motives of personal greed: these were not the kinds of people who wanted simply to line their pockets, though it would come as no surprise to learn that some did. Had they thought of the matter at all, they would probably have felt themselves superior to the thieves of Teapot Dome; nevertheless—indeed, almost *because* of that feeling of theirs—they were morally far below the ordinary grafters who have always been present in American politics. The Watergate men were not crooks, they were thugs. They were ideological thugs. They had, God help us, a mission.

A mission to defend America from its defilers, its soft-minded devotees of permissiveness, its chanters of amnesty, its celebrants of drugs, its enemies of work. (To break into Watergate; to rifle Dr. Ellsberg’s psychiatric files: that was work, hard work . . .) The Watergate men saw themselves, one supposes, as agents of traditional values, ‘old-line and true-blue Americans standing fast for Gary Cooper, J. Edgar Hoover, John Wayne and Richard

Nixon, heroes all of individualism and the American way. But they also knew themselves to be creatures of the 20th century, who had learned the lessons, as Joseph Berman remarks on an adjacent page, of corporation and advertising battles, the necessity of screwing the other side, screwing everybody before you get screwed yourself, cheating, lying, maligning, slandering. Nice guys finish last, said an American sage named Leo Machiavelli, and in a cause so urgent as the defense of America, no methods could be too ugly. You can't fight a war in the 20th century with bows and arrows, I heard another American sage, once a theoretician of the Left, declare a few years ago; and the likes of Haldeman and Erlichman and Magruder, all those stiff-faced apostles of squaredom, were not going to rely on bows and arrows. Not in the age of electronics.

If the experience behind men like Mitchell and Stans and Haldeman was that of corporate and advertising chicanery, the experience behind the creatures they exploited was that of the CIA, FBI, and secret intelligence ventures. It was, in a parodic way, an example of the military-industrial complex at work. Behind the Watergate plotters stood the wealth of American business, apparently passed around to the Nixon committees with lavish abandon; for, if George Meany could not bring himself to support Senator McGovern, the American corporations, with their keener sense of class relations, seem to have felt that Nixon was their man. And they were ready to pay.

The Watergate men were not fascists in any precise sense of the term. They did not intend to establish a dictatorship of terror based on a militarized movement of inflamed plebeians. Some of them, of course, could easily fit into a totalitarian milieu: robots like Bernard Barker who said his job had been not to think but to obey orders. Is it hard to see such men working for Hitler or Stalin? fulfilling their assignments with fanatic devotion, even at some personal sacrifice?

I think a more useful analogy is provided by Costa-Gavras's film *Z*. This film shows us a country where some of the externals of democracy survive: the opposition is still legal, it has the right to hold meetings and publish papers. Yet through a systematic use of gangs of hoodlums working in close collaboration with the police, the regime achieves a state of

quasi-terror, rendering the opposition physically and politically helpless and the nation morally inert. Not, to be sure, that the Haldemans and Erlichmans and Mitchells thought their way through to such a goal; they did not need to, and indeed, to have been explicit would have meant to inhibit themselves with some weight of consciousness. But it was to the condition of *Z* that their behavior tended—*Z* was the meaning of their actions.

Confirmation for this view comes from an unexpected source—Malcolm Moos, an influential conservative Republican who wrote speeches for Dwight Eisenhower and has since become president of the University of Minnesota. Noting the plans of the Watergate gang to set up a secret and extra-legal espionage apparatus in the White House, Mr. Moos says that this involved a "coup d'état" by a portion of the government against the government. Had a radical said this, it might seem excessive; since a conservative says it, we need simply nod in assent. Watergate signified a process of *sedition*, the usurpation of crucial powers by a segment of the executive branch of government. That is the fundamental ground for questioning whether the Nixon administration remains fit for office.

What prevented the drift toward the *Z* condition? Efforts by two young reporters on the *Washington Post* who kept digging for the facts; the determination of Judge Sirica, a conservative who conducted his court by the precepts of elementary justice. That such people were able to force Watergate upon the national conscience is a tribute to democracy, still the best political system devised by man; but that the truth should have had to depend on the more-or-less accidental presence of a few individuals gives one no great reassurance as to the health of democracy.

II

LET US TURN to narrower concerns. Do you remember the wonderful advertisement that appeared last November, just before the election, in which a group of distinguished intellectuals, including Professors Sidney Hook, Robert Nisbet, Irving Kristol and Edward Shils, came out in support of Nixon—*Richard Nixon!*

The one-sentence statement of these distinguished intellectuals declared Nixon the more "prudent" of the two candidates.

In recent months we have not been hearing much from the signers of this statement; it is said that some are suffering from embarrassment. One hopes so. Thus far only Irving Kristol, in the May 17 *Wall Street Journal*, has had the courage to venture into print with reflections on Watergate. He is not inclined to abandon himself to moral indignation before the recent scandals; he scorns the "conventional bogies" of the liberals—I imagine he'd regard my invocation of Z as precisely such a bogey. He sees Watergate as "a wave of collective delusion, suspicion and paranoia engulfing the White House." Indeed, "it is the very incomprehensibility of Watergate that gives it such a nightmarish quality."

I can't resist the polemical thrust of remarking on how strange it is that this "wave of collective delusion, suspicion and paranoia" should be the work of the very administration which Professor Kristol supported on the ground of *prudence*. For prudence is the very quality most distant from paranoia. Surely it doesn't speak well for the claims of the new conservatives to reasonableness, maturity, and civilized discourse that they offer us "prudence" and a few months later it turns out to be "paranoia." Something got mislabeled.

More important: how is it that, in the course of rejecting the notion that Watergate symbolizes "a general drift toward 'presidential despotism,'" Kristol does not stop to consider that the very bewilderment he expresses about the "nightmarish incomprehensibility" of Watergate is very similar to the kind of bewilderment that some people expressed about the "alleged" nightmares of the totalitarian states? How, they asked, could one believe that Stalin was "paranoid" enough to send millions of innocent people to Siberia? Why, they asked, would Hitler want to murder helpless Jews whom he might have used to greater profit in his factories?

Now I am not saying that the Nixon men were totalitarians—though it would not be amiss to see Watergate as a pretotalitarian episode. What I am saying is that Kristol's bewilderment, which I am sure is unfeigned, should cause him to see Watergate in a far

more lurid light than he does. For if he could understand and theorize about the far more terrible deeds of Hitler and Stalin, surely he should not be content with—indeed, he might even accuse himself of laziness in accepting— notions about "bewilderment" in regard to Watergate.

In any case, one waits for public declarations from other signators of the "prudence" statement. Will the distinguished sociologist Robert Nisbet, who wrote grave essays on the breakdown of authority caused by student uprisings, now favor us with some reflections on the breakdown of authority caused by the authorities? Will the distinguished philosopher Sidney Hook, who gave his vote to Nixon as "a comrade in arms," no less, "of Norman Thomas," now favor us with some reflections on the role of intelligence in public affairs?

And for that matter, to come a little closer to home, what about George Meany and Albert Shanker and Bayard Rustin who, while not openly supporting Nixon, directed their major energies to deprecating his opponent as the candidate of the "kooks"? Have they had any second thoughts on their electoral "neutrality"?

III

A FEW YEARS AGO I wrote a short piece in *DISSENT* called "Is This Country Cracking Up?" It was met with a certain derision among vicarious *realpolitikers* who charged that "you intellectuals" tend to see the decline of the West when all that is happening is an ordinary sunset. Well, it wasn't the decline of the West I was talking about, it was a slow disintegration of those premises of value which hold a society, any society, together. It was an idea that came, not from Marx, but from Schumpeter who had suggested that capitalism might crack up less because of economic crisis than through a loss of confidence and belief in its formal values. I don't think the country is cracking up in any immediate sense; but that there is a kind of Schumpeterian disintegration seems to me clear. It is a matter that requires further, closer analysis. For if not rotten to the core our society has been shown to have a great deal of rot at the core. □

Watergate: On Politics & Money

In reacting to the criminal assaults on the democratic process and the Democratic party, it is essential that we contemplate—and act on—the polite, everyday and perfectly legal subversion of democracy which takes place when corporate economic power influences government policy. John Connally is a case in point. Although Ralph Yarborough termed Connally's conversion to Republicanism "the first time a rat swam onto a sinking ship," a number of commentators saw the former Texas governor's change of registration as a daring move to shore up public confidence in the Republican party. And when Nixon appointed Connally to the White House staff, some newsmen saw that as evidence of "housecleaning."

Yet Connally retains his ties to a law firm that represents Gulf Resource and Chemical Corporation, a company under investigation for a secret \$100,000 contribution to the Nixon campaign—a contribution that may have been "laundered" through a Mexican bank and used to pay the Watergate gang. "Honest John" may have been part of the very mess he is supposed to clean up!

But that sordid angle is not the one which concerns me most. Instead I want to focus on the more basic corruption of democracy that Connally-type wealth represents. When his appointment to the White House staff was first announced, it was said that Connally would serve the President as an unpaid consultant—and would therefore retain his ties to sundry business interests. Besides his work for Gulf Resources, Connally is involved in a consortium seeking to develop an international business in natural gas. A prime target in that venture is Siberia, possessor of the largest natural gas reserves in the world. The indicted chief fundraiser for the Committee to Re-elect the Presi-

dent, Maurice Stans, went to Moscow last year as Secretary of Commerce to explore that deal. The figures involved are astronomical, as high as \$40 billion by some estimates. Obviously, any deal with the Soviet Union will have to be negotiated both by the United States government and the companies involved. With close cooperation between the government negotiating team and the company's negotiators, there are mind-boggling possibilities for windfall profits—profits on a scale comparable to the sums harvested by those astute—and large—grain companies that had advance notice of last year's Soviet wheat purchase.

In the Watergate case we see amateurish and bungled examples of the power of money in politics. Incompetents went around with briefcases filled with \$200,000, burgled psychiatrists' offices, involved the CIA, the FBI, the Marines, Cabinet officials and, quite possibly, the President himself in the criminal obstruction of justice. What bothers me is that we will become so fascinated by this blundered villainy that we will lose sight of the deeper level of corruption represented by John Connally, a Watergate winner rather than a loser.

HOW CAN WE deal with the more profound problem of institutionalized and legal collusion between the public and private sectors? It is possible, now and in the immediate future, to attack at least some of the flagrant excesses revealed by Watergate. Three areas are particularly important:

- campaign-financing should be largely federalized with allocations to be made on a democratic basis, with special protection (but not parity) for minority parties;
- all television and radio time in national campaigns should be provided free by the networks and stations as a condition of their licensing, and this time should also be parceled out in a democratic fashion;
- the postcard system of voter registration should be enacted immediately.

It is important that the perpetrators of the Watergate break-in be punished, but democracy is more threatened by the subtle pressure a Connally is capable of exerting on our national energy policy, for example, than it is by the ineptness of a Gordon Liddy. As a first step, public participation on the boards of large

companies is required. Beyond that, we must demand open and democratic debate over energy policy. Watergate—and the more insidious influences of a Connally—provides another argument in favor of policies aimed at the redistribution of wealth, for it is now clear that such policies will affect the maldistribution of political power as well as the maldistribution of income. □

Joseph Bensman

Watergate: In the Corporate Style

When Watergate was still a “caper,” I saw it as a faded replay of *Mission Impossible*. The burglars then seemed to have filched an inferior scenario from a famous TV series. But as one exposé after another tumbled off the presses, I concluded that Watergate was not a TV production but a Mad Avenue operation. It looked to me like ineptly applied advertising strategy, and about that I knew only too much. The formula is as follows: you maintain an old established brand—even one (like Richard Nixon) that languished for a while and got repackaged—mainly by damaging the competitor’s test market. The Democratic primaries were such a market.

The Segretti assignment, the theft of Muskie letterheads, and the distribution of damaging statements were all designed to knock out a strong competitor and guarantee a weak one. This is standard operating procedure in Ad Alley. The techniques are ingenious. You keep

the new brand from achieving penetration by securing as much TV time and newspaper and magazine space as you can get. You start rumors that a competitive brand, say a new cigarette, is barred from the better hospitals because it uniquely causes cancer. A soft drink is rumored by its promoters to be an aphrodisiac and by its competitors to induce impotence. And so on.

Sometimes a manufacturer messes up the competitor’s test market by introducing a brand of his own. One so resembles the other in color, taste, name, or general appearance, that brand confusion is bound to ensue. So long as the new brand’s identity is obscured, the old brand need not even increase its sales. Threats are thus often squelched even before they can reach public awareness.

Not that most ad agencies hire clumsy burglars or involve the CIA in their business. But most of them, in the course of market research, do illegally acquire vast amounts of information. They lay hands on sales figures, technical developments, and marketing or promotion plans to which only insiders are lawfully privy. They gather intelligence by hiring well-informed personnel away from the producer or his agency. Members of competitive agencies routinely exchange confidential information which they pass on to their superiors without discussing the criminal *quid pro quo* everyone takes for granted. Leaks and plumbings are no novelty in the ad world. Nor is it unusual for an agency to tip off one client by violating the confidence of another.

The presence of ex-ad men like H. R. Halde-
man, Dwight Chapin, Jeb Stuart Magruder, Ron Ziegler, and Kenneth Cole is a fact of some importance. They personify the continuous migration of Mad Avenue mentality and morality into government.

Having satisfied myself that I essentially understood the Watergate affair, I arranged to meet with several people I had known while working in advertising. I presented my theory and awaited their verdict. It was negative, even scornful. What, they wondered, had academic life done to me that I should so grossly mistake a part for the whole? They knew everything about the snake oil of our pecuniary civilization, but to them it was the latter far more than the former that mattered.

Here is their explanation: Watergate stands for the everyday *corporate* approach. This approach includes advertising and marketing. I was on the right track, but stopped too soon. Watergate meant much more than the mere marketing of a President.

They asked me to consider the phenomenon of unrecorded cash—a conservative estimate for the funds of CRP (the Committee to Re-elect the President) is upward of \$6 million. Every sizable corporation has such monies on hand. The flow and control of undisclosed cash, money for which records may not be kept, constitute a standing challenge to big business accountants, treasurers, or other financial officers, not least those employed by the Mafia. Maurice Stans handled, as others laundered, part of this cash, and Stans had not only been a U.S. secretary of commerce but something functionally more important, a CPA.

Nor, I was reminded, should we overlook a certain parallelism between the corporate counsel and the President's counsel. The counsel, or *consigliere*, is there to advise what undertakings are legal, shady, extralegal and illegal. If expert, he is able to estimate the probabilities of detection and prosecution. His job is mainly to achieve maximum undetectability, and when fatal risk-taking proceeds with or without his advice, he covers it up. His fees depend largely on how much success he has at this.

Further similarities obtain between our President in the capital and presidents in the executive suites. The head of a large firm strives to achieve corporate objectives. He expects obedience, loyalty, and success on the part of his staff—and insularity from its operational details. "Don't tell me *how* you do things. Just *do* them." The staff can retain or enhance its standing only if underlings produce results. When criminal means are used, the staff has to protect the president from any suggestion of complicity. Ignorance is innocence, and the boss must be kept in a state of innocence.

Therefore chief executives never really "know" about the violation of antitrust laws, misrepresentation, fraud, misappropriation. If quiz shows are rigged, no one is more surprised or offended than the president of a network who has ordered high ratings—with no necessary recourse to outright felony. Indeed, the emphasis on personal honesty within a context of corporate crime produces a management

group that is religious, righteous, upright, honorable, morally indignant, and sanctimoniously crooked. Thus John Mitchell can claim: "I never did anything mentally or morally wrong. . . . I have never stolen any money."

My Madison Avenue friends, however, spoke wistfully of the position of the White House staff and the CRP prior to the Watergate scandal. Most businessmen, in contemplating corporate crime, are forced to weigh the possibility that state and federal agencies might enforce the law: they are compelled to be moderately discreet. In the case of the CRP and Watergate crimes, the supervisors and heads of federal agencies themselves planned, initiated, managed, and attempted to cover-up "an organized crime wave." And since they apparently had little fear of prosecution, they chose to be righteous, reckless, mindless, and arrogant. The usual checks "would be," in their language, "inoperative."

If Watergate stems from the migration of corporate managerial attitudes into politics, then the American public has something to worry about. The traditional politician, especially the machine politician, knew what he was selling when he sold the public trust. He sold it in small lots for large sums. He knew the limits of what he could sell and what he could get away with. Above all, he knew what he was selling. Modern corporate management combines unlimited loyalty and personal honesty with outsized corporate and political crime. It can learn its limits only by overstepping them. This requires continuous surveillance, regulation, exposure, and prosecution.

Just now, attention has shifted away from the \$6 million or more of illegal contributions by American businessmen to the CRP. If the investigative focus should shift back in that direction (and if all the records have not been destroyed) then the full involvement of American corporate interests in these crimes might unfold. Who paid how much? Exactly where did the cash come from? Was it unrecorded cash? If so, will anyone be indicted for tax evasion? What was asked in return for the contributions? And what was promised and delivered?

While Watergate may reveal the accelerated transposition of corporate ethics to politics, business has not become more virtuous because government has become more corrupt. □

New Trends in the Unions

The emergence of two distinct and conflicting tendencies within the trade unions—roughly, a Republican and a Democratic wing—has become more visible in 1973, although signs of this could already be seen during the 1972 presidential campaign. Dramatic evidence of this split is the open warfare between the predatory Teamsters Union and Cesar Chavez's Farm Workers Union, with the AFL-CIO seeking to prevent Frank Fitzsimmons, the Teamsters' president and President Nixon's closest labor ally, from wiping out the Farm Workers' organization.

In these circumstances, the phrase, "Organized Labor" has become somewhat less than useful as a way of understanding recent trends in the unions. In place of homogeneity and solidarity we now have ferment, coalitions, mergers, rivalries, and political antagonisms. Not even Watergate has budged the Teamsters and Secretary of Labor Peter J. Brennan, with his Building Trades base, from the Nixon Republican camp. Quite the contrary.

To be sure, from an institutional point of view, unionism in America has a formidable structure. The latest Bureau of Labor Statistics report states, "Increasing by 542,000 since 1968, membership in 208 labor unions and public and professional employee associations totaled 22.6 million by 1970. Nearly 500,000 of that gain was attributable to advances in union membership." Since then at least another 250,000 gain can be estimated conservatively.

Another BLS survey indicates that net assets of American trade unions were over \$2 billion in 1970, and annual income was over \$3 billion, \$2 billion from dues and the rest from investments and other sources. There were over 153,000 signed contracts between labor and management last year, most of them for two- or three-year periods of time, with over 95 per-

cent of them negotiated peacefully, and most of them containing union-shop and check-off provisions to provide union security.

Another significant advance is the growth of white-collar unionism, once a rarity on the American scene, but now becoming a permanent feature of our labor-relations system. The Teachers Union, the National Educational Association, and the State, County and Municipal Workers Union have become major forces. *Over 3.5 million white-collar workers are now enlisted in unions.*

All this suggests, among other things, that the current organizations bear little resemblance to the lean and hungry unions of the early CIO days, or for that matter of the AFL in the 1930s. Unionism does have an amazing viability, no matter what the individual union failures, scandals, or policy blunders may be. A refreshing example is the rebirth of the United Mine Workers as a symbol of decent unionism, owing to the victory of the Miners for Democracy. The embarrassing example is the growth of the Teamsters to over 1.8 millions members, no matter how tarnished its image.

In a brief six months, Meany has flip-flopped from "neutrality for Nixon" to a postelection honeymoon period, and now a hostile break—hardly a manifestation of political stability. Although the Watergate affair was well known to knowledgeable Washingtonians who read the daily press, last February the *New York Times* described the Meany-Nixon relationship this way:

When he [President Nixon] came to the Americana Hotel to speak to the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO last Monday, the President received a cordial welcome from Mr. Meany and other union leaders. Mr. Meany took special pains to state his respect for the President of the United States.

In April Meany sat in the audience of the national Building Trades conference while President Nixon defended Brennan's actions in breaking a preappointment commitment that he would support the AFL-CIO proposal for a new minimum-wage law. Later Meany took the floor and blasted Brennan for supporting the Nixon proposals which would exclude teen-age categories from minimum-wage protection. Nevertheless, the Building Trades stood by Brennan. No one asked him to resign. Meany's

fulminations indicated how little influence he had over the Building Trades in a political contest with the White House.

Revelations that Charles W. Colson, former special counsel for President Nixon and now the Teamsters' chief lawyer, had helped arrange the blasts at Meany, after the November 1971 confrontation between the President and Meany at the AFL-CIO convention, suggest one of the techniques the Nixon camp used against Meany. The Teamsters Union, according to a pro-Hoffa newspaper, *The Manchester Union Leader*, was deeply implicated in secret funding of the Nixon 1972 campaign.

Then there was the *New York Times* report that Attorney General Richard Kleindienst and Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen turned down a request of the FBI to continue surveillance that had begun to detect the Teamsters Union president's connections with the Mafia. This connection is supposed to have involved meetings between Fitzsimmons and men identified by the FBI as Mafia figures. Next was the atrocious attempt of the Nixon administration to proclaim its economic record as a success for the workingman, an argument which Meany denounced as the technique of the Big Lie.

Finally came the brazen raid on the Farm Workers Union, with the Teamsters claiming to have organized 50,000 workers, signed up in what Meany called "sweetheart agreements," including a provision that allowed for the re-introduction of the notorious "labor contractor" methods of hiring. The AFL-CIO Council voted to raise \$1.6 million to aid Chavez, who may also expect continued support from the independent UAW. Nevertheless, Chavez faces overwhelming odds in the summer of 1973. They include the antagonism of the Nixon and Reagan administrations, the hostility of the Farm Bureau and other growers organizations, and the unlimited muscle and money of the Teamsters, with their White House and Labor Department connections.

AS WAS EXPECTED, the strong unions did better than the weak in Phase I and II of the Nixon economic game plan. The Building Trades did the best of all in 1971 and 1972. In 1973, the only certainty under Phase III guidelines of 5.5 percent was that the Teamsters, negotiating for over 400,000 truck drivers in a nationwide pattern, would do better than other unions. To

counter Japanese steel imports, the Steelworkers and the industry decided to try an experiment—unresolved issues in the next negotiations will go to binding arbitration, rather than the test of a picket line. Local unions do have the right to strike on local issues, and there will be wage increases, but neither side can afford a national strike. Auto negotiations in the fall of 1973 are expected to be touch and go—two factors, a highly profitable year and foreign competition, are operating for a peaceful settlement.

But given the rate of inflation, April figures from the BLS indicated a decline in real wages for industrial workers by \$2 a week. Unions that for years had denounced escalator "cost-of-living" clauses, have now included this form of protection in new contracts—the UAW has had it for over 20 years.

Under the political and economic pressures, unions are making new alliances to strengthen their positions. Eighteen unions are engaged in coalition bargaining against General Electric. Jerry Wurf, of the State, County and Municipal Employees, forged an alliance with federal government workers, and sections of the National Educational Association. The Teachers (AFT) kept trying to expand the successful formation of one teachers organization in New York State, the Congress of Teachers, into a national structure. However, the break between Dave Selden, the AFT president, and Al Shanker, with the prospect of a factional struggle within the AFT, appears to have slowed down the AFT-NEA unity campaign.

Early in 1973 the UAW and the Machinists held a successful joint national conference in Washington, D.C., with both unions suggesting that talks of unifying the two organizations were premature. Joseph Bierne, president of the Communications Workers, has been negotiating with the large postal union, seeking organizational unity. Meanwhile confidence in the national AFL-CIO leadership of George Meany was weakening, and maneuvers for his successor continued, with I. W. Abel of the Steelworkers, and Lane Kirkland, the secretary-treasurer of the AFL-CIO, as leading contenders.

In the sphere of world labor, the AFL-CIO was almost completely isolated and with less influence than at any recent period. The latest *faux pas* of Meany was his denunciation of the British trade union movement for seeking to establish better relations with unions in the

Common Market countries, in an effort to make the voice of British unionism more powerful as England enters the EEC. At the February 1973 AFL-CIO executive board meeting, Meany criticized Vic Feathers, head of the British Trade Union Congress, to American reporters in the presence of Feathers. Meany called the Feathers proposals an attempt to establish a Moscow-London Axis. Such insulting behavior has not endeared Meany to European unionists.

Given the protectionist character of some of the features of the Burke-Hartke bill to restrict some imports, the AFL-CIO—but not the entire American labor movement—appears in Europe to have gone “isolationist.” In Canada, the anti-AFL-CIO feeling is very strong, going back to Meany’s prowar stand and because of some American union leaders’ insensitivity to the feelings of their Canadian counterparts. Such unions as the UAW are devoting extraordinary attention to keeping their Canadian workers part of the team, but the wave of nationalism sweeping that country makes this difficult. The AFL-CIO still remains outside of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions which—because of the wealth of the German metal workers federation—can no

longer be influenced by American dollar contributions in the way it was during the early post-war period.

The rise of economic nationalism, both here and abroad, has created more difficulty for the prospect of confronting multinational corporations with concrete forms of multinational unionism. While the smallest signs of international solidarity are given wide publicity owing to the talents of Charles Levinson, secretary general of the chemical workers federation, and Dan Benedict, secretary of the metal workers federation, the fact is that unions in each country or bloc are looking out for their own interests first. In a series of regional conferences on international affairs, the AFL-CIO leadership has admitted that its international influence is at a very low point. Its Educational Institutes drew students from many parts of the world, but the days of high-handed operations in cooperation with the CIA, as outlined in detail in Joseph Goulden’s book on George Meany, appear to be over. Cold warriors have few friends anywhere these days. The AFL-CIO may not be disliked as much as ITT in South America, but there are no indications it could win a popularity contest either. □

Henry Pachter

A Left Turn Among German Socialists

There is no "iron law of organization." No "iron law" of logic forces a labor party to choose either sectarian ineffectiveness or the shallow opportunism and the bureaucratic machine rule of a mass party.

Observers of the German Social Democrats (SPD) who never graduated beyond Robert Michels and the early Lukacs may have been surprised by the spirit that ruled its April 1973 Convention in Hanover. There was a party that has been part of various government coalitions since 1967 and yet attracts the discontented Left; a party that has borne responsibility for some economic mismanagement in the last years and yet is preparing itself to become the majority party for the first time in the next elections; a party that ought to have become eroded by routine—and yet the majority of delegates is under 40 and roughly one-third of the members of its new presidium are counted among the "Left."

One is tempted to compare the new face of the old SPD with the popularity of Palme in Sweden, with the performance of Allende in Chile, and with the Popular Front turn in France—or one might even speak of a worldwide renaissance of leftism among democratic socialists. To an American observer, however, one would like to suggest comparison with the McGovern campaign: for all the concessions the SPD has made to its coalition partners, it still retains the image of a workers' party. And simultaneously, while making a sustained, sincere, and convincing effort to become a "peo-

ple's party" with a generally meliorist outlook, it also attracts militant young people whose concern is ideological rather than economic. The explanation of such a paradox may be given on many levels—sociological, political, and historical—but foremost the credit must go to the person at the helm of the party. The SPD owes its present strength to Willy Brandt, a man known for his honesty, good judgment, and responsible action: bold not in words but in deeds and—a point often overlooked—a man who has come out of the movement itself.

The contrast to McGovern is obvious: in the United States, where personalities count for much in politics, the candidate failed to inspire confidence precisely because he was a one-issue man and had little background in grass-roots movements. The second difference, I would suggest, lies in the nature of the issues: what the McGovernites imposed was a collection of ill-assorted planks dear to the hearts of the groups in the McGovern coalition but, especially with the deescalation of the Vietnam war, there was hardly any cause that could unite the nation around a new program. By contrast, the planks that were added to the SPD program in Hanover had grown and been developed out of the experience of the SPD in government during the past five years. These planks had been amply discussed by the membership and in the nonsocialist press, and in their ensemble constitute a new approach to politics: their appeal can be tested in the light of the

Brandt government's accomplishments between now and the next election.

The opposition in the SPD was not out to win total control, but it recognized from the start the need to maintain the unity of the party and to preserve its populist character. Its speakers repeatedly stated that they accepted the idea of equal status of Marxists and ethical socialists, pragmatic trade unionists and idealistic students, routine parliamentarians and supporters of direct action—all within one large party.

The Godesberg program, which was adopted in 1959, had been admittedly non-Marxist, antisectarian, a deliberate opening to the Right, and an appeal to nonproletarian strata. It assured the voters that private property would be respected and that a market economy was the best technique to obtain a better distribution of income. "Private enterprise wherever possible, public management where necessary," was the slogan. With this program the SPD crashed the fatal 33.3 percent barrier and won 36 percent of the vote in 1961, 39 percent in 1965, 43 percent in 1969, and 46 percent in 1971.

The great reform planks were and still are *Mitbestimmung*, i.e., workers' representation in the management of enterprises; a more democratic educational system (only 10 percent of all Germans graduate from high school, only 5 percent from universities); and *Ostpolitik*, i.e., an opening to the East and de facto recognition not only of the Communist regimes but of the geopolitical consequences of World War II. To these proposals the Convention added a specific tax program for the redistribution of income and an ingenious profit-sharing scheme that would shift share ownership and thereby control of the enterprise away from investors toward publicly controlled workers' funds. Moreover, the socialist mayors—precisely those who counted among the party's "right-wingers"—have developed a drive for public control of real estate in urban areas and for more comprehensive planning of the human environment.

While this evolution has alarmed the coalition partner, a bourgeois-liberal party, and might pass for radical in the U.S., the left wing in the SPD has found it wanting in direction and militancy. The party's left wing has de-

manded a return to the formulas of Marxist class war; a more decisive denunciation of the "new capitalism" or "corporate state" (a small group that characterizes the present conditions as "state monopoly capitalism" meanwhile has switched to the CP); a popular front with the minuscule Communist party; closer collaboration with the East German state; withdrawal from NATO; and abolition of a government directive forbidding the employment of Communists and Nazis in civil service and education. The left wing also has supported a university reform that makes a mockery of scholarship and has turned out a generation of high school teachers who tend to transform the classroom into agitprop sessions.

Though these "leftists" count among their followers some older workers, their main strength is found among students and teachers who have little knowledge of the hard fights the traditional party had to win before it was able to distribute posts and influence. (One of the old-timers ridiculed the students' concern with "consumerism" while many workers still earn less than 1,000 marks [\$300] a month and would like to consume more.)

The most vocal section of the party's left wing are the Jusos (the Young Socialists), officially the party's youth organization but distinct in complexion and style. Jusos have not always fought according to the rules. Their terrorist methods helped oust Munich's reform Mayor Vogel. The Jusos have supported squatters who occupied buildings that were to be razed, have poured concrete into street-car rails to obtain "free transportation," and they consider anyone who distrusts Communists a cold warrior. In large urban centers they constitute up to one-third of the party's membership, and they use their freedom from work to draw party meetings out into the wee hours of the morning; then, when the workers have gone home, they adopt resolutions and elect delegates to their liking.

With such tactics, the party's left wing managed to have 30 percent of the delegates at the Hanover Convention and to block the election of most "rightists" to the presidium. Thus roughly one-third of the members of the new Presidium may be counted as "leftists," and a goodly number of its "centrists" can also be expected to support radical solutions for Germany's economic and social troubles.

SOME OF THE RESOLUTIONS on social and economic policy which were carried by the left wing at the Convention clearly point that way: while not changing the operational code of the "social market economy" (this is what the Germans call the welfare state), they aim at specific controls and redistribution of income, wealth, and power, which eventually would place the entire economy under the direction of public bodies. If the Godesberg program timidly called for the control of investment and monopoly "in order to prevent abuses," the new long-range program envisages positive, qualitative directions for corporate investment. It may not take too much courage these days to call for the control of multinational corporations, but the new long-range program is, to my knowledge, the first platform of any party in the world that clearly says growth of the so-called national product is not to be considered as an absolute value. Even Helmuth Schmidt, a "rightist," recommended that the party should learn from the planning experiences in neighboring East Germany. Willy Brandt, in turn, condemned "limited liability capitalism" which allows socialization of the losses while protecting property when there are surpluses.

Other resolutions would strengthen the steeply progressive tax platform of 1971 and place on the agenda for the near future four measures that—in the hands of a determined government—might crack the framework of private capitalism:

1. *Mitbestimmung*, i.e., the participation of workers' representatives in management decisions.
2. Distribution of bonus shares to a "growth fund," which would nominally belong to the workers but practically be voted upon by their representatives or by public authorities.
3. Expansion of public ownership in enterprises that already enjoy a monopoly or threaten to acquire excessive power.
4. Municipal ownership and management of real estate in urban conglomerations.

(The theory that corporations should be nationalized if and when their operations are a threat to the commonweal is common to the youth organizations of all parties; Juso speakers at Hanover were able to quote a theological textbook to that effect.)

There can be little doubt that the soothing reports in the American press, assuring its readers that radicalism had been averted at Hanover and the core of the party machine still has all the levers of power, do not reflect the SPD as it emerges from this important convention. On two important issues only the centrist leadership offered resistance. When the Jusos called Willy Brandt "the chancellor of the Americans," he answered indignantly and asserted that the *Ostpolitik* must not mean a loosening of the ties to the West or a lowering of the guard toward the East. Likewise, the leadership will meet radical demands wherever they are realistic; but it clearly drew the line where alignment with the Communists begins. A compromise, which many centrists and rightists feel went too far, was reached on the employment of Communists and Nazis in government and education. The left-wingers wanted no checks at all, the right-wingers gave up the blanket formula and agreed that each case should be decided on its individual merits.

The left wing is in a good position to take over the party, provided it can maintain unity with the older, more reformist members. It clearly represents something very different from the old sectarian radicalism, namely, a widespread trend toward syndicalism among young people of all parties. In some respect the Juso program may even be called less radical than the rhetorics of young Catholics and Free Democrats. None of them are prepared to defend the present Federal Republic and all are to some degree hostile to NATO and to U.S. influence. In their desire to oppose present policies some will go so far as to accept uncritically the Communist regime east of the Elbe. This neutralist philosophy, which is also attractive to German patriots of nonsocialist persuasion, has strong supporters even in the leadership. Party boss Wehner delivered himself of some strong anti-American statements after seeing Swedish Prime Minister Palme, and Willy Brandt's principal adviser on foreign affairs, Egon Bahr, is the author of a controversial plan to "neutralize" Germany in three stages. The appeal of these ideas touches all classes and it may help to hold the party's Center and Left together (if by the "Right" we mean those leaders, now deprived of power, who are strongly committed to the Western alliance).

The party is becoming increasingly middle-

class in composition, and if its new ideology is middle-class, too, the term "middle-class ideology" needs redefining. The new middle class places a premium on nonconformism and ideological concerns, conceives of itself as an avant-garde, and refers to the old crowd of plodding trade union officials and parliamentary party secretaries as "canal diggers." Since the days of Bebel, when working with one's hands was considered a mark of distinction, the party has come a long way. A methodical build-up of a mass party may no longer be the task of the leadership in an age when TV has replaced the house visit by the local ward-heeler. It remains to be seen whether the young enthusiasts will become "canal diggers," too, or whether the straw fire of revolutionary enthusiasm will burn itself out. □

ps: Willi Brandt now has become the spokesman of Europe in its new independent position vis-à-vis the U.S. He plainly told Nixon in Washington that Dr. Kissinger's project of a new Atlantic Charter would not go down well with the Europeans. □

A. G. Noorani

Bad Times in India

Nothing reflects better the situation in India and the mood of its government than the speech Prime Minister Indira Gandhi delivered last March in Patiala. Mrs. Gandhi noted that there had been a sharp decline in India's image abroad. A year ago, after the victory over Pakistan, India's stock was very high. "But today India is nowhere in the world papers."

The Prime Minister did not attribute this to the poor performance of her government—nor

to the lack of the rains which has led to severe drought in large parts of the country. She simply blamed the opposition and its talk of poverty, corruption, and civil liberties. "Who is hurt by it? It is India, the image of India that is hurt." And she reverted to her favorite theme of "foreign danger"—the unnamed but not unidentifiable Big Powers whose pride had been wounded by Pakistan's defeat in the Bangladesh war and who were ready to seize every opportunity to humiliate India. The opposition, she added, was helping them.

Things must be in pretty bad shape for Mrs. Gandhi to make such desperate remarks. But she was anxious, also, to impress her audience with her toughness and went on to make the self-revealing comment that while her father, Jawaharlal Nehru, had been "a saint who came into politics by mistake," she herself was "born in the thick of politics. Therefore, I have more vitality and experience to face the challenge of the Opposition."

The speech attracted wide attention. The Indian press was quick to point out that the Opposition was not able to mount much of a challenge. Mrs. Gandhi's writ runs in all the states bar one, Tamil Nadu, which is governed by the DMK, a party that once advocated the South's secession but whose plank today is a federation on the U.S. model. In the 514-member Lok Sabha (lower House of Parliament) Mrs. Gandhi's Congress has 350 seats; the rival Congress a mere 16; the pro-Hindu Jan Sangh 22; the private-enterprise Swatanta party 8; the Socialists a mere 3. The pro-Moscow Communist party, which supports Mrs. Gandhi, has 23 seats while its rival, the CPI (Marxist), has 25. Once pro-Peking, the CPI(M) is now neutral on matters between Russia and China and is strongly opposed to the Congress government. What challenge can such an anaemic and disunited opposition pose to the government?

The causes of frustration clearly lie elsewhere. Mrs. Gandhi won the general election of 1971 on a "*garibi hatao*" (remove poverty) program. Soon, the crisis of Bangladesh was at hand, and it was tackled with great success—the liberation. In the March 1972 elections to the state legislatures, Mrs. Gandhi again swept the polls.

A few months later decline set in. Prices began to rise steeply, making nonsense of all economic calculations, and there was a rash of

violent incidents. Labor was restive and so were the students.

In Andhra Pradesh a movement for the state's breakup gained momentum. There was trouble over the choice of an official language in Assam. It was all reminiscent of 1967, except that Mrs. Gandhi now was in full control. When the Opposition made much of her troubles, she accused them of being in league with foreign powers.

No one outside Mrs. Gandhi's party accepts these charges; the real causes of popular discontent are there for all to see. Inflation has played havoc and little has been done to check it. The prices of food, for example, have recently gone up by 17 percent.

The drought was compounded by neglect and faulty planning. Famine conditions prevail in parts of Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore, Bihar, Orissa, Bengal, and Manipur. The year 1972 has been described as a tragic year for India's agriculture, but it has also exposed the government's bungling. Conditions of drought are not unprecedented in India, and they should be provided against in a country whose irrigated area comprises less than one-fourth of the total area under cultivation.

In parts of Maharashtra this is the third time the monsoon has failed to come. Out of the state's 26 districts 21 now are suffering famine. About 20 million people in this state alone have been uprooted. Of the kharif crop, 70 percent is damaged, with a loss estimated at Rs 260 crores. The state government has opened scarcity relief camps.

Last January the National Development Council endorsed the Planning Commission's document entitled "Approach to the Fifth Plan" (1974-79). It calls for an overall annual growth rate of 5.5 percent, with the basic objective of economic self-reliance. The Planning Commission will prepare the draft of the Fifth Plan by the end of September.

But, as critics have pointed out, the Fifth Plan, twice the size of the Fourth, is founded on an illusory estimate based on 1970-71 prices, which inflation has rendered hopelessly out-of-date. The Rs.51,000 crores outlay has an uncovered gap of Rs.3,000 crores. On the basis of current prices, the Plan will require an outlay of about Rs.60,000 crores. It helps little in bridging the credibility gap.

An effort to deal with these problems was made at the last annual session of the ruling Congress party at Calcutta in December 1972. It adopted 'a concrete program of action . . . for effective implementation within the next 15 months.' (The Fifth Plan is expected to commence in April 1974.) Its most outstanding feature is the provision of jobs for 500,000 educated unemployed.

The other features of the Plan sound no less impressive: completion of land reforms in the states by the end of 1973; permanent machinery to facilitate distribution of food and essential articles to the people within six months; extension of midday meal programs to feed an additional 3 million children of Harijans and those in tribal pockets and slums; a program for allotment of panchayat lands to the landless in 1973-74; distribution of surplus land to the landless and to small marginal farmers by December 1973; provision of drinking-water facilities in 28,000 villages by April 1974.

The problem, however, is one of performance not promise. A Rs.50 crore program for creating new jobs in every district of India was introduced in 1970. In July 1972 it was officially admitted that the allocation had not been fully spent.

Socialist party General Secretary Prem Bhasin argues:

The Plan approach not only makes a provision of Rs.280 crores for loans to government servants for the purchase of cars (while the total provision for public transport is only Rs.250 crores) but, also, while Rs.800 crores have been earmarked for urban housing only Rs.100 crores have been provided for rural housing. . . .

In December 1971, only 8.2 percent of the total bank credit went to agriculture. Small-scale industry, which contributes about 40 percent of industrial production, got 11.55 percent in December 1971. Small and marginal farmers could make little claim on bank credits. The chief beneficiaries were the rich peasants, wholesalers, big business, and money-lenders.

Meanwhile, Mrs. Gandhi has been attacking the opposition parties in terms that seem to deny their legitimacy. Last September, Congress President Dr. S. D. Sharma charged they had been infiltrated by CIA agents. No proof was adduced. "It is not for us to prove that this agency is working in our country. It is for the CIA to prove that it is not active in India," she told the members of her party on October

2. The next day the State Department characterized the accusation as being "without foundation."

Mrs. Gandhi was aiming at two birds with her stone, the Opposition and the U.S. John B. Connally had met her in July as President Nixon's special emissary. It is no secret that the visit was not a success and that Connally was not the best person for such an assignment.

The biggest question in foreign policy remains the relationship with Pakistan. India's foreign minister has hinted that India might take a new initiative to unfreeze relations. Certainly a normalization of relations with Pakistan and China could lead to a considerable saving in the defense budget and that would be no small gain, the other gains apart. All in all, the Indian situation today does not appear to be bright, but there is no cause for the kind of vindictive pessimism in which foreign observers, infatuated with melodramatic authoritarian schemes, like to indulge. Challenging as these problems are, there also exists a determination to tackle them within the democratic framework. One of the better recent statements Mrs. Gandhi has made is that "We feel that we can and will achieve our goals through democracy." With this, the best of her domestic critics surely agree. □

Jean Bloch-Michel

The French Left-- Uneasy Relations

Everyone in Paris knows that the French Communist party (CP) is no longer a revolutionary party bent on seizing power by force or subversion—perhaps simply because this would be impossible. In signing the Common Program for an electoral bloc with the Socialists and other left-wing groups before the election this past spring, the CP had to make a number of important concessions, but it also succeeded in

breaking out of its electoral isolation. Its hope to become a governmental party has thereby come to seem credible again. Counting on this new credibility, it tried not only to recoup some of its former supporters who had drifted over to Gaullism, but also to bite off a section of the democratic Left which its newly moderate stance might reassure.

Pretty much the same sort of calculations were in the mind of François Mitterand, to whom credit is due for the revival of a Socialist party (SP) which had partly disappeared from the political scene. A Left government excluding the CP, behind which stands a fifth of the electorate, is a political illusion, and any Socialist-led government resting on such an illusion would necessarily be condemned to slide toward the Right. But neither is a Left government possible if it is dominated by the CP, feared and unwanted by four-fifths of the electorate. Only a strong SP, balancing off the CP and consequently guarding the country against the excesses that many people fear if the CP were to approach the centers of power, made at all credible the idea of a Left government. The SP therefore had to show itself as both a supporter of the Left alliance and a rigorous but wary ally of the CP, determined in the first place to conserve its independence and to speak out on its differences. Thanks to the astute Mitterand, who knew how to revitalize party cadres while giving the SP a new firmness, this rebalancing of the Left became possible. The first round of voting last spring gave the Socialists 20.3 percent of the vote and the CP 21.25 percent.

The non-Communist leftists (SP and Left radicals) gathered in the fruits of the alliance policy, especially since the Communists obtained only 21.25 percent as compared with 22.51 percent in 1967. Hence, for the Socialists and the radicals of the Left a gain of 1.4 percent and for the Communists a loss of 1.26 percent, both small in quantity but important as signs of the trend. A section of the leftist electorate, which had either gone to the Communists or taken refuge in abstention, had now gone back to the SP.

It is likely that the SP will now continue this policy of Left electoral alliance for several reasons. The most obvious one is that it has gained from it a certain vigor and renewed youth. The Socialists no longer believe it is

possible in France to carry out a leftist policy based on a Center or Right majority. In Germany the absence of an organized CP makes it possible for Willy Brandt to pursue a Center-Left policy on his own, but that course is not open to the French SP. It was when they were practicing such a policy that the French Socialists committed their worst errors, with their leaders, Guy Mollet and Robert Lacoste, in charge of the Algerian repression. This scandal they do not wish to repeat.

So far, the SP has profited most from the policy of alliance. It is now represented in the National Assembly by 89 deputies. To these must be added 12 Left radicals with whom they form a group, plus the 3 of the Left-socialist PSU (Parti Socialiste Unifié), which brings the number of non-Communist Left deputies to 104.

Two kinds of questions now arise. First, there seems to be beginning some fresh thought in the ranks of the democratic Left. The SP is being influenced by the CFDT (the Christian trade union movement) which continues to grow, and by some younger recruits who have come from other leftist groups or from the PSU. This influence takes the form of discus-

sions about the "self-managing socialism" favored by the CFDT, as opposed to the authoritarian and centralized views of the CGT, the Communist-led unions. For perhaps the first time in 50 years, one feels that there is now taking place a certain amount of genuine political reflection in the Socialist milieu of France.

The second question has to do with the "sincerity" of the Communists. Is the policy of electoral alliance an attempt to repeat the experience of the popular democracies, that is, to destroy the SP? Or has the CP "changed" and is it henceforth ready to play by the democratic rules? It seems to me that the only answer one can give to such a question is that of Mitterand. His role, he has said, is not to assure himself that the intentions of the CP are indeed those that it affirms, but to ensure that the CP has no choice but to act along such lines.

Having said this, any prophecy about the future of the French Left would be imprudent. To a great extent, the future rests on the attitude of the Communists and the analysis they make of the situation. As for the Socialists and their allies, their hope from now on, after having redressed the balance of forces on the Left, is to unbalance it—to their advantage. □

Mark Kelman

The Social Costs of Inequality

For most radicals, the problem of poverty and the problem of inequality have been connected. Whether they had a theory of the exploitation of the working class or a gut sense that price-gougers and sweat-shop operators stole the bread of the poor, radicals have long felt that many were badly off *because* a few were so well off. This view has for some time been under attack, with the result that the issue of equality has also seemed to fade.

According to neoclassical economics and its philosophical derivatives, inequality as such is acceptable, as long as it also serves to raise the level of those at the bottom. All manner of inequality-producing economic arrangements are justified by this presumption, from incentive bonuses to entrepreneurial profits to interest on capital. More immediately, such policies as investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation, though clearly most beneficial to those at the top, are lauded because they lead to economic growth which, in turn, may raise the real income levels of the poorest members of society.

The neoclassicists also attack the goal of equality by hexing it with their worst curse: it is *inefficient*. If increasing inequality raises the Gross National Product, they say, the lot of even the poorest can then be improved by some redistributive taxation. All but the most rabidly Ayn Randist disciples urge that the government establish a "negative income tax" program to share some of the copiously growing income with the impoverished; but they demand that the rates for the rich not have a disincentive effect that would increase

equality at the cost of lower total national income.

Radicals have failed to mount an adequate counterattack on either of the two key assumptions the neoclassicists make. (1) Are the "economic incentives" really necessary for overall economic growth—or are the institutions inegalitarian and hierarchical merely to maximize the income of the elite? (2) Does the *well-being* of the poor improve in proportion to their changing real income if the rich get disproportionately richer—or does *inequality itself* hurt the poor?

This essay will concentrate on the second of these questions, presuming, solely for the sake of argument, that "economic incentives" are necessary to growth. It will argue against the proposition that growing inequality is perfectly acceptable as long as the real income of the poorest members of society is increased.

In all fairness, neoclassicists do concede that there are some costs to inequality per se. Consumption, it is acknowledged, has externalities or neighborhood effects. If you and I both consume more goods but I continue to consume less than you, I may feel no better off. A Winter '72 *Public Interest* article, "Does Money Buy Happiness?," confirmed this bit of economic theory. Although the *relatively* well off seem to express satisfaction in all manner of public opinion polls and psychological tests, there seems to be no evidence that people get happier as a society gets richer or that people were happier in richer societies than in poorer ones. In other words, merely raising everyone's in-

come level does not change anyone's satisfaction with his economic lot.

Economists often explain this "neighborhood effect" in a most unflattering way: a textbook example is that a poor person with a black-and-white television set still feels deprived because he knows there are color television sets around. But this "envy" explanation is not at all adequate. For a start, in purely economic terms, different infrastructures inflate the needs of the poor in increasingly rich societies so that those left out of growth are directly hurt. With no stream nearby, a washing machine becomes a necessity. Dispersed job markets make expensive transportation part of the production cost for the poor worker who requires it for work. More important, social relations and structures in poor societies may make perfectly acceptable certain activities that would be a burden in a rich society. For instance, milling grain or weaving clothes may not be a *task* for an Indian peasant; for the "richer" yet relatively more deprived ghetto-dwelling American, a lack of money to buy processed food or clothes off the rack is quite a deprivation since making these items would scarcely fit into an urban culture.

Some neoclassicists would also concede that there are sociopolitical costs to inequality as such. Deferential behavior, and an associated dehumanization and loss of self-esteem, clearly arises from discrepancies in economic position rather than from a lack of goods or from poverty. Antidemocratic political corruption grows out of the existence of inequality: both offering and accepting bribery is based on the expectation of becoming *better off* than your neighbors, not just "well off."

But I am most interested here in pursuing a point that is vehemently denied in neoclassical theory: *that a real growth in income for the poor may not even enable them to obtain more of some of the most essential goods if there is a concurrent increase in income inequality.* The poor will obviously be able to get more of some services and

goods (that is, after all, what a rise in real income means), but they may not get more of all kinds of goods, and those goods from which they are excluded may be among the most important.

What is economic growth? It is a product of increases in hours worked and in productivity, an increase in the output of tangible goods and services. If we say that people in the poorest class have experienced a real income growth from, say, \$1,000 to \$2,000 a year, we mean that they can consume twice as many goods of identical quality or twice as many hours of equally efficient service.

For ordinary items like food, the process by which economic growth leads to the procurement of goods can be described quite simply: with their additional income, people go to the store to buy food. Since there is only a given, fixed amount of food in the stores at a single point in time, they will bid up the price on this existing stock of food. This increase in price will make food production unusually profitable and divert some of the society's resources into the production of food until its price drops down again to the lowest possible cost of production (including a "normal" rate of profit).

But for certain goods this process could not occur. For example, unique goods, like an authentic signed Rembrandt, are in completely inelastic supply. Assume at Time I that there are two art lovers earning \$1,000 a year, one (X) willing to spend his total income on the Rembrandt, the other (Y) willing to spend half. The wheels of technical progress spin and, at Time II, each man finds himself with an income of \$3,000. Man Y surmises that this income should give him his Rembrandt plus more clothes for his family. But there is still only one Rembrandt, and he is still outbid. More clothes, yes, but no more Rembrandts.

For goods in totally inelastic supply, price is not fixed by supply cost, even in the long run; it is fixed by demand. Ordinarily, if

five items costing \$1 each are offered at Time I and there are five buyers willing to pay \$10 (as well as a sixth willing to pay \$9.99), the price will be \$10, but production will increase immediately till demand = supply = cost, perhaps when there are 50 buyers and the 50th buyer is willing to pay only \$1. If the supply is fixed at five, though, the price will remain at \$10; it will remain as far above cost as the demand price for the number of available goods.

If we assume, just for argument now, that there is some good G in fixed supply which poor people are willing to spend a very large proportion of their income for, their ability to obtain the good depends upon the *relative* income (and preferences) of the richest class. If the poor cannot get such a good, their "income" is devalued; it is as if we were given \$10,000 but allowed to spend it only in a store selling bubble gum. We could certainly get a lot, but we couldn't get very much *satisfaction*.

Assume there have been two shipwrecks, each with 1,000 people and one doctor who can give 50 hours of medical care, to be distributed by economic criteria alone, in the week before the rescue ship comes. In one shipwreck, 90 percent of the victims have the same amount of money, say \$1,000, and 10 percent have \$1,999. The 100 most injured are willing to give all their money for treatment, the next 800 are willing to give 50 percent, and the last 100, who are slightly wounded, 10 percent. The doctor will treat the 100 most wounded for one half hour each for a fee of \$1,000 per person. In the second shipwreck, 90 percent of the passengers have \$2,000, 10 percent have \$50,000. Assuming injury is distributed randomly so that 90 of the most injured are relatively poor, the richest 10 percent will still be the only ones treated since they will all outbid even those "poor" willing to spend 100 percent of their income. Even the slightly wounded will offer \$5,000 for the doctor's time. Though the "poor" are richer in the second shipwreck, they are less able to obtain a good in fixed supply.

In the extreme form I have presented, only totally nonhomogeneous collectors' items and Veblenesque goods (those whose rarity is the basis of their value) would be considered in completely inelastic supply, and these are hardly very important cases. But the fact is that of the four basic consumption items—housing, medical care, clothing and food—the first two partake, each in its own way, of this supply inflexibility, *so that mass access to them is determined by the degree of inequality rather than the real levels of income*. I will draw the case in detail for medical care, and suggest outlines for a similar case in the housing and education markets.

III

No serious observer could claim that the supply of medical care is constant. Supply can be raised through an increase in the number of doctors, longer working hours for current practitioners, and wider use of para-professionals. While there is a considerable time lag in the first and most vital of these methods, because of the long training period involved (if one wanted to double the total supply of physicians by 1990, one would now have to increase the size of medical-school entering classes by 400 percent) there is every reason to believe that, on the supply side, the medical market is relatively "normal," i.e., entry is induced by excess profits.

The problem, though, is that demand is not independent of supply. With any conceivable level of output expansion, demand will expand to exceed it. The ambiguous nature of health and the uncertain delivery of medical care create a situation akin to permanent excess demand, a situation requiring rationing. When demand exceeds supply, two rationing systems are possible in the market. In an egalitarian society, the good is rationed according to a preference based on need, i.e., the severity of the disease. In the inegalitarian society, price is set by the price the rich can pay. Since everyone is willing to spend high portions of her or his income to obtain medical care, a widening

spread of income will simply exclude the bottom portions of society from private medical care. If, as I think is the case, the demand for medical services by the rich is limitless within conceivable supply constraints, an attempt by the poor to procure medical care by raising the proportion of their income they are willing to spend on medical care will merely cause further price inflation and higher doctor's incomes for the rich will simply up their bids to retain their share of medical care. Such a process has gone on in all "free medical markets": in the late 1960s, America and Canada spent 8.2 and 9.7 percent respectively of GNP on health care, compared to 6 and 7.1 percent for nonmarket Britain and Sweden. Yet the poor received, according to all measures, far better medical care in the latter two countries.

For an ordinary good, demand functions are discrete and independent, i.e., one knows pretty well what one wants and what price one is willing to pay for it before one knows whether it is available at that price. Medical care is not like that at all, for two main reasons.

First, the demand for medical care is based more on "treatability," a supply factor, than on "disease." In some important sense, people are always sick. The average lower-middle-class male between the age of 20 and 45 experiences over a 20-year period approximately one life-endangering illness, 20 disabling illnesses, 200 nondisabling illnesses, and 1,000 symptomatic episodes: an average of one new episode every six days. When one gets older, it gets worse: as the body ages and chronic disease arises, there is hardly a moment when every part of the body feels perfectly fine. The decision to see a doctor, then, is based in large part on a judgment of his potential effectiveness. People live with arthritis, backache, coughs, allergies because there is not much that can be done for them, just as they once lived with infectious diseases, tuberculosis, etc. And though people *pay* for a great deal of medical care for certain kinds of cancer, heart disease,

and nerve disorders, they're not buying anything but reassurance that all was done that could be.

Second, the patient has next to no idea what it is that he wants, in terms of product. While he would like to feel better, the patient has no idea what procedure should be employed. If the doctor says surgery, it is surgery. "Shopping around" is not very relevant in medical practice: it is far too expensive, time-consuming, and often impossible to elicit a number of opinions—besides, the consumer couldn't judge among them anyway. Even if you do look around, most doctors, as a result, tell you to do what *your* doctor says, because the state of medical technology is generally so uncertain that only missionaries and fanatics are particularly sure of their own opinion in complex or chronic cases.

THE SUPPLIERS' MARKET response to this uncertain demand is simple: establish practices where there are rich people and sell them as much medical care as you care to provide. The pattern of the medical market in the United States today fits this model appallingly well:

- According to the 1970 Census, egalitarian Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) have a higher median family income than inequalitarian ones (\$10,800 to \$10,500), but in 44 of 59 cases,* above-median egalitarianism is associated with below-median physician supply (doctors per 100,000 population) and below-median egalitarianism with above-median physician supply. The four poorest, extremely inequalitarian SMSAs (Albuquerque, Oklahoma City, Phoenix, and Tacoma), all with family incomes averaging under \$10,000 a year, have a median of 179.7 physicians per 100,000 people, compared to 111.4 for the eight richest egalitarian SMSAs, all with median

* All SMSA data exclude Southern SMSAs, which are universally far more inequalitarian, so I am always comparing Northern SMSAs to one another.

incomes over \$11,000. Only 2 of 13 observations cross medians. While there is the mediating factor that the inequalitarian SMSAs are to some degree "regional" centers or sites of medical schools, the explanation seems insufficient: Detroit and Toledo, which fit the same bill but which are egalitarian, have 138.6 and 134.9 doctors per 100,000 people respectively. The mechanism by which doctors locate in areas where there are rich people to fill their practices is probably not direct: med-school graduates hardly check Gini indices of income equality. But research grants, expensive machinery at hospitals, and "nice" neighborhoods where doctors live are all more likely to be found in inequalitarian SMSAs.

Within SMSAs as well, doctors will choose to go where the rich are: some ghetto areas of New York have less than 10 doctors per 100,000 people while the SMSA as a whole has well over 200.

Once they are set up in rich areas, there is no reason to believe they cannot fill their time. The rich simply learn to go to the doctor for symptoms the poor would ignore. A relatively old but dependable study of an upstate New York city, Earl Koos's *The Health of Regionville*, divided the population into three socioeconomic classes and asked respondents which of a list of symptoms should be called to the attention of a doctor. Only two symptoms were checked as needing attention by less than 75 percent of Class I respondents. Class III respondents checked ten items less than 25 percent of the time and only three symptoms, all related to unexplained bleeding, were checked by more than half of the respondents.

While no good figures for prices or hours worked are available by neighborhoods, simple observation indicates that doctors in Great Neck or White Plains or Newton have no trouble filling their appointment books. Both prices and utilization are extremely high though the supply of physicians in these towns is many, many times above any conceivable national level. A check of the tele-

phone directory indicates that there are roughly 750 physicians per 100,000 inhabitants in Great Neck, more than five times the national average.

- The real income of the American poor has shot up since the Depression, yet there seems to be little reason to believe that their access to medical care has increased significantly. While the number of physicians has doubled since 1931, the absolute number engaged in primary care has *declined*. In 1931, fewer than 20 percent of physicians were engaged in specialty care; by 1967, the figure was 61 percent. What occurred was that the expansion of medical-care supply resulted not so much in an expansion of patient visits as in an expansion of the "quality" of care—i.e., of costliness of care for the rich. Specialists generally provide high-cost, very high-price medical care for more uncertain diseases, while primary care tends to handle the more certain, cost-effective areas of medicine: antibiotics for infection, prenatal checkups for expectant mothers, treatment of injuries. In much the same way, hospitals have done very little to improve the quality of their community services—a 1970 *New England Journal of Medicine* study showed that emergency-room care was effective in only 27 percent of cases—while they have overinvested in fancy, technologically advanced machines. 30 percent of the hospitals equipped to do closed heart surgery had *no* such cases in the year they were studied by the President's Commission on Heart Disease, Cancer, and Stroke.

- Doctors, taking advantage of consumer ignorance and uncertainty, sell their particular service whether it is needed or not. A 1965 study by the Kansas Blue Cross Association found that while populations were homogeneous there were three- to four-fold variations in surgical rates for the population of different areas, because there were large differences in the number of surgeons and hospital beds in the different regions.

Similarly, for 23 hospital regions in New York State, the urban population's appendectomy rate was 8.11 per 1,000, the rural population's 3.44 per 1,000. The corresponding mortality rates were 5.26 for the urban population and 3.94 for the rural! Tonsillectomies, costing \$150 million and 300 lives a year, are generally considered worthless. Estimates that one-third of hysterectomies are completely unnecessary prompt the common comment that the indications for the operation are two children and \$400.

The vast overprescription of antibiotics that is frequently pointed to also reflects the fact that doctors feel they've got to give something to their many patients who come "not feeling well," but who have untreatable virus infections. Likewise, the prescription of skin creams and antibiotics for acne by dermatologists, of various combinations of ups and downs for imprecisely diagnosed depression, and the ungodly speed with which a stomach ache is greeted with a GI series are all basically attempts to delude the rich into thinking that their untreatable diseases are being attended to. It's hardly fraud: the doctors are indeed doing the best they can in most cases. And, on the part of the patients, it's not stupidity but reasonable risk-taking. If you've got a lot of money and you're sick, trying anything is not always a bad idea.

The result of a market distribution of medical care in an inegalitarian setting is very simple: the poor can try to spend more of their income for medical services, but the rich will still get a disproportionate share of the doctors. Not only can they give the doctors more money (for their vastly higher relative incomes permit them to outbid the poor even when they are willing to give only small portions of their income for treatment, i.e., when the ailment is particularly trivial); but their neighborhoods are far more pleasant places for doctors who themselves are generally upper-middle-class in background. In a permanent excess demand market rural and ghetto areas simply cannot attract doctors; part of an administered supply is in-

credible discretion over location by the suppliers.

Unless accompanied by a decline in inequality, a growth in real income for the poor would not necessarily procure more medical care for them: doctors would simply spend more time treating more abstruse, hopeless, or imaginary illnesses in more technically sophisticated ways in the enriched pockets of wealth.

IV
Supply inelasticity is a problem in other important markets as well. Housing supply is extremely inelastic in the short run as leases preclude immediate unit subdivision and zoning laws and small landholders unwilling to sell hold up density changes by blocking multiple dwellings. Furthermore, construction itself is quite time-consuming. In addition, housing supply expansion is dependent upon two key factors outside the housing market itself: credit rates and transport and infrastructure development. Even in the long run, housing is dependent on "locations" that are intrinsically somewhat scarce.

While space limitations preclude a full detailing of the process, suffice it to say that inelasticity has roughly the same results in housing as were outlined in the case of the unique Rembrandt: i.e., the relatively poor get squeezed out even if they get richer. The stock of housing stays fixed even after the relatively rich bid up the price to maintain "their" space in times of population growth, and the poor have to squeeze together to match the bids of the rich for the remaining space.

Of the 62 Northern SMSAs that I checked, 34 diverged considerably from the median equality figures. All indications are that the presence of an unusually rich class does dramatically increase the *price* of housing as the relatively rich bid to hold on to housing for themselves and the poor must match their bids. In the 17 most inegalitarian SMSAs, the median value (price) of housing was 1.80 times the median family income (the

average was 1.85) while in the 17 most egalitarian SMSAs, the median was 1.48 and the average 1.54. Only one egalitarian SMSA had as high a housing value/income ratio as the median inequalitarian SMSA.

While there is no perfect measure of the cost of building housing, permit valuations are fairly good since they account for land and construction costs. According to the basic model I drew, price should most exceed cost in the inequalitarian SMSAs since the relatively rich set the price for housing demand with their bids on the limited supply good. This is in fact the case: the median ratio of housing value (price) to permit valuations (cost) is 1.43 for inequalitarian SMSAs and 1.08 for the egalitarian ones.

Extreme overcrowding, too, is related to inequality rather than levels of income, just as would be expected from my model. Seven of the 62 SMSAs I observed have greater than median equality and very low (under \$10,000 a year median) family income. The median proportion of units with more than one person per room in these SMSAs is 6.2 percent, the average 6.8. Of our 17 extremely inequalitarian SMSAs, 11 have median incomes over \$10,800, yet their median proportion of units with more than one person per room was far higher, 6.9 (the average was 8!). Similarly, rich egalitarian SMSAs have a 6.6 median and an average of 6.8—the poor inequalitarian SMSAs have a 6.9 median and a 7.8 average.

One might imagine that the general preference for housing is greater in the inequalitarian SMSAs and that the poor ratios of housing price to income and to cost are merely based on higher general demand rather than higher inequality and the associated housing bids of the relatively rich. This is simply not true, though: the median vacancy rate in the egalitarian SMSAs is 1.26 percent of units compared to 1.41 in the inequalitarian SMSAs. Similarly, the higher population growth that characterizes the more inequalitarian SMSAs does not explain their poor performance. The five fastest

growing of the 17 egalitarian SMSAs all grew faster in the 1960s than the five slowest inequalitarian ones; nonetheless, the ratio of housing price to median family income is far lower (1.59 to 1.9) and there is overlap in only one of ten cases. Similarly, the median price-to-cost ratio in the fast-growing egalitarian SMSAs is 1.35 compared to 1.48 in the slow-growing inequalitarian ones.

In the case of education, I will be even sketchier. If we assume that education is an accreditation rather than a training process—i.e., if we assume that one needs a college degree not to be able to handle a businessman's job but to distinguish oneself from the multitude with mere high school degrees—then a growth of real income will not increase the poor's chance of getting the real output of schooling accreditation. They can buy *more* years of schooling as their incomes rise but never so many as the relatively rich who, in an increasingly inequalitarian regime, continuously have even more to spend. Equality of opportunity, then, depends on equality of condition as well as the elimination of poverty.

THE FACT that obtaining medical care, housing, and education requires not only a change in real income levels but a narrowing of inequality has many implications.

Most immediately, recognizing that America is an inequalitarian society, it requires us to abandon any "flat grants" strategy of dealing with poverty. The mainstream of economic thinking holds firmly to the notion that the only poverty program we need is a negative income tax. If we give the poor, some money, they'll get what they want. This position is consistent with a fairly justified faith in consumer choice and a thoroughly foolish faith in the perfection of markets.

Since none of the "flat grants" people want to give the poor enough of rich folks' money to change the basic shape of the income-distribution curve, their efforts will be largely useless in getting the poor shelter, medical care, or economically rewarding edu-

cation. What will occur, instead, is that the poor will obtain more of those goods that are in elastic supply and the visible paradoxes of American poverty will simply intensify: dilapidated units will have refrigerators and color TVs and the poor mother dying in childbirth because she never had a prenatal checkup will be buried in rather nice clothes.

What is needed (short that is, of what is really needed, a restructuring of all property relations such that income is distributed more equally), is that government supersede the market and provide medical care, housing, and education according to nonmarket criteria.

The implications of this article, though, go much further than simply attacking the rapidly growing school of anti-interventionists, as important a task as that is.

The traditional place of inegalitarian incentives in economic theory must be called into question. The trade-offs between growth and equality must be weighted more toward equality, for the welfare cost of growing inequality may well outweigh the gain of higher productivity. Since the poor spend a higher proportion of their income on vital goods than do the rich, any change that raises

their relative price hurts them (in much the same way as the superrich would be better off if the price of yachts dropped relative to bread, even if their income stayed the same). Confiscatory taxation at the top, then, would probably have good effects even if the money were burned rather than spent on meaningful social programs. In underdeveloped societies particularly, the use of vastly inegalitarian development schemes such as land consolidation must be looked at with great suspicion: not only will access to the many supply-inflexible goods in such societies be rationed in a more skewed direction but the destruction of the positive cultural underpinnings implicit in economic restructuring will be tremendously harmful. If development has very uneven economic benefits, it may well be destructive.

Altogether, when one considers the social costs of inequality and an inegalitarian economic system—in terms of alienation of the lower classes from the society at large, crass materialism, and cut-throat competitiveness—and then realizes that its immediate *economic* costs are quite substantial as well, a commitment to egalitarianism becomes an urgent commitment. □

Robert Lekachman

The Conservative Drift in Modern Economics

American intellectual conservatism, as Joseph Epstein observed in this journal's last issue, has become a tendency to be interpreted as well as resisted by radicals. Our contemporary conservatives, like their English predecessors, are skeptical about human behavior and disposed to doubt that social and economic arrangements are susceptible to drastic improvement. With considerable ingenuity, conservative social scientists have argued that government intervention out of benevolent motive into free market processes usually generates unexpectedly malevolent consequences. Thus the conservatives judge most of the social experiments of the 1960s to be failures, less because of fraud and maladministration, and more because New Frontiersmen and Great Societarians were foolishly utopian in their expectations and unwisely Rousseauist in their view of the possibilities of human perfectibility.

The relationship of economists to this intellectual trend is an odd one. The Chicago economists, led by Milton Friedman and George Stigler, have long preached a free market message as legitimate heirs to Henry Simons and Frank Knight who two generations ago created the Chicago tradition. Possibly the most creative economist of his time (it is a professional scandal that a Nobel prize has not yet come his way), Friedman has proposed education vouchers and a volunteer army, measures supported by the Nixon administration, as well as a negative income tax which surfaced as the central element of the now defunct Family Assistance Plan.

In their profession, the Chicago school is a minority, albeit an increasingly influential one. What of the mainstream professionals, the Keynesians and post-Keynesians who have dominated the journals and the graduate departments and staffed Washington agencies? What have they been up to? Let me recall two events. In 1972, the portion of a major Brookings Institution study of the federal budget, which attracted most attention,¹ was a relatively brief evaluation of manpower training, compensatory education, health care, and similar Great Society initiatives. The volume's senior author, Charles Schultze, had been Budget director during the Johnson years and his coauthors had also occupied Great Society posts. Here they emphasized the difficulties inherent in the measurement of the consequences of social policies, the scanty information available to the designers of such policies, and the consequent urgency of more rational selection of priorities. Cautious experiment, accompanied by constant evaluation, is much preferable to the funding either of programs yielding small results or of large untested new ventures. Coming from a Democratic government in exile such as the Brookings economists, this qualified but unmistakable concession of past error has been of considerable intellectual assistance to the Nixon administration, which for its own reasons has harbored deep resentments against community action, legal ser-

¹ *Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget*, by Charles L. Schultze, Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin, and Nancy H. Teeters (Washington, D.C.: Brookings).

vices, subsidized housing, job training, and other subverters of the work ethic.

The second event is more recent. On January 11, 1973, President Nixon announced the end of the Administration's moderately successful experiment with Phase II wage-price controls and their replacement by a vaguely designed and even more vaguely described set of Phase III controls. The immediate reaction of Walter Heller, Gardner Ackley, and Arthur Okun—three liberal economists who had served during the eight Kennedy-Johnson years as chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers—was applause for the President's initiative. On January 13 the *New York Times* headlined their response: "3 Democratic Economists Back Phase 3 Structure and Principles." The sub-head noted that "Heller, Ackley and Okun are joined by Dr. Burns, Who Voices Full Support." Arthur Burns of course is the impeccably conservative economist at the head of the Federal Reserve System. Moderate economists were of similar opinions. Henry Wallich, once on the Eisenhower CEA, declared that "In the long run, the fewer controls the better, and I applaud them for deciding that the long run is now." After all these cheerful statements, stock market, currency market, and corporate price behavior were, to write temperately, distressing. A new run on the American dollar, apparently led by American multinational firms and banks, caused a second devaluation. Food prices surged upward. Industrial materials began to ascend at annual rates in excess of 12 percent. George Meany rumbled before Congress that labor in its impending negotiations would demand full protection against higher prices. By the end of March in a speech that mingled Vietnam and food prices ("beef with honor" in Mary McGrory's apt words), the President reluctantly announced retail and wholesale freezes on the price of beef, pork, veal, and lamb.

LIKE the Brookings budget survey, this story is exemplary not so much as another dis-

closure of the inadequacies of eminent economists, in this instance as forecasters (though the *Times* headlines certainly do make that point), but as an excellent insight into the economic cast of mind. What led the economists astray was not the absence of native wit, but the presence of good graduate-school training. The graduate schools teach new technique but old wisdom. As far in the past as 1848, John Stuart Mill insisted that "only through the principle of competition has political economy any pretension to the character of a science." In his period Mill was far from a conservative. On the contrary, he argued in favor of steeply progressive taxes on inheritances, identified the virtues of zero economic growth, and seriously questioned the impact upon factory workers of production organized purely in the interest of maximum profit. Through thick and thin, however, Mill clung to the merits of market rivalry and the importance of preserving competitive incentives. Thus it has always been. In our day, George Stigler has praised the education of young economists in these terms:

He is drilled in the problems of *all* economic systems and in the methods by which a price system solves these problems. It becomes impossible for him to believe that men of good will can by their individual actions stem inflation, or that it is possible to impose changes in any one market or industry without causing problems in other markets or industries. . . . He cannot believe that a change in the *form* of social organization will eliminate basic economic problems.

Their training, concluded Stigler with approval, transforms economists as social scientists into conservatives. As amateur politicians and apprentice campaign strategists, economists naturally but *nonprofessionally* advocate all manner of preferences for large social change. It was an economist who invented McGovern's demogrant. Nevertheless, economists, when they inspect wages, prices, budgets, and interest rates, perceive complexity and uncertainty. Always they fear the

general equilibrium dislocations which may attend the best-intentioned tinkering with any part of the system. Thus economists of all stripes are skeptical of economic controls: they distort market reactions and interfere with the delicate competition of sellers for customer favor and employees for jobs. The sooner the controls come off, if, mistakenly, they are applied, the better.

THIS EMPHASIS upon markets explains Brookings uneasiness about recent social reform. Although liberal economists favor various government interventions in the interest of the poor, black, and otherwise vulnerable, they are necessarily suspicious of the quality of government action simply because market tests do not typically apply. How can the analyst evaluate alternative arrangements for medical care, pre-school education, urban renovation, manpower training, and so on in the absence of market prices and free choice among competing products by the customers or their parents?

Such skepticism is reinforced by the professional aspiration to avoid value judgments (= nonmarket conclusions uttered by human beings). A fair example is the computation of Gross National Product and the other national income measures. The 1973 edition of Samuelson's *Economics* defines Gross National Product "as the sum of final products such as consumption goods and gross investment." This is to say, the statisticians in principle simply add up the price tags on consumer goods, hours of medical and legal consultation, new machines and structures, and increases in business inventories. They nobly refrain from judgment on the biological or social merits of the items which enter into the grand total. Comparisons of GNP from one year to the next do not, for example, ask how the new goods and services are distributed among rich, poor, and middling families. From a theoretical standpoint, such a question is irrelevant because economists now believe that there is nothing "scientific" they can say about the psychic enjoyments

of different persons. Interpersonal comparisons are *verboden!*

In modern times economists have liberated themselves from the durable Benthamite proposition that as vessels of pleasure and pain human beings are approximately equal and the further postulate that satisfaction diminishes as the quantity of possessions and income rises. As late as the 1920s, A. C. Pigou, Alfred Marshall's Cambridge successor, was arguing on strictly Benthamite grounds that economic changes that promoted income equality also increased economic welfare. A dollar taken from a rich man hurts him less than a dollar removed from a poor man and, by easy extension, a dollar more for a man who starts with only a few implies a quantity of joy greater than the pain endured by the millionaire who surrenders that dollar. But if, as contemporary economists insist, no scientific method exists for comparing the feelings of different people, then there can be no scientific demonstration that one distribution of income and wealth is better (or worse) than any other distribution. Lester Thurow's brilliant *Public Interest* (Spring 1973) essay "Toward a Definition of Economic Justice" demonstrates how hard it is for an excellent technician of egalitarian disposition to harmonize technique and ethical principle. Rather painfully, Thurow does so in the course of arguing that consistent application of free market principles necessitates less inequalitarian distribution of income. Economists were in a stronger polemical posture when their technique was less intricate and their distributive principles were more boldly avowed.

Attachment to market models and reluctance to render ethical judgments entails important consequences. Economists cannot as professionals unite in support of (or opposition to) any set of arrangements for the distribution of income and wealth. But in much better professional conscience, they can join hands on behalf of measures that promote freer markets and more efficient use of human and natural resources. Almost all

economists are free traders. With diminishing fervor, they advocate antitrust and open access to crafts and professions. As men of practical policy whose central professional value is efficient operation of the economy, economists can readily urge budgetary and monetary initiatives by Congress and the President which promote high rates of growth and full employment of men and material resources. Even here a caveat ought to be uttered. Excessive enthusiasm on the path to full employment often entails inflation which, for economists, may damage efficiency as much, though differently, as unemployment. The Phillips curve, named in honor of its English inventor, explicitly relates rates of unemployment and price rise. To economists, the apparatus conveys the message that painful trade-offs, either of price stability or employment, must be made.

The last spell of euphoria on the part of economists about the state of their discipline occurred in the wake of successful national pursuit of high growth and employment. The 1964 tax, advocated by Heller, Tobin, Okun, Ackley, and their colleagues, was remarkably successful as a tool of economic stimulation. In his March 1966 Harvard Godkin lectures, Walter Heller uttered these proud words:

Economics has come of age in the 1960s. Two presidents have recognized and drawn on modern economics as a source of national strength and Presidential power. Their willingness to use, for the first time, the full range of modern economic tools underlies the unbroken U.S. expansion since early 1961—an expansion that in its first five years created over 7 million new jobs, doubled profits, increased the nation's real output by a third, and closed the \$50-billion gap between actual and potential production that plagued the American economy in 1961.

Moreover, achievement was intellectual as well as material:

Together with the gradual closing of that huge production gap has come—part as cause, part as consequence—a gradual, then rapid, narrowing of the intellectual gap be-

tween professional economists and decision-makers. The paralyzing grip of economic myth and false fears on policy has been loosened.

Heller's eulogy was intoned at just about the last date when an economist could point with plausible pride to a pleasing combination of high employment, steady growth, and reasonably well-behaved prices. Lyndon Johnson's ill-fated attempt to support simultaneously an ever bigger war and an increasingly expensive set of social programs overheated the economy and generated an inflation that 1973, seven years after its inception, has not yet been tamed.

It would have been reasonable to anticipate from the Nixon administration some disgust with the economists aroused by both their failures and their "successes." For if Walter Heller accurately praised the profession for its role in the mid-1960s, then critics had an equal warrant to complain of the meek fashion in which Ackley, Okun, and Schultz administered an inflationary regime from 1966 through 1968. Here quotation marks surround successes because these were the social programs that tax cuts, rapid economic growth, and larger tax collections had made possible. These were also on the whole measures the President disliked or detested. If economists were implicated in the design of the War on Poverty, Model Cities, and other disturbers of the status quo, so much the worse for them and their colleagues. Probably no student of Mr. Nixon's political history would have been startled if he had staffed his official family with the businessmen and accountants who were so prominent in the Eisenhower regime.

Instead the President surrounded himself at least as closely as his Democratic predecessors with economists in positions of prominence, among them George Schultz, successively secretary of Labor, director of the vital Office of Management and Budget, and in the second Nixon administration simul-

taneously secretary of the Treasury, White House counselor, and chairman of the Cost of Living Council; Herbert Stein who in 1973 began his fifth year as member and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; Arthur F. Burns, the first economist to head the Federal Reserve System; and James Schlesinger, who moved as chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission to the directorship of the Central Intelligence Agency. By sympathy, association, and training, these men are conservative. Schultz and Stein are members in good standing of the Chicago free market cult. Schlesinger is a veteran of Rand systems analysis. The independent Arthur Burns venerates the work ethic, hates to spend public money, and evinces more sympathy for the ideas of his old friend Milton Friedman than chairmen of the Federal Reserve have displayed in the past.

Indeed examined critically even the economists' 1964 tax cut triumph says as much about the profession's conservative hierarchy of values as about the capacity of economic analysis to promote social improvement. Within the Kennedy administration, the argument about how best to stimulate a sluggish economy centered on the relative merits of lower taxes and larger social spending. From New Delhi, Galbraith urgently reiterated the message of his *Affluent Society*—the private sector is bloated and the public sector starved. Among economists, Galbraith is generally held to be an excellent polemicist and a superior writer but a poor technician. Within the New Frontier certainly it was tax reduction fervently advocated by Walter Heller which won the President's favor. Kennedy's decision in late 1962 to propose a package of tax reforms and tax reductions implied postponement at best of new public spending initiatives and narrowing of the revenue sources of such programs in the future. Choice of tax reduction as the instrument of business expansion has had the fiscal consequence of reducing the 1973 tax receipts of the federal government by approximately \$45 billion—if the 1962 rates

were still in force. At the same time, regressive social security payroll levies have risen \$40 billion. As a direct result of policies advocated or accepted by liberal economists and their Congressional allies, poor people pay more and their affluent neighbors less. Along the way, the tax reforms have been repeatedly jettisoned.

Let it be said yet again that Walter Heller, Arthur Okun, and Gardner Ackley are sincere friends of the poor, black, and deprived. They are on public record in favor of progressive taxation, loophole closing, and a wide variety of federal interventions on behalf of the needy. Okun reacted to President Nixon's plan to dismantle some 115 categorical grant programs in the 1974 budget with the comment that it was "impeccable economic and intolerable social policy." How then did these economists and their colleagues find themselves in such disrepair that President Nixon could plausibly advance budget limitations (mostly created by tax cuts sponsored by liberal economists) as an excuse for reducing social expenditures? Why were the liberal tools—full-employment budgeting and revenue-sharing so readily converted into conservative weapons?

Much of the answer is to be found in standard economic ideology. I noted earlier that economists find most attractive the "scientific" objectives of efficiency, growth, and free choice. Although some economists are egalitarians, still others uneasy about GNP increase as an unequivocal community boon, and probably a substantial majority (of Americans in general as well as economists) distressed by the persistence of poverty amid general plenty, economic science fails to justify these generous sentiments. Since conventional wisdom holds there is no scientific way to compare the satisfactions of different people, it is as possible that economic welfare will be enlarged by subsidizing Nelson Rockefeller as a Bedford-Stuyvesant welfare mother of five. Again, although economic growth notoriously generates pollution, overcrowding, destruction

of viable ethnic neighborhoods, demolition of architectural landmarks, clogged highways and overpopulated beaches, and assorted emotional distempers attendant on disruptive change, professional economists and national income statisticians have only recently come around to taking the first steps in modifying the national-income accounts to accommodate these malign side-effects of growth.

For as presently computed, the national income measures exaggerate year-to-year improvements in economic welfare because they deliberately avoid judging the consequences of "free" market operations. If businessmen produced only two classes of output—pollutants and antipollutants, Department of Commerce statisticians would routinely total the price tags on the items classified under each rubric and call the result Gross National Product. Although careful statisticians refrain from identifying as synonymous GNP and economic welfare, Presidents, lesser politicians, and ordinary folk inevitably do so interpret annual celebrations of ever-larger GNP. The first serious attempt to cope with the disamenities of growth occurred in 1972! William Nordhaus's and James Tobin's "pioneering study" (the words are Paul Samuelson's) put their objective in these words:

Our adjustments to GNP fall into three general categories: reclassification of GNP expenditures as consumption, investment, and intermediate; imputation for the services of consumer capital, for leisure, and for the product of household work; correction for some of the disamenities of urbanization.²

WHAT an odd subject it is, to be sure, that could ignore until only yesterday leisure trends, the changing significance of work within the home, and the emergence of new disamenities as well as the persistence of old ones! The profession has been equally tardy in its concession of the extent to which pri-

vate entrepreneurs fail fully to "internalize" some of their costs. Paper mills which pour foul odors into the air and foul chemical wastes into adjacent streams have long imposed upon individuals and communities the expense of cleaning themselves, their possessions, and the municipal water supply. As economists now belatedly explain, these costs can readily be shifted back to the polluters ("internalized" according to professional jargon) if Congress and state legislatures compel the polluters to install efficient cleansing devices or purchase expensive licenses to pollute. The receipts from the latter might finance public facilities and compensate individuals for protecting themselves against remaining pollution.

Failure adequately to measure the costs of growth carries with it persistent overestimate both of the extent and the benefits of growth. Even according to their own favored criteria, economists have done badly. It is old doctrine that markets allocate efficiently only when the producers and sellers are engaged in genuine competition, and the pattern of consumer demand accurately mirrors the tastes and preferences of buyers. The American economy departs significantly from both of these structural arrangements. In real life, price competition, at the heart of free market requirements, proceeds, if at all, under a large variety of limitations. The auto industry is paradigmatic of the behavior of the concentrated industries. Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors jostle each other for market shares in ways that do not include the prices they charge their dealers for comparable models, fuel economy, safety, or antipollution.³ The limited actual competition in this market focuses upon style, advertising, and meretricious frivolities of design.

Oligopoly is the dominant style of manufacturing organization, but far from the only

² See "Is Growth Obsolete?" in *Fiftieth Anniversary Colloquium*, National Bureau of Economic Research (New York: Columbia University Press 1972).

³ During the first Nixon administration, the major auto companies entered into a consent decree with a sympathetic Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice which featured a promise to stop colluding to halt the design of better antipollution devices.

limitation upon price competition. Tariffs and quotas limit imports, narrow consumer choice, and raise the prices of rival domestic products. In the construction trades, strong unions limit the entry of new labor. Professional licenses serve much the same function. Patents narrow the ambit of legal rivalry. From the economists's standpoint, each of these market imperfections distorts efficient allocation of resources and generates the wrong answers to the signals given by the customers.

Matters are no better on the buying side of the supply-demand equation. It is again a familiar proposition among economists that market purchases accurately reflect consumer preferences under two conditions: the customers freely express their own desires,⁴ and they bring with them the dollars they have earned by productive effort. If all income were earned, people would be richer or poorer according to the differing estimate free markets make of their skills and talents. Talented performers realize more income and cast more dollar votes when they go to market.

The pretty picture is crucially marred by the reality of inherited wealth. The child of a millionaire has contributed nothing to GNP. Nevertheless, the accident of birth confers many dollar votes upon him. Because the rich are always with us, "free" markets furnish numerous luxuries that consume resources otherwise available for use in the fabrication of necessities and comforts for people of more modest income. The prices of the luxuries are lower and those of the necessities higher because of this resource diversion.

If economists were faithful to their own conclusions, the pursuit of efficiency, growth, and free choice should make the profession partisans of radical change in the central institutions of contemporary capitalism. Economists of all people should be militant anti-

trustees, enemies of national trade unions, foes of occupational licenses and professional credentials, bigoted free traders, and, like Mill, eager by inheritance taxation to diminish the distortions of free markets occasioned by accumulations of inherited wealth. Be it said in their honor that only the Chicago economists have consistently spelled out the full implications of the economists' central valuations.

III
Under the circumstances, the response of establishment economics to concrete issues such as the domestic plans of the second Nixon administration is necessarily limited and peculiarly disembodied. Consider, as a representative example, Dr. Alice M. Rivlin's "A Counter-Budget for Social Progress."⁵ Now at the Brookings Institution, Dr. Rivlin served the Great Society as assistant secretary of Health, Education and Welfare in charge of program evaluation. She identifies "plenty of reason to be outraged by this budget if one believes the Federal Government ought to be substantially increasing, not decreasing, its efforts to improve opportunities for the poor and to increase social services for everyone." She then gives the devil his due: "With some important exceptions, the social programs the President cut were outdated or inequitable or only partially effective."

Unfortunately most lay readers of Dr. Rivlin's highly intelligent argument would be constrained to concede that her second point is more effectively argued than the adverse judgment on the budget thrust contained in her initial point. She has no trouble at all demonstrating that some existing programs lacked equity, others were "unnecessarily costly," and still others poorly designed actually to diminish hunger, improve the delivery of health services, reduce pollution, or alleviate other human ills. Economists know about efficiency.

⁴ Galbraithians, a professional minority, insist that advertising effectively manipulates and distorts the actual preferences of buyers.

⁵ *New York Times Magazine*, April 8, 1973, p. 33 ff.

The "counter-budget" of the title is based less on economic analysis than on a set of political judgments:

... there is general agreement [how can she be sure?] that the solutions should remain within the existing framework of American government. The radical left talks glibly about "overthrowing the system," but never says what would replace it—and the radical left does not have enough political clout to be taken seriously anyway. The old Socialist solution—nationalizing major industries as a means of equalizing incomes—does not attract reformers any more. Socialism isn't considered radical, just quaint. Who thinks any useful social purpose would be served by having the Federal Government running U.S. Steel or General Motors? Nor does one hear serious proposals any more for direct provisions of social services by the Federal Government. A national health service and a national education system once sounded like brave new ideas to reformers; now they sound like unwieldy superbureaucracies.

After eliminating several generations of radical proposals, Dr. Rivlin sketches three strategies which she finds attractive: tax and cash transfers; subsidies to low-income individuals for the purchase of housing, college training, medical insurance, and the like; and grants to localities to enlarge their "capacity to render services."

The drift of this analysis is, according to taste in nomenclature, mildly liberal or mildly conservative. On the Right, Friedmanite structural change is to be avoided. So, at least equally, are the various redistributions of power and wealth that are the staples of radical prescription. In Brookings hands, economics becomes the ally of minute, incremental change. The "system" is realistically accepted. And although Dr. Rivlin, like her colleague Joseph Pechman, has harsh words to say about tax inequity, there is really no reason the beneficiaries of present arrangements should not also claim their rights as leading actors in the system. Economic theory as presently construed by

practical men and women is a poor weapon against the rich.

Accepting the prevailing political climate, mainstream economists concentrate on immediately available possibilities. In a conservative period, when the chances of egalitarian action are low to zero, the economists, whatever their politics, have congenial work to do. Their virtuosity in cost-benefit analysis helps them sort out the weaker from the stronger social initiatives of the recent past, compose endless interpretations of the successes (few) and the failures (many) of job training, compensatory education, housing subsidies, and community action, and accept, when opportunity knocks, employment in the citadels of the Nixon administration.

No more than conservatives should liberals and radicals applaud inefficiency or shut their eyes to the waste of public funds. The point, however, is by now familiar; efficiency is almost the only scientific value that economists are educated to identify. As Stigler rightly maintained, by the time a young economist has been thoroughly socialized en route to his doctorate, he is burdened by the complexity of economic affairs, convinced that alteration of anything in the economy affects everything else, and deeply indoctrinated with a preference for small, marginal change of a kind that, not entirely coincidentally, economists since 1870 have been comfortable in interpreting.

His teachers inform him that he has no right to judge the quality of the items that enter into GNP. He may not utter interpersonal comparisons of the utilities of rich and poor persons. It must be a tribute to their residual good sense that economists in such large numbers are to be found on the side of progressive social change and mildly egalitarian redistributions of income, wealth, services, and power. For in the end, marginalism inhibits, paradoxically, even the structural shifts that appear to be dictated by the valuations of conventional theory. Economists have retreated from antitrust and nationalization, not in very many instances be-

cause they are in the pay of General Motors or ITT, but because a genuine rearrangement of the industrial landscape would upset the economy after a fashion only to be guessed at, and therefore to be avoided.

That patron saint of Anglo-Saxon economics Alfred Marshall adopted as his motto "*natura non facit saltum*"—nature makes no leaps—and neither, his *Principles of Economics* at length insisted, ought societies. Establishment economics relies ultimately upon political and pecuniary markets to define the arena within which it can safely operate. Political markets are congressional, presidential, state, and local contests used by rival politicians to present themselves and their programs to the inspection of the electorate. As citizen, the typical economist probably voted for George McGovern. As social scientist, he has to be aware that the contrary preference of 62 percent of the voters has and, moreover, ought to have an impact upon the choice of national policy and the allocation among competing objectives of federal resources. Since as an economist our hero has nothing to say about the character of the voters' choice, he ought to cultivate his own garden.

In economics this moral is repetitive. The lesson is much the same out there in the factories and supermarkets. People do buy more copies of *Playboy* than of the *Public Interest* or *Dissent*. In the rating game Marcus Welby consistently does better than BBC dramas on public television. Boone's Apple Farm Wine sells considerably better than real wine, and so on. Who is the economist to judge his fellow citizens? If he presumes to try, he does no more than express his own elitist prejudices. Hence still, despite signs of change, the official national income statistics remain an idiot's measure of economic welfare—a record of activities, beneficial and harmful, trivial and important, free and coerced. Even when economists are uneasily aware of the imperfections of existing markets, the concentrations of economic power in defiance of economic theory, and the inequities of great wealth, their prefer-

ence for tiny readjustment, and their desperate dependence upon markets as the only institution with which they are trained to cope, prevent them from advocating important change.

Why shouldn't Richard Nixon hire economists? By ideology, they ought to be comfortable in any administration. On the one hand, they affirm the legitimacy of the political market. On the other, they join strong affections for efficiency with self-denying ordinances that inhibit analytic judgment of the quality of private output, the equity of present distributions of income and wealth, and the realities of the concentration of economic power.

One ought then to absolve of any charge of inconsistency Great Society economists who initially presided over and now negatively evaluate Lyndon Johnson's wars on poverty, racial discrimination, and assorted social ills. The 1964 presidential election issued Lyndon Johnson a set of instructions which the economists helped him to carry out. Reassessing their political preferences, the voters in 1968 and more strongly in 1972 gave Richard Nixon a different set of instructions. With utter propriety, economists can assist this winner in his effort to interpret and follow these instructions. Waiting in the wings, Great Society economists can usefully employ themselves in the making of efficiency judgments of their previous handiwork.

If, come 1976, Edward Kennedy, Walter Mondale, or some as yet unidentified savior returns the country to Democratic stewardship, the economists will gladly accept new definitions of political reality and new opportunities for incremental change. The economists who, among the social scientists, have probably changed their basic attitudes least, support themselves with a comparatively consistent set of intellectual values. The only trouble is that it amounts to an ideology inherently hostile to significant change and implicitly friendly to all handy status quos.

□

Luther Carpenter

On Socialist Planning

Problems, Failures, Possibilities

Socialists have always known the values they want to serve; they have had more difficulty working out an economic system that would have to serve them. Since the early days of the Labour movement, socialists have talked of producing for use instead of profit; of aiming the economy directly at the needs of the people; of deciding what to make and provide on grounds of social benefits and social costs. In the 1930s many socialists in England, like their counterparts elsewhere, thought they had found the answer in economic planning. Since the 1930s the meaning of the phrase itself has changed, as the ambitions expressed by it have eroded. However, many socialists still cling to it; the alternative for them seems to be the abandonment of basic socialist goals. Can life be put back into the idea of planning? Part of the answer to that question will depend on whether there was life in the idea when socialists first turned to it, or whether it was intrinsically a flawed idea. With this question in mind, I want to reexamine what English socialists said about planning between 1930 and the election of the Labour government of 1945.

The first surprising point is that it took English socialists until the 1930s to try to work out the economics that would be needed to make their values real. Until 1921 the burning issue had been whether a single industry should be run by civil servants or managers representing the community, by representatives of the workers in the industry, or by some joint body. Part of their consid-

erations was the problem they called "co-ordination." The Webbs stumbled on it:

Finally, there would be the necessary financial co-ordination and direction of the nation's ways and means, including such arrangements as the currency, prices and charges, the provision required for the future, the allocation of particular resources to particular needs, the equitable distribution of the national rent or surplus value, and, where necessary, the levying of taxation for the making up of deficits.

The Webbs simply gathered up all the problems of managing a national economy to dump on somebody else's doorstep: "The Department of Finance must be in fact one of the most important parts of the national administration."¹

In the late 1920s the Labour movement dabbled with two kinds of policies that came closer to the problem but ultimately evaded it. The first was the preparation of lists of public works projects, usually including roads, the electrification of railways, and housing, which came to be called "plans of national development." They embodied the desire to put the nation to work producing needed goods, but they limited the idea of needs to a sector of social capital projects. The more sophisticated proposals tried to calculate indirect impacts on the private sec-

¹ Beatrice and Sidney Webb, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (London, 1920), p. 119.

tor, but did not claim to manage it. Ultimately these development programs came to appear too fragile for all the hopes that had been pinned on them; but they remained part of the Labour party's vocabulary and a rival to more comprehensive conceptions of planning.

Simultaneously the Trades Union Congress pursued its own effort to get economic decisions to reflect social needs. The idea of a National Industrial Council representing the unions and management grew out of the Mond-Turner talks in 1928. The fragility of the concept soon became clear—unions were not even able to obtain enforceable agreements controlling the impact of mergers and technological change upon jobs and conditions of work. Such a National Industrial Council could only advise, not plan. Nevertheless, the idea also survived to cut across proposals for comprehensive planning. In 1933–34 the General Council of the TUC again pushed for a National Economic Council. Their first response to the demand for planning postwar reconstruction was to participate in joint advisory bodies attached to specific ministries. This attachment to joint advisory bodies expressed the desire of workers' representatives for direct consultation, which they often felt would be jeopardized by centralized planning or by political control of the planning process.

When the word "planning" hit the scene, rather abruptly at the end of 1930, the temptation was to apply it to all the expedients then in sight. As *SSIP News* commented in January 1932, "the most recent universal remedy is apparently contained in the word 'Plan.'" (SSIP, the Society for Socialist Inquiry and Propaganda, twin of the New Fabian Research Bureau, merged with the ILP to form the Socialist League in 1932.)

The word "plan" had a promising vagueness, with impressive overtones of prudence, foresight, consciousness, and rationality. The vast bulk of references to planning were mere rhetorical comparisons of conscious direction of the economy with blind drifting at the

mercy of impersonal forces, and to the waste of misused resources and unemployed men. But it was through this word that socialists tried to work out what they could control in the economy, the actual controls this would require, and the degree to which they could guide production by considerations of need and social cost.

To make a start, most would-be planners tacked some sort of planning commission or supreme economic authority onto their current image of national ownership of essential industries. Their acceptance of the word "planning" coincided with the left-wing search for legal powers that could override the opposition of bankers and industrialists to nationalization and an expansionary monetary policy. Many left-wingers, notably Stafford Cripps and the Socialist League, never got beyond this negative, defensive idea. The other obvious influence was the example of the Soviet Union. But both influences were weak and imprecise. Would-be planners did not swallow the Soviet example whole. Even the British Communist party failed to work out the ideas used in Soviet planning and to rethink their application to British conditions. The success of Soviet planned industrialization was used to support claims for national ownership of the means of production, rather than leading to a discussion of comprehensive planning itself. The best Communist economist, Maurice Dobb, joined other British observers in looking for modifications in Soviet practice—most notably the use of markets. Socialist economists watched Russia sharply; many, such as Colin Clark, soon became suspicious of Soviet statistics and uncertain whether the Soviet Union had a coherent economic policy. Others, such as Douglas Jay, reacted against all ideas of planning because of their dislike of Soviet centralism. Generally, then, the Soviet example influenced images rather than actual efforts to work out how to plan. Barbara Wootton's widely praised *Plan Or No Plan* shows how a supreme economic

authority was an assumption in search of a policy:

The second condition of successful planning is also a simple one. It is that an authority must be constituted which has the power both to draw up plans and to supervise their execution. There must be *some body* [my emphasis] corresponding to the Russian Planning Commission and, like Gosplan, enjoying nation-wide authority as well as the support of local organs in every area and in every industrial unit.²

It was obvious that the Russian Gosplan would fit awkwardly into the British parliamentary system. When she wrote *Plan Or No Plan*, Barbara Wootton shared a common skepticism about the ability of Parliament to deal with economic issues. At most she thought it could give general directives to a planning authority. More optimistic Labour parliamentarians insisted that the Cabinet itself, or a Cabinet subcommittee or inner Cabinet composed of the ministers whose departments would be involved, should be the supreme economic authority. Often this was combined with proposals for a minister of Economic Development. These proposals left the awkward but unavoidable likelihood that a Cabinet subcommittee's secretariat would make the real decisions. The Labour party's National Executive never could come to a final decision on the composition of a supreme economic authority; perhaps the idea cannot be made to fit in with Western definitions of purely political democracy.

Left-wingers generally agreed that a supreme economic authority would be an "all-in" authority. It would have to control output, wages and incomes, prices, and investment, because changes in one variable could throw off the balance of the economy. But this agreement got them no closer to an understanding of the problem. Was there a

logical starting point, a variable that could be planned in itself and then made the focal point to which other variables were adjusted? Basic socialist considerations pointed toward production as the central variable. In a world dominated by poverty and unemployment, surely the essential task was to produce all that could be produced, using all the manpower and productive capacity that was available; then one could design a distributive system that would get goods to those who needed them. Using the Gosplan to guide her thoughts, Barbara Wootton tried to envision the operations of a supreme economic authority that put production first. It could prepare preliminary plans of output based on parliamentary directives and on local projections of possible production; it then could submit the preliminary plans for criticism by local units, by Parliament, and by public opinion, and then could issue a final version. Purchasing power could be made ample to consume all that was produced; prices could be adjusted to clear the market of all goods; and investment could be related to the plan of production.

But how would the supreme economic authority decide what to put into a plan of production? Capitalist production decisions, if one could believe orthodox economists, were the result of comparing monetary costs of production with anticipated prices. Socialists had grave doubts about these variables. Price was only a pale reflection of the satisfactions or welfare produced by a particular good; cost calculation was primitive and left out costs that could not be imputed directly to the firm.

Early in the 1930s, a committee of the New Fabian Research Bureau tried to solve the problem of costing by coming up with a uniform procedure. However, their report never appeared. Two alternatives were left. The first was to improve existing cost accounting. Most socialists felt that national ownership would permit more accurate calculation of costs, so that the nation could be sure of using efficient plant ahead of inef-

² Barbara Wootton, *Plan or No Plan* (London, 1934), p. 307.

ficient plant. G. D. H. Cole had in mind a much more radical notion of costs:

The social valuation of the "costs" of any service has to be made ultimately in terms . . . of the amount and quality of the labour and real capital resources which it uses up, the quality of the life which it affords to the labourers, the real value of the product to the consumers, the indirect effects of the particular uses to which the labour and capital are put—e.g. such effects as pollution by smoke, the promotion or destruction of the employees' intelligence or vitality, the disturbance of amenities as well as values caused by a particular localization of an industry.³

The difficulty with this concept was that it contained at least two major categories of cost that required very different analysis. The first type of analysis asserted that the real cost of producing a particular good was the amount of scarce resources used up. (Ultimately it could be said to be the other goods and services that could have been produced with those resources.) Consequently Cole asserted that a supreme economic authority would have to make an inventory of national resources. "We have so many available workers, with their different skills and capacities; so many factories, mines, and other fixed capital assets in good working order; and so much fertile land."⁴ Cole appears to have considered this inventory as a kind of supply schedule for the productive resources of the community. Planners would release resources as uses for them developed. This picture made sense in Britain's depressed state, with large amounts of manpower and fixed capital going to waste. In a full employment situation, the idea that real cost was the value of other goods and services that could be produced with the same resources would become more crucial. In this case, comprehensive planning would mean trying to calculate the

satisfactions to be obtained from different combinations of the available resources. But Cole did not reach this point. H. D. Dickinson, espousing the rival concept of market socialist planning, did; he realized that it would mean the simultaneous solution of thousands of equations to simulate a market, but felt it was possible in theory. East European planners who have taken up the problem sound remarkably similar, with some maintaining that computers make it possible to solve the equations while others prefer to use markets for the same purpose.

Maximizing welfare in this sense would not have satisfied Cole. It would have left out half of this concept of cost, "the indirect effects of the particular uses to which the labour and capital are put. . . ." The strength of this argument was that it identified as social costs the social consequences that outrage socialists. It would be desirable to bring the health of the worker, urban crowding, and the withering away of old industrial areas directly into the decision of what and how to produce, instead of allowing problems to arise and then trying to cure them by palliative legislation.

The cost analysis used in capitalist societies had failed to consider these effects as costs. Cole jumped to the conclusion that they were "considerations which will not directly admit of money measurement." Like many socialists, he felt that financial control of industry distorted it. But this dislike may have led him to miss one contemporary development that might have integrated indirect effects into costing. Town planners reached a point at which they could make numerical estimates of the costs attributable to smoke pollution and traffic congestion. If these costs could be calculated in advance, they could enter into an overall calculation of costs as a charge upon an industry, along with the costs of abandoning public facilities in declining areas while building new homes and schools in growing areas. There are serious problems in attributing such costs to particular industries; but the alternative has

³ G. D. H. Cole, *Economic Tracts for the Times* (London, 1932), p. 189.

⁴ G. D. H. Cole, "A Plan for Britain," *Clarion* Texts (London, 1931), p. 14.

been to shift the problems back onto the community, which either ignores them or tries to solve them out of general taxation, thereby effectively subsidizing the industry responsible.

By introducing such a broad concept of social cost, Cole left the whole idea of costs indeterminate. How could decisions between projects be made? Cole insisted, and Wootton and Dobb agreed, that many decisions were already made in social terms that went beyond calculable costs.

. . . in the sphere in which demand has become collective . . . the State, in deciding to embark on some public work, or in giving one such undertaking preference over another, is to some extent guided, not by their respective money costs in relation to any return that can be expressed in prices, but by weighing their social utility against the amount of the social resources their creation will use up.⁵

The public works example is revealing. A broad, qualitative notion of social cost made obvious sense when it was applied to projects that involved large lumps of capital and manpower, where the problem was whether or not to act. It would be less useful in deciding to increase the production of shirts as opposed to toothpaste in a state of near-full employment.

Cole had faith in his capacity to compare disparate kinds of social costs with each other and with social utility; he said that he wanted a place on a socialist National Planning Commission. This faith in qualitative decisions disturbed those socialists who stressed the advantages of automatic, impersonal markets. They found qualitative decisions "arbitrary" and therefore irrational. Qualitative decisions could not be made automatic or routine. If each decision were made on its own merits, weighing all the variables would take an impossible amount of time and effort. Market-oriented socialists emphasized the

scarcity of resources and the numbers of possible combinations. To win them over, Cole would have had to prove that qualitative planning would be more rational both in terms of the outline of society and in terms of the allocation of resources. The two notions of planning diverged. Qualitative planning was rational with respect to the shape of society, while market socialists tried to provide a precise mechanism for maximizing welfare and achieving equilibrium.

On the other side of the equation, Cole and other nonmarket planners hoped to replace demand with a more accurate calculation of need. Virtually all socialists agreed that the inequality of incomes meant that monetary demand was not a true measure of need. Cole asserted that ". . . need, rather than demand, will become the primary criterion of the worthwhileness of productive effort. The need for bread will take precedence of the demand for cake, up to the point at which the entire community is in a position to consume enough bread to satisfy all reasonable needs." The commonsense notion of basic needs looked as if it could be made scientific. Throughout the 1930s researchers such as John Boyd Orr tried to establish basic nutritional needs, while others tried to set objective minima for housing. The obstacle was that one could not classify whole industries as producing simply needs or luxuries. As Cole pointed out, a civilized standard of life required "a very wide range of goods and services that can be classified neither as necessities nor as luxuries."⁶ These "substitutable necessities" included tobacco, theaters, and beer—and additional amounts of necessities such as food and housing. Thus in calculating the number of houses to put in a long-term program, one could not simply calculate the number of families without housing or living in substandard housing. In practice, applying a standard of need looked as if it would only modify the calculations of demand that already went on. Cole effectively conceded this

⁵ G. D. H. Cole, *Economic Tracts for the Times*, p. 209.

⁶ G. D. H. Cole, *The Principles of Economic Planning* (London, 1935), p. 224.

when he did not support the idea of distributing necessities directly. Socialists periodically suggested making milk or other goods free, but no one worked out a concept of a sector of free necessities.

Since all were agreed that the inequality of income distribution prevented demand from measuring need, the obvious point to try was moving demand closer to need by equalizing incomes. Cole suggested a combination of social dividends and publicly determined wages. He was ready to consider an example in which three-fifths of the total purchasing power was distributed in the form of social dividends.⁷ This would have left relatively little room for variations in wages and salaries. But incomes policies, social dividends, and family allowances had a checkered career. The TUC opposed any version that might decrease wages and hamper efforts to increase medical coverage and unemployment benefit. Market-oriented socialists could not abandon wage differentials to direct the flow of labor; they could only hope to reach greater equality by abolishing unearned incomes.

Thus the most ambitious efforts to work out new variables for planning—need and social cost—ultimately failed. Even Cole did not make them the basis for planning but used them as supplements for demand and production costs. Some significant efforts were made to apply need and social costs to sections of the planning process, most notably investment and the location of industry. But before we look at those efforts let us bring together what we've said about the alternate global model of planned production—market socialism.

III
Market socialism was a rigorous, even fanatical, application of points broadly accepted by all British socialists. Cole, Dobb, and Wootton all supported efforts to incorporate markets for consumer goods into socialist planning. Markets for consumer

goods went well with the libertarian nature of British socialism, which emphasized freedom and the growth of the individual personality.

What is surprising is the prevalence of a model of socialist planning that was dedicated to make markets more efficient and more dominant over economic decisions. Socialist economists spent more energy working out how an unfettered price system could work under public ownership than on developing concepts of need and social cost. Orthodox marginalist economists had as much influence on English socialists through the London School of Economics as had Keynes and the Cambridge economists. The fervor that they imparted can be seen in H. D. Dickinson's invocation of marginal analysis: "... only in a socialist community ... is it possible to realize the true principles of economic valuation ... The beautiful systems of economic equilibrium described by Bohm-Bawerk, Wieser, Marshall, and Cassell are not descriptions of society as it is, but prophetic visions of a socialist economy of the future."⁸ Dickinson's *The Economics of Socialism* provides the most complete version of market socialism; it comes close to being a utopia erected around markets.

Market socialists accepted the orthodox definition of economic rationality: meeting consumers' preferences at a minimum cost. While they made obeisances in the direction of "true economic cost in the sense of the relative scarcity of the means of production,"⁹ they introduced no major changes into the calculation of monetary costs. They agreed with laissez-faire theorists that one can only assign costs to factors of production through markets. Having accepted the premise, they then sought to deny the conclusion that markets required private, competitive ownership of the means of production. They assumed the collective ownership of the means of production, with a supreme economic authority supervising the alloca-

⁸ H. D. Dickinson, *The Economics of Socialism* (London and Oxford, 1939), p. 204.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 258.

tion of resources and the bookkeeping of productive units. The supreme economic authority had to prevent productive units from adopting monopolistic price policies; but it should have no authority to fix prices. Production of goods whose selling prices exceeded cost would be expanded, and goods making a loss curtailed, as in a pure market economy. Within the ranks of the market socialists, the only real controversy was whether equilibrium should occur when prices equaled average or marginal costs.

The price of a finished product would allow the producing unit to draw up demand schedules for the producers' goods it needed. The supreme economic authority would calculate aggregate demand schedules for producers' goods at each stage of production; its bookkeeping would replace direct competition for scarce resources. As an example, let us look at the way Dickinson thought that capital should be allocated. Each industry would submit a series of activity schedules for capital at rates of 6 percent, 5 percent, and so on. The supreme economic authority would then calculate demand schedules for capital at these rates. It would allocate capital either by setting the amount to be used in the society as a whole, which would then determine the effective interest rate; or by setting the rate, which would then determine the amount. This example did not even explicitly refer to the need to invest enough to ensure full employment. Capital would be supplied automatically, according to the original activity schedules—which left little room for considerations of social cost and the location of industry.

Market socialists envisioned a perfectly competitive market for labor. They justified this in terms of individual freedom to choose one's trade. Virtually all British socialists accepted the argument; it is surprising that no one challenged it. Earlier socialists had wanted to free workers from the ignominy of being a commodity. Dickinson talked of driving workers out of a declining industry by lowering wages in it; several writers gave an

astonishing example of expanding labor in a growing trade by raising wages sharply and then lowering them gradually as the industry filled up. This assumes an astonishing degree of labor mobility, ignoring both the existence of trade unions and other factors that bind workers to their jobs and towns. It would have subjected workers to a more rigorous discipline from the labor market than existed in capitalist Britain.

One further consequence flowed from this deification of the wage market. Each type of labor had to receive the reward needed to equate its supply with the demand for it. This requirement effectively took precedence over the argument that incomes had to be approximately equal, so that consumer demand would approximate need. Dickinson did agree that there was to be a sector of free goods, which would cushion the wage earner against inequality and declining relative wages. However, he made no effort to indicate what goods might be covered and how their production might be planned. One feels that market socialism would have left the public sector—both free goods and collective consumption areas such as health and education—as impoverished as it is under capitalism.

Decisions concerning collective consumption would be "arbitrary" and "political." When Dickinson called them "arbitrary," he indicated that he had no willingness to talk about them. His notion of the public budget was orthodox; it was the repository for public expenditure. A social fund would have to be financed from industry: it would be calculated to balance collective expenditure and to prevent inflation. But this did not provide a "rational" answer to the issue of the size of the public sector. It merely meant that any public expenditure should be matched by purchasing power drawn from market consumption by increased prices. Market socialism had to admit that it could not deal with the basic parameters that shaped the economy, but could only achieve equilibrium once those parameters were set. Dickinson

admitted the need for four kinds of arbitrary decisions: the allocation of resources between collective and individual consumption; the allocation of resources between present consumption and investment; the amount of leisure time; geographical planning and the price imputed to land.

IV

Collective consumption, investment, leisure, and geographical planning—if these variables were “arbitrary,” then the Labour movement could either treat them in an ad hoc manner, separated from their effects on the rest of the economy, or could try to make them starting points for comprehensive planning. The dominant approach to leisure and collective consumption was ad hoc. The 40-hour week was part of the Labour canon; the ad hoc creation of national health and other benefits won out over ideas that could have been used in comprehensive planning, such as a minimum standard of civilized life. Geographical planning was approached from both directions. Labour could follow the lead of the growing town and country planning movement, with its doctrines of garden cities and green belts as ends in themselves; or it could emphasize the serious problem of the depressed areas, which called out for national planning of the location of industry.

And then there was investment. Planned investment was an article of socialist faith, constantly invoked. Nor could investment be planned on a purely ad hoc basis; its impact on the economy as a whole was too obvious. But many socialists essentially wanted to reduce the impact of investment on the economy and to prevent the destruction of Labour governments by “banker’s ramps.” They argued that the domination of industry by finance led to monopoly pricing, gambling on the stock exchange, and industrial stagnation. Both of the global models of planning we have described above put little emphasis on investment. Cole wished investment to become an adjunct to the planning of production, firmly subordinated to the supreme

economic authority and its criteria of need and social cost. Dickinson treated investment not as the motor of industrial development but as an arbitrary element whose allocation should be tamed. These economists were far from the growthmanship of the 1960s, in which a high rate of investment was virtually an end in itself, and often seemed to be the only meaning anyone cared to give to planning.

However, most efforts to work out a version of planning that the Labour party could apply rapidly emphasized investment. It was acceptable to stalwarts on the National Executive—in particular to Hugh Dalton, the chairman of the Executive’s Policy Subcommittee for much of the 1930s—and to the young economists of the New Fabian Research Bureau. For them, the focal point was the role and powers of a National Investment Board.

The idea of a National Investment Board first surfaced in the Liberal *Yellow Book* in 1927. The Liberals’ idea was to unify existing government borrowing and creation of capital assets, to form a single fund that could be managed in a countercyclical manner and could draw up an annual budget of capital expenditure for government. A Board of National Investment would have considerable resources behind it—funds from the Post Office Savings Bank and from social insurance, the National Debt, and the Sinking Fund. The Liberals cautiously suggested that some private projects, such as railway electrification, and some cooperative ventures might be eligible for loans; but their notion of public investment still restricted it to traditional public works and road building. They discussed slum clearance, but did not bring it within the purview of the Board. The only power they would give the Board over private investment was control over overseas investment.

Early Labour versions were often less innovative. The TUC proposed a National Investment Trust in their evidence to the Macmillan Commission (1931), but it was

merely designed to fill a gap in the provision of intermediate credit to industry. The National Executive's Policy Report, "Currency, Banking, and Finance," presented to the 1932 Conference of the party, recommended a National Investment Board. It did not see the Board as an agency for controlling public investment, as the Liberals had. Instead, the report gave the Board the power of licensing new issues for capital investment. Behind this power lay a limited notion of what investment controls could do:

It would aim at smoothing out undue fluctuations in the demand for capital. It would aim at checking new issues which seemed likely to compete, for the savings available at any particular time, with the capital requirements of any programme of planned investment and industrial reorganization approved by the Government.¹⁰

By "a programme of planned investment" they meant little more than traditional public works; "industrial reorganisation" referred to the rationalization of basic industries, with or without public ownership. This clause attempted to give some priority to public works and public enterprise, but fell far short of building a criterion of need into investment policy. The Executive explicitly refused to see the Board as an investor in its own right, drawing up a program of national development and borrowing funds to implement it. Instead it was a balance wheel to the economy, with almost all public and private investment outside its purview.

The limits in this picture contributed to the rejection of the Executive's economic policy at the 1932 Conference. A spectrum of socialist economists argued that the Board would have to play a broader role. Colin Clark provided the fullest evaluation of investment in "The Control of Investment." He also started with a national development plan. He estimated that the largest share of new investment was already public—public

works, housing, and public utilities. The Board should have the duty of drawing up such a program; its own funds, provided out of taxation, to use in implementing it; and the right to issue bonds to add to its funds. The Board should be allowed to lend to private industry; but its loans should transform the Board into a public holding company, and should carry a measure of public control. Private companies and institutions accepting loans should have to follow trade union rates and working conditions, and accept some control over their rates of expansion, location of new plants, and prices. Clark had not worked out how the Board could decide what rates of expansion were proper for various industries. It is possible that he had nothing more in mind than the frequent criticism of overinvestment in declining industries, such as textiles immediately after World War I. But the notion of trading state-raised capital for industry acceptance of public regulations offered a chance of getting social costs into the investment process.

The National Investment Board was also to be given powers over private sources of investment. Clark pinpointed insurance, savings banks, and buildings societies as important sources of new capital; he hoped to get them to lend money through the Board in return for its bonds, rather than submitting them to formal controls. The Board should have the power to reduce taxation on undistributed profits, if the institution holding them would invest them through the Board. In this proposal Clark sought to implement Keynes's argument that all the money saved did not find its way into investment. The Board should try to find enough uses for capital to dry up the amount of available savings, to stabilize the trade cycle. This picture of the Board's role was more positive than the Executive's image, which saw the Board restraining unwise new issues and concentrating upon abuses of speculation and waste. The Executive accepted Keynes's

¹⁰ Labour Party, "Currency, Banking and Finance," *Policy Report* #1 (London, 1932), p. 10.

point in 1933—but did not back it up by favoring the authorization of the Board to issue bonds.

Clark had come much closer to envisioning an authority that could control both the total amounts and specific uses of capital; he had reached a point at which he could have gone beyond the idea of a large public works program with which he started. However, the concept of the National Investment Board did not continue to develop. It had not drawn the attention of a group of economists or politicians who would put it at the center of their thinking. The party's Executive stopped thinking about planning as a whole; the New Fabian Research Bureau explored particular industries more than it worked on central planning. Economists farther to the Left had little to add. They differed from Clark's picture in *The Control of Investment* only in wanting the Board to obtain a monopoly over private lending, requiring all investment to conform to its plans for development. Nor did Clark's 1935 pamphlet, "A Socialist Budget," go further. It did not develop the idea of guiding relative rates of expansion of various industries, or of using public investment to obtain social benefits. Instead Clark was drawn toward what became Keynesianism, measuring the impact of public investment on public and private employment; this line of thought easily led to ignoring social costs and location of industry, by concentrating on investment totals.

In 1939 Christopher Mayhew returned to the subject. He suggested a new approach that could plant social considerations firmly in the foreground: "... all firms, companies, boards, and public authorities should be compelled to secure the permission of the Board before increasing or replacing their *physical* capital—buildings, machinery, etc. to the extent of more than £20,000 in any one year."¹¹ Like Clark, Mayhew felt that efforts

to license new issues of stock would merely enmesh public policy in the snarls of existing investment markets. Unlike money, buildings and orders for machines could not easily evade control. Furthermore, planning physical investment would unite industrial planning with town planning. Planners could emphasize the location of industry, attacking the decaying industrial regions an expansionary monetary policy alone could not revive, and reconciling growth with the preservation of amenities.

Mayhew was aware that all licensing was negative. It could prevent undesirable micro-economic development, but by itself could not secure full employment. In the near future, he thought, it would become more important to prevent inflation; but the National Investment Board had to possess powers that could expand the economy as well as restrict it. The information that the Board gathered to regulate physical investment would give it a clear picture of overall investment. It could decide on the total amount of investment needed to provide full employment overall, and distribute it to meet unemployment in particular regions and for particular public needs. To expand investment, Mayhew returned to traditional proposals: public works policy, and an Issue-and-Placing Committee to assist private ventures. He did not propose giving the Board powers to lend for private developments. This omission is somewhat surprising, as many other socialists would have supported it as a way of getting additional control over private investment that could lead to public ownership. Other observers had pointed out the dangers of expanding and contracting public investment; it could lead to instability and underuse of capacity in public works contracting, and to insecurity in public employment. Mayhew's underlying reason for restricting the Board's financial powers was that he had become convinced of the benefits of a mixed economic system. While he did speculate on the possibility of the Board

¹¹ Christopher Mayhew, "Planned Investment," *Fabian Research Series* #45 (London, 1939), p. 37.

coming to supercede capital markets in a more socialized economy, this remained a speculation; and, in such a world, Mayhew agreed with Cole that the Board would be reduced in stature as other planning agencies took over.

There were still considerable loose ends to be worked out. Mayhew had not said much about the relative weight to be given to different criteria for investment. He had written as if licensing would be sufficient to get industries to locate in depressed areas without positive inducements. But these loose ends do not explain the lack of response to his proposals. For that explanation, we may turn to the Labour movement's distrust of financial control over the economy; to the movement's difficulty in coming to grips with the problem of what England should look like; and to the impact of the war.

One would have expected the idea of planning to make more headway than it did during the war. General invocations of planning abounded among the promises of a new world. However, the Labour movement failed to arrive at a firm commitment to planning based on any of the ideas of the 1930s. Socialists also hesitated to carry over wartime planning measures; they resembled authoritarian planning, and seemed ill-suited to achieving a plurality of ends. Liberal economists kept socialists on the defensive by hammering at these points.

From the beginning, voices within the Labour party's Executive and its Research Department tried to get the party to take up postwar planning. Delay came from the need to concentrate on the pressure of wartime needs on workers' rights, and from the loss of leaders and researchers to the war effort. Both the leaders who joined the government and those who remained on the Executive resisted efforts to draw up bold plans for reconstruction. The epitome of this attitude was the Executive memorandum of

December 16, 1941, urging that, because of the wartime electoral truce, plans for reconstruction should not become a matter of "platform propaganda."

Several war measures could have led to comprehensive planning. Wartime controls included manpower rationing, the scheduling of raw materials for priority uses, forced lending on the part of banks, and the production of "utility goods." Most of these were ad hoc powers, whose application was roughly coordinated but hardly planned. Churchill's War Cabinet bore an obvious resemblance to socialist proposals for a planning committee of the Cabinet; but, except at one point in 1942, the Executive did not put this idea at the center of reconstruction. Nor did they propose converting the Ministry of Production into a peacetime agency. The third possible focal point for planning as something distinct from traditional budgetary policy had been a National Investment Board. The Board received no mention in the party's statements on reconstruction in 1941 and 1943. Hugh Dalton's belief that public control of the Bank of England was all that was needed for a socialist financial policy continued to dominate these statements. The 1944 statement, "Full Employment and Financial Policy," reinstated and expanded the concept of a National Investment Board that we saw in 1932. It listed the Board's functions as preparing estimates of the National Income "and of the desirable scale of National Development . . ." using surveys of proposed public and private capital development schemes; preparing public works projects that could be put into effect to increase investment; licensing new issues of securities; and "to find finance for all schemes of national importance sanctioned by it." The actual strength of the Board would depend greatly on whether the last clause was interpreted to include public lending to private developments, and the use of such lending to achieve social purposes. There was no hint of such a strong policy in "Full Employment and Financial

Policy," however. The short program that followed later in the year once again reduced the Board to getting new issues, eliminated references to a program of national development, and generally made it clear that the party did not intend to control investment. Despite the appearance of a program of national development in the 1944 statement, the Labour party did not seem able to use Mayhew's proposal of combining physical planning of the location of industry with overall planning. The party called for planning the location of industry more consistently than for any other planning measure; but they saw it as an activity in itself.

The physical transition to peacetime conditions offered, theoretically, an opportunity to apply planning ideas. But the Tories had no intention of permitting anything other than a restoration of the industrial status quo, and Labour ministers fought a mild rear-guard action that entailed frequent efforts to quell their own militants. The 1941 statement actually was most precise on the kinds of priorities that could be applied to the release of raw materials and manpower for peacetime production and the establishment of priorities for new building. Labour spokesmen talked of a long-term program of house-building that could stabilize the construction industry for 20 years; but even this limited kind of planning wasn't worked out. As is perfectly understandable, virtually any proposal that would provide jobs and consumer goods could hardly be made to await the establishment of national priorities, if the government had no intention of setting priorities.

The slim chances of getting any comprehensive planning implemented, or even accepted as Labour policy, were undercut still further by the lack of cooperation within the movement. Labour ministers were often touchy about their relationship to the rest of the movement. The Labour party's Executive included trade unionists but had only sporadic contact with the General Council of the TUC. On its side, the TUC thought

of reconstruction in an entirely different vein until early 1944.

Throughout the 1930s the TUC had been hostile to what it saw as grandiose conceptions of planning emanating from the political side of the Labour movement. Pressure for postwar planning built up early in the war and was met by a dogged repetition of the General Council's belief that planning was the government's problem, the TUC's role limited to consultation. At the end of 1942 Walter Citrine met with William Jowitt; he reported that the paymaster general was receptive to the setting up of a joint committee of the TUC, the Federation of British Industries, and the British Employers' Confederation to consult and to advise him on postwar reconstruction problems. This of course was a mild echo of the TUC's policy of the late 1920s—a National Industrial Council. It is remarkable that as late as the end of 1943 the TUC was engaged in joint talks on reconstruction with employers' organizations, but not with the Labour party. Through the Reconstruction Joint Advisory Council the TUC hoped to pressure the government into issuing statements that wartime controls would be maintained. They also hoped for a voice in deciding the priorities for releasing factories and natural resources, but found the government unwilling even to give them an indication of its ideas so that they could comment. Finally in April 1944 the General Council of the TUC admitted the overall failure of this approach; they had been unable to get beyond general discussion on any problem.¹²

This admission coincided with the TUC's first solid attempt to draw up its own picture of England after reconstruction. After the 1943 Congress, Citrine provided research assistants and an Advisory Committee of Economists to assist the Economic Committee. Predictably the Economic Commit-

¹² The material in these paragraphs is drawn from the minutes of the Economic Committee of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, at Congress House.

tee began by affirming that nothing had happened since 1932 to require the TUC to modify its position that planning was a matter of obtaining the correct structure for each industry, with several basic industries coming under national ownership. However, successive drafts of the "Interim Report on Postwar Reconstruction" added provisions that sought to bring the performance of socialized industries into national planning of major economic variables. The second draft added a paragraph listing "economic vantage points" that the government "must have adequate control over . . .":

- (a) The utilization of land, the supply of water, the use of other natural resources;
- (b) the supply and availability of cash and credit money;
- (c) the rate of gross investment and the supply of capital for investment;
- (d) the location of industry and general physical planning; and
- (e) foreign trade and foreign lending and investment.¹³

The third draft admitted the need "also to provide for the ultimate responsibility of the managements of socialized industries to a minister in order to ensure the proper co-ordination of their policies and that the industries are conducted in full accordance with the government's general plans for the maintenance of employment, the control and the location of industry, and the furtherance of socially desirable expansions of consumption."¹⁴ Such a minister could have become the minister of Production, with proponents of centralized planning of production such as Cole had wanted. But it seems more likely that conceding ministerial responsibility would erect a further line of defense for a particular industry against efforts to plan the overall development of the economy through the "economic vantage points" of the previous quotation. The TUC

made no speculations about possible national planning machinery, such as a planning committee of the Cabinet or the drawing up of a national plan, or on authorities that might control investment, land, natural resources, physical planning, or credit. In a parallel report, the TUC took over the limited version of a National Investment Board that was featured in the Labour party's 1944 statement. Thus the TUC carefully refrained from giving the Board a strong power to decide what investment was in the public interest. The Board would have only advisory powers over private investment, but the report admitted that it might have to ask for licensing powers if advisory powers proved inadequate.

In dealing with industries not ripe for nationalization, the TUC returned to and expanded quasi corporatist ideas which it had shared in the early 1930s. For a wide range of industries—including textiles, chemicals, cement, capital goods industries (electrical engineering, aircraft, automobiles, and ship-building, among others), and others that were declining and coming under concentrated economic control, or were important to consumers—the TUC recommended the formation of industrial boards. These boards would be composed of representatives of employers and workers, with a government-appointed chairman and "a small number of other members also appointed by the government in consultation with the general interests affected." Such boards "would be concerned with the general planning of the industry so as to secure maximum efficiency of production."¹⁵ In spelling out what this meant, the TUC borrowed heavily from the advocates of business rationalization. An Industrial Board might concentrate production in the most efficient concerns, standardize products, pool research, and create joint marketing and purchasing agencies. The TUC gave no indication how this notion of planning would fit into overall planning of

¹³ Trades Union Congress, "Interim Report on Post-War Reconstruction" (London, 1944), p. 13.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 17.

the economy. It did reserve the power to fix prices and to limit entry into the industry to the government, and made provision for a minister to order an investigation of abuse of a board's powers. Here, as in its interpretation of nationalized industry, the TUC put largeness over other concepts of planning according to the national interest. What was wrong with monopoly was not that it was monopoly, but that it was private. The TUC consistently felt that large-scale industry was more stable, offered greater security of employment, and could pay higher wages than small firms—thus achieving many of the objectives of direct, comprehensive planning.

Thus, when the Labour government came to power, no concept of planning had obtained common acceptance within the movement. Several suggestive points had been raised; but in most cases they had not been turned into comprehensive proposals. Planning was often secondary to individual thinkers' main work—Colin Clark's studies of national income, for example, outweighed his interest in a National Investment Board. The challenge of fascism, the conduct of the war, and the promulgation of traditional Labour policy all took precedence over planning for most of the thinkers we surveyed. Nor did the Labour movement back up individuals' pioneering suggestions with collective research, except in the case of the New Fabian Research Bureau.

But planning was not simply reduced to something to be thought about in one's spare time. In an important sense, postponement turned out to be an informal choice against planning. The Labour movement had rejected both global models: the market socialists' projections of economic orthodoxy as well as Soviet-style planning of production. The Labour government did accept, a little uneasily, the controls that had been built up during the war, and the expanded notion of what could be done by manipulat-

ing the national budget. But it passed over the chance to continue the wartime Ministry of Production, and stoutly refused to take additional powers over investment and banking. Since 1945, the word "planning" has been revived several times, from Herbert Morrison in 1947 to Harold Wilson; each time it has drifted farther away from either the concept of making production meet needs at minimum social cost, or the dream of pure market allocation of resources.

Neither of these models of planning fitted easily into traditional British policies. They aroused fears based on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, which account for much of the resistance. In addition, both models created uncertainties in the minds of both trade unionists and intellectuals. Market socialism was too obviously an intellectuals' fantasy that did not take account of the unions' efforts to reduce workers' vulnerability to market forces. While it satisfied many intellectuals by integrating the economics they had learned into the socialist future, it offended others. Its willingness to turn back to an unconscious mechanism to run the economy appeared anti-intellectual. Soviet-style planning would also reduce the unions' independence and their chances of intervening in economic decisions. Trade unionists and intellectuals both shared fears that a command economy would be rigid and arbitrary and would override individuals' preferences.

Thus the Labour movement's refusal to work out comprehensive models of planning may well indicate that the idea is not politically feasible in advanced economies—as long as they can provide more than basic needs for a large portion of the population. This conclusion would be reinforced by East European drifting to a mixture of command planning and market features. In such an economy, the costs of *not* planning—unintended side effects, wastage of resources in low-priority production, an impoverished public sector, overlapping and confusion, the abandonment of assets in decaying areas

coupled with the sprawl of growing areas, irrational transport patterns—all these are submerged, only to reappear as individual anxieties. Individual short-run interests become more immediate and obtain fierce support; infringements of them are felt deeply. In contrast, it becomes hard to draw up and support a list of priorities. The argument that Western economies are being planned, incoherently, by and for corporations and narrow elites is true—but not strong enough to revive comprehensive planning.

But one cannot leave the problem there. First, comprehensive planning of production may become necessary, and therefore much more feasible politically, if nations have to ration resources. One or more resources—energy, land, food—may become a bottleneck that would determine economic possibilities. Such a society would find it necessary to revise the assumption of consumer sovereignty that now makes planning appear rigid and arbitrary. It would have to use concepts of need and social cost, or turn to authoritarian politics to protect a distorted distribution of resources. Socialists could only plan, and sell the idea of planning, in such a situation by making their concepts of need and social cost much more objective than they stand at present. A faith in qualitative planning with no technique for making comparisons would not be convincing, while market socialism and the feeble forms of indicative planning that have been tried in England both failed to plan those variables which are intrinsically political.

Second, socialists cannot abandon need and social cost in the short run without abandoning their basic yardsticks. Even if one could not envision a comprehensively planned world at the present moment, there is good reason to get considerations of need and social cost into more public decisions. Does the work of the 1930s suggest any promising avenues to explore? The emphasis on physical needs in the 1930s suggests that socialists made a mistake by shifting their attention to a minimum monetary income.

Designating certain goods to be produced directly for use or to be subsidized could make sense—if there were the political will to defend this sector of basic needs against political pressure and against erosion by the way a mixed economy channels wealth to speculators and oligopolies. The idea of social cost also calls out for development. If a technique could be invented for charging industries for pollution, transportation of workers in congested areas, redundancies and retraining, industrial diseases, and the abandonment of social assets such as schools and hospitals, industrial development would be more rational. The economists and town planners of the 1930s made a start on calculating specific “external diseconomies”; the next step would be to create a common procedure for calculating costs, as the New Fabian Research Bureau wanted to do.

Finally, a good case can be made for the kind of National Investment Board that Christopher Mayhew outlined. The percentage of the national income set aside for investment is inherently arbitrary; if the decision is not made politically, it is made erratically as a by-product of market decisions. Trying to encourage investment by manipulating taxation has led to “stop-go” cycles and has generally aided profits and speculation as much as real investment; it is an inherently wasteful and imprecise way of expanding investment and offers no way of checking excessive growth short of overall recession. In addition, combining the national determination of the volume of investment with physical controls could give more assistance to outlying and declining regions, especially if the Board used the investment grants and regional employment premium developed by the 1964 Labour government. Mayhew’s proposal cleverly combined many of the objectives socialists hoped to achieve through planning. It deserved much more detailed commentary than it obtained, and perhaps could provide an alternative to socialism’s retreat from planning. □

Marx's Vision of Future Society

And the Problem of Utopianism

In his *Paths in Utopia*, Martin Buber distinguished between two modes of what he called eschatological thinking: the prophetic and the apocalyptic. In the prophetic mode, the central theme is the preparation of humanity for the hour of redemption; the purification of the spirit and the opening of hearts toward the moment of future salvation and emancipation. In the apocalyptic mode, the process of redemption is already predetermined in all its details; men are merely its instruments, and the human factor is limited to the cognitive function of reading the writing on the wall, deciphering the true meaning hidden behind the facade of external reality and attaining an understanding of the shape of things to come.

According to Buber, the prophetic mode is expressed within the socialist tradition by the utopian socialists, whereas Marx's thought falls into the apocalyptic category.

It seems to me that on this Buber was wrong. He himself admits that in his *Civil War in France*, Marx reverts to a more "utopian," i.e., prophetic mode. Moreover, Buber's book grew out of a series of lectures he gave in the 1940s to kibbutz audiences (the original Hebrew version of *Paths in Utopia* was published in Israel in 1947 by the Histadruth book guild), and it appears that Buber was not yet well acquainted at that time with Marx's early writings, especially the 1844 *Paris Manuscripts*. Moreover, his distinction between utopian socialism and

Marx seems to follow too closely the orthodox lines of demarcation between the two traditions, set down abstractly by the Marxian tradition itself; in this it did injustice both to the utopian socialists as well as to Marx.

Something of this can be gleaned from the way Karl Mannheim viewed the Marxian attitude toward the utopians. In his article on "Utopianism" in the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Mannheim appears to be missing the point completely when he says that "in branding these antibourgeois reformers with the epithet *Utopian*, Engels meant to rebuke them for their addiction to the sentimental delusions of the eighteenth-century philosophers." Marx's own attitude toward those whom he called utopian socialists is, on closer scrutiny, much more sophisticated and differentiated than this.

In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx gives the "originators of utopian systems," as he calls Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen, their due: he credits them with having critical insights into the class struggle and considers them "in many respects revolutionary." The trouble is not really with them, Marx contends, but with their disciples who cling rather slavishly to the original views of their masters, overlooking the historical development that has taken place since these systems were developed.

To Marx the main trouble with the utopians is ultimately epistemological. It is not

that their schemes are unrealizable, impractical, or rooted in never-never land. It is because the utopians concoct schemes at all that they are wrong; their system-building, their attempt to construct "a science of society" have, according to Marx, no foundation in an adequate understanding of social reality.

It may come as a surprise to many that Marx criticizes the utopians for trying to be "scientific." After all, wasn't it Engels who traced the development of socialism "from utopia to science" in his famous tract? But Engels's retrospective account glosses over, in this case as in other instances when Engels doubled as the official historian of Marxism, many of the more fruitful aspects of Marx's theory: when a theory begins to write its own history, it runs into some obvious difficulties.

LET US have a look at Marx's own account of his disagreement with the utopians as expressed by him *at the time* of his attempt to differentiate his own socialist theories from those of other socialist thinkers.

In his polemic against Proudhon in *The Poverty of Philosophy* Marx takes the utopians to task for looking to "abstract" systems as the models for future society. The utopian socialists still keep themselves busy imagining the future, "while in the measure that history moves forward, and with it the struggle of the proletariat assumes clearer outlines, [the workers] no longer need to seek science in their minds. They have only to take note of what is happening before their eyes and to become its mouthpiece." Similarly in *The Civil War in France* Marx suggests that the working class "has no ideas to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which the old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant." Marx appears to suggest here that the proletariat is the true inheritor of philosophy: to Hegel, "To comprehend what is, is the task of philosophy." To Marx this devolves unto the proletariat and becomes its praxis.

Marx thus sees his method as implying an understanding of existing reality as a key

to the future: *true knowledge of the shape of things to come is a function of having an adequate understanding of existing social relations*. If one does not understand the present, or misunderstands it, how can one know anything about the future? For this reason Marx spends quite an amount of time in trying to show that Proudhon, for example, is wrong in every and any statement he makes about present society. If he is so much in the dark about the present, how can he have anything illuminating to say about the future?

Marx's position about this seems to be quite straightforward: statements about the past and the present may be verifiable or falsifiable. On the other hand, statements about the future, "systems" in his language, detailed schemes of future society, can be neither verified nor falsified; hence they are ultimately useless.

In the *German Ideology* Marx's main contention about the utopians is that since they do not understand existing society, as a matter of fact do not even *try* to understand it, their pronouncements about the future cannot really grasp it. It is their lack of understanding of existing conditions which pushes the utopians to develop "scientific" theories that "exist only in the head of the thinker."

Similarly, in the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx criticizes the utopian socialists for not understanding that existing circumstances in capitalist society create the conditions for a socialist transformation. Since they do not understand this, they "search after a new social science, after new social laws, that are to create these conditions." Hence they try to push the proletariat into a Procrustean bed of "an organization of society specially contrived by these inventors." For them "future history resolves itself into the propaganda and the practical carrying out of their social plans."

One has only to read the contradictory, detailed plans of various utopian socialists with their minute and meticulous coverage of every aspect of human life to realize what it was in utopian socialism that put Marx off.

Like latter-day social engineering, its blend of arrogance and ignorance was its most de-testable feature.

This critique of utopianism obviously leaves Marx with a difficult dilemma in another quarter: if there are epistemological limitations on the ability to say anything sensible about the future, these would apply, after all, to Marx himself as well. Indeed, we find that, popular beliefs to the contrary notwithstanding, Marx has very little to say about the structure of the future socialist society precisely because of these self-imposed limitations. All one would be able to say would be that looking at capitalist society and its internal tensions one could see that the socialization of the means of production is the immanent tendency of its development. As Marx put it in the *Grundrisse*: "All our attempts to explode [the existing form of social organization] would be quixotic if one could not find embedded in society as it is today *the material conditions* of production and commercial relationships of the classless society." Socialism hence calls not for visionaries but for a dialectical understanding of "that which is."

It is for these reasons that Marx's discussions of future society are few and far between. The writings of most utopian socialists centered around their visions of future society and blueprints for the future, while Marx spent his lifetime writing (and never finishing) *Das Kapital*. Furthermore, we find that when Marx does venture to discuss future society he usually views it in "stages": the temporal dimension, so crucial to his theory in general, does not evaporate into a timeless future. This is not just a technicality. Stage I, which is the proximate future, is discussed in much greater detail than Stage II, which is already once removed from immediate experience. If Marx feels that he may risk a number of positive statements about Stage I because it is the direct outcome of the dialectical tensions of present society,

there is very little to base oneself on when discussing Stage II, and hence Marx is much more tentative about it.

The two instances in which Marx goes into some details about the two stages are both to be found in manuscripts never published by Marx himself. The first instance is in one of the 1844 *Paris Manuscripts* entitled "Private Property and Communism" and the second is in his 1875 *Critique of the Gotha Program*. Before, however, going into the details of these relatively extensive accounts, attention should be given to another text, perhaps the most poetic evocation on Marx's part of the promise of future, unalienated society.

This occurs in *The German Ideology* and appears as almost a marginal comment in the course of a historical explanation about the origins and consequences of the division of labor. Suddenly, in the midst of this historical account, Marx switches tenses and postulates what the abolition of the division of labor would imply in a future communist society. The passage is well-known, yet it still merits quotation at length:

For as soon as there occurs a division of labor, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood. While in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow,

to hunt in the morning,
fish in the afternoon,
rear cattle in the evening,
criticize after dinner,

just as I have in mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic.*

* This has recently been slightly improved upon by Jerry Rubin in the last paragraph of *Do It!*; but the one activity added there does not need to detain us for the moment.

The theoretical problems raised by this passage are, of course, quite staggering; we shall therefore limit ourselves to only two of them.

First: despite the appearance of postulating activity in future society as purely voluntary in its nature, this apparent free choice of doing one thing in the morning and another in the afternoon is most explicitly premised on the statement that “society *regulates* the general production and *thus* makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow.” One would wish Marx had been more specific about how exactly one regulates production in such a way as to allow each individual a maximum of choice and versatility. After all, this is the major problem involved, yet this socialist version of Renaissance man is ultimately left hanging in the air. Be that as it may, one should be very careful in using this passage by Marx as an illustration of an anarchist paradise involving no control or planning. Nothing could be further from Marx’s mind, and the obscurity of the exact nexus between control and freedom should not lead one to overlook the existence of some sort of planning implied in this voluntaristic vision of future society.

Second, and perhaps even more serious, is the basic irrelevance of the examples given by Marx as instances of unalienated activity after the division of labor will be abolished. Hunting, fishing, rearing cattle (for the sake of the argument one could overlook the “criticism after dinner” which is, after all, a joke at the expense of Bruno Bauer)—all these are fairly unsophisticated, wholly unmodern, totally preindustrial activities. Marx always accepted the historicity of the industrial revolution and had very little patience with the machine-smashers and their theoretical defenders. As a matter of fact, he always premised his vision of socialism upon the potentialities inherent in industrial development: it is therefore quite surprising to find him using an imagery that is so idyllically bucolic and pastoral. One merely

has to substitute three or four modern industrial occupations for the pastoral ones used by Marx to realize that it would be extremely difficult to imagine a person being an atomic physicist in the morning, a population expert in the afternoon, and a telephone maintenance man in the evening. The modern division of labor is so much more complex to overcome than that implied in Marx’s almost Rousseauian account. This is a serious lapse in Marx, and by suggesting that it is the only time when such romantic nonsense crept into his writing one is not trying to take him off the hook.

It may, however, be of some interest to our discussion that these occupational examples used by Marx are not entirely his own. Actually, they are literally taken over from Fourier. In his account of the average life of the man of the future, Fourier maps out in nauseating detail—which we may by now associate with utopian social engineering in general—the various activities involved. It is a long and tiresome list, and not all of it need be repeated here. It involves getting up at 3:30 in the morning, and then one finds, in this order:

at 5:30 A.M., a session in a hunting group;
at 7:00 A.M., a session in a fishing group;
and later,

at 6:30 P.M., a session in a cattle-rearing group;

at 9:30 P.M., *cours des arts* (concerts, balls, theater); and inevitably, at 10:30 P.M., everybody goes to bed, presumably totally exhausted and happy. (There is also, one should add, a 4:00 P.M. session of a group for exotic plants; but one may see why Marx did not care for that one.) *

The Fourierist origin of Marx’s examples may explain (though not excuse) their pastoralism. But there is one crucial difference that may shed some light on the difference

* See N. Riasanowsky, ed., *The Teachings of Charles Fourier* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 50.

between Marx and the utopians: we have seen that Marx's voluntarism in this passage is enigmatically linked with some sort of overall planning and control. But the main postulate of Marx's passage is that this sort of planning—and its consequent overcoming of scarcity—will make it possible for me “to do one thing today and another tomorrow . . . as I have in mind.” In Fourier, on the other hand, this is “an average day”: it is planned for you and it is good for you and you should—and would—follow it. This is what you will do, in a way, for the rest of your life. Fourier's is a regimented system, meticulously worked out in its details, totalitarian in its aspects. Marx's vision is, on the contrary, that of free human activity. Because of historical reasons one tends to identify the utopians with voluntarism and Marxism with a regulated society: it is, however, the other way round.

Let us now turn our attention to the problems involved in Marx's discussion of future society in the *Paris Manuscripts* and the *Critique of the Gotha Program*. In both cases there is not only the suggestion that one has to envisage future society dynamically, i.e., in stages, but there appears also to be a very deep ambivalence on Marx's part about the nature of the first stage. After describing this stage in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Marx adds: “What we have to deal with here is a communist society not as it has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society, which is thus *in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually*, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges” (my italics).

In the *Paris Manuscripts*, these “birthmarks” are spelled out in more detail. Just as in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Stage I involves the successful nationalization of the means of production. There is no private property in the means of produc-

tion; everyone is employed by society, and there is an equality of wages.

Marx discerns, however, that this society has not basically overcome alienation (and surplus value). Since everyone is still a wage-earner, the relationship of the worker to the process of labor has not basically changed. Nor has surplus value disappeared, though the surplus does not accrue to the individual capitalist but goes to the state that uses it for social purposes: yet from the worker's subjective point of view, this has not changed the “external” nature of his work as far as his consciousness is concerned.

Marx calls this stage “crude communism,” and though he is obviously also referring to communist theories other than his own, the language of the manuscript as well as the parallels with the *Critique of the Gotha Program* make it clear that he is talking about what he considers also a historical stage in future development.

This “crude communism” is still related to the whole world of production and goods in the old way of viewing everything under the rubric of private property: the fact that property is not owned individually but collectively does not change the basic notions of bourgeois society (“bourgeois right” is still dominant, as he points out in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*). As Marx says, “private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is *ours* only if we have it, if it exists for us as capital, is immediately possessed by us, eaten, drunk, worn, lived in, etc., in short, used.”

When we substitute the capitalist “I own” by the “we own” of crude communism, nothing fundamental has changed. As Marx says, in crude communism the

domination of *material* property bulks so large that it wants to destroy *everything* which cannot be possessed by everyone as *private property*. It wants to abstract from talent, etc., by *force*. Immediate, physical possession is for it the sole aim of life and existence. The condition of the *laborer* is not

overcome but extended to all men. The relationship of private property remains the relationship of the community to the world of things. . . . The community is only a community of *labor* and an equality of wages paid out by the communal capital, the *community* as universal capitalist. How little this overcoming of private property is an actual appropriation is shown precisely by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization, the reversion to the *unnatural* simplicity of the *poor* and wantless man who has not gone beyond private property, has not yet even achieved it.

This is the same kind of society that Marx characterizes in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* as “still constantly stigmatized by bourgeois limitation.” To Marx these defects “are inevitable in the first phase of communist society,” but his ambivalence is quite outspoken, and there are no facile suggestions in his account of an easy breakthrough. As scarcity will still exist in this first stage, the maximum that society will be able to offer to its members will be “to each according to his work.” The bourgeois measurements will still remain in force.

MARX HAS NOT, of course, been the only socialist thinker to be aware of the fact that the road to salvation may lead, as in a Judaic tradition that was of course wholly unknown to him, through Forty-nine Gates of Impurity. One of Marx’s most intimate friends during his Paris period was Heinrich Heine, who came from a similar social and intellectual background and who was at that time one of the most eloquent communist writers of the younger German generation. Heine never developed a theoretical concept of communism comparable to that of Marx, but at that time, when Marx was still totally unknown, Heine’s articles about French communism were one of the main sources about socialist ideas in Germany.

In the Preface to his work *Lutetia*, Heine proclaims his attachment to the proletarian revolution. He is filled with revulsion at

bourgeois society, yet he has his doubts about communism and the fate of culture under proletarian rule:

I am filled with horror about these dark destroyers coming to power. With their uncouth hands they will tear down all the marble statues of beauty. All the artful imaginative plays of the poets will be destroyed by them. Where laurels grew, potatoes will be cultivated. The lilies of the field, that never toil and never spin, but even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of them, will be given looms and told to produce. The nightingale will be banished to foreign lands, since its song is unproductive. My own *Book of Poems* [*Buch der Lieder*] will find its way to the grocery store, where its pages will be used to wrap coffee and snuff-tobacco for the old women of the future.

Yet Heine resignedly concludes, “I see all this, but I cannot repudiate communism.”

Though Heine’s considerations appear to be mainly aesthetic, the basic nature of his doubts is similar enough to the context of Marx’s notion of “crude communism” to merit attention. Yet there is a fundamental difference: while for Heine this description is equivalent to communism per se, for Marx it is merely the first stage.

The ultimate stage for Marx is something else: it is “the complete emancipation of all human senses and aptitudes”; it is “the complete and conscious restoration of man to himself within the total wealth of previous development, the restoration of man as a social, that is, human being.” As such “communism as fully developed naturalism is humanism [and] as fully developed humanism it is naturalism.” Marx is much less specific, for reasons outlined earlier, about the exact institutional structures of this higher form of communism. Nevertheless he makes a number of claims for it, and they merit a close investigation.

This fully developed communism is, according to Marx,

the genuine solution of the antagonism

between man and nature
and man and man.

It is the true solution of the struggle
between existence and essence,
between objectification and self-affirmation,
between freedom and necessity,
between individual and species.

It is the solution to the riddle of history,
and knows itself to be this solution.

Now this is obviously a most ambitious claim to make for any social system: it is also, of course, a total transcendence of the "birth marks" that will characterize, according to Marx, the first stage of socialist society. A close look at the list of antagonisms that will be overcome by fully developed communism clearly suggests what they are: *they are the traditional problems of Western philosophy*. The terminology itself is deeply Hegelian: these are the dichotomies Hegel claimed to have overcome in his philosophy. Marx's earlier critique of the Hegelian system maintains that the Hegelian solution is a false and merely apparent one. The problems remain, to be solved according to Marx, not on the level of theory in philosophy but on the level of social praxis. This, after all, is the true implication of the XIth Thesis on Feuerbach.

In the *Critique of the Gotha Program* Marx's language is slightly less philosophical; but there again appears the suggestion that the higher form of communist society will overcome the dichotomies between physical and mental labor, between labor as "mere means of life" and its being "life's prime want," between "the all-around development of the individual" and the increase of "all the springs of the cooperative level"—and, of course, in that society will disappear "the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor."

Marx does not, however, discuss the mechanisms of change immanent in Stage I that would transform it into Stage II. This seems to me to be the major flaw in his ac-

count: for given his own criticism of the utopian socialists, one could very easily turn Marx's critique against himself. If the transition from capitalism to Socialism I is shown by Marx in numerous writings to be the dialectical outcome of the internal tensions and contradictions of capitalism, there is nothing in the Marxian texts to suggest the dynamics which would transform Socialism I into Socialism II. If the description of Stage I in the *Paris Manuscripts* can sometimes be likened to a society reminiscent of the Soviet Union, what are Marx's guarantees that one may not be stuck in Stage I? Marx's historical understanding led him to his contention that capitalism cannot continue expanding without undermining its own foundation, "digging its own grave." No comparable claim is made about Stage I and the frightening possibility of being stuck in Stage I cannot be overlooked, given the premises of Marx himself. The assertion that there will be a Stage II appears, in this context, to be as arbitrary as the glowing optimism of the utopians which Marx was otherwise so quick in criticizing as being without foundation in reality.

In fairness to Marx one should, however, add that he appears to be trying to look for possible paradigms in existing reality which, if universalized, could become the foundation for the kind of society enunciated in his writings as "fully developed communism." And though there is no systematic attempt on his part to link these elements to the overall social system of Stage II, the potentialities inherent in the spheres of human relations involved are of considerable interest.

The first sphere is that of artistic creativity. Marx mentions on several occasions that work activity in future society will be much more like art than like labor. By this he does not mean that work will become play: quite the contrary—in the *Grundrisse* he suggests that emancipating work from alienation "does not mean that labor can be made merely a joke, or amusement, as Fourier

naively expressed it in shopgirl terms. Really free labor, the composing of music for example, is at the same time damned serious and demands the greatest effort."

The parallel with artistic creation lies somewhere else: in the fact that what the artist creates for himself is being created at the same time for others as well; what one person gains in creative experience is not at the expense of another person, in other words, there exists no zero-sum relationship between the artist's enjoyment of his creativity and that of the public. Furthermore, there never exists, strictly speaking, an "object" of art: for a piece of music to become an artistic experience it does not suffice that it has been "produced" by the composer. It has to be "reproduced" by an orchestra or an individual performer and "reproduced" again by the listener: otherwise it is merely a piece of dead wood. It is for this reason that Marx likens social man to a person whose senses have been fully awakened and developed. "The eye," he says in the *Paris Manuscripts*, "has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object, derived from and for man. . . . The senses of social man differ from those of the unsocial."

The model of man in fully developed socialist society is thus viewed in terms that have an explicit aesthetic quality: "It is apparent how the *rich man* and *wide human need* appear in place of economic wealth and poverty. The rich man is simultaneously one who *needs* a totality of human manifestations of life and in whom his own realization exists as inner necessity, as need." The artist may be in the thrall of an inner necessity to create; but by expressing this urge he is becoming truly free.

The other paradigm is that of sexual relations, and Marx has an extraordinary excursus on the subject in the manuscript "Private Property and Communism." It can be very easily romanticized and trivialized, and one should be careful not to be carried

away by what might appear to some as trendy implications.

It is not the content of sexual relations that interests Marx but (if one can make the distinction) their structure. To Marx the sexual nexus presents a structure of human relations totally different from that of the zero-sum relations of the market. Sexual relations are, on one hand, determined by man's natural organization: but they are sustained by an element of will; in them, human beings discover that they need the other human being—not as an object, but as a complement to themselves. The structure of sexual relations is such that it shows that in his most intimate, individual moment, man (*Mensch*, not *Mann*) is a social, co-operative being—a species-being (*Gattungswesen*, to use Marx's language).

Marx's text is slightly repetitive but nonetheless clear:

The immediate, natural, and necessary relationship of human being to human being is the relationship of man to woman. In this natural species-relationship man's relationship to nature is immediately his relationship to man as his relationship to man is immediately his relationship to nature, to his own natural condition. In this relationship the extent to which the human essence has become nature for man or nature has become the human essence of man is sensuously manifested, reduced to an observable fact. . . . The relationship of man to woman is the most natural relationship of human being to human being. It thus indicates the extent to which man's natural behavior has become human or the extent to which his human essence has become a natural essence for him, the extent to which his human nature has become nature to him. In this relationship is also apparent the extent to which man's need has become human, thus the extent to which the other human being, as human being, has become a need for him, the extent to which in his most individual existence he is at the same time a social being.

This may come as a surprise, but the language used here by Marx also points out that the sexual relationship can be a paradigm for future social relations *because in it the same dichotomies are overcome which Marx envisaged as about to be overcome in Stage II*. We recall that these were the antagonisms of man/man, man/nature, existence/essence, objectification/self-affirmation, freedom/necessity and individual/species. The paradigmatic nature of sexual relations arises from the fact that Marx claims that these antagonisms are already overcome in them—just as, in a way, they have been shown by Marx to disappear in artistic production. This model of future relations implied in sexual relations may also be the reason for Marx's virulent attack on the bourgeois concept of the family in *The Communist Manifesto*: Marx's anger—so much out of line with the cool language of the rest of the *Manifesto*—may have been triggered off by his realization that even sexual relations, which could serve as a pos-

sible model for future society, have been so totally stunted within capitalist society.

ANYONE who looks to Marx for clear-cut models for a socialist structure of society is apt to be frustrated; he would also be classified by Marx himself among the utopians who have "science in their mind." In his own way Marx was painting his "gray on gray" by writing *Das Kapital* rather than a nonexistent work called *Der Sozialismus*. But, if one may mix one's metaphors, this painting of gray on gray, by showing that a form of life has grown old, not only explains the world but also changes it. Nonetheless, despite Marx's self-denying ordinance about schemes of future society, he allowed himself several glimpses into future alternatives; and though, as we tried to show, these accounts are fraught with problems and unanswered questions, Marx's own awareness of their tentative nature makes him perhaps less of a utopian than he would have otherwise appeared.

□

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HEW, the University, & Women

Over the past few years the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) and the academic establishment have been engaged in a contest over equal employment opportunities for university women. In October 1967, Executive Order 11246, as amended by 11375, extended equal employment rights to women in universities holding federal contracts. Under this Order, academic women alleging discrimination could file complaints with the Office of Civil Rights, directed by J. Stanley Pottinger. If noncompliance was found with the terms of federal contracts, Mr. Pottinger could recommend contract cancellations to the Department of Labor.

In 1969 it seemed that the status of women would be improved if statistical information was presented showing patterns of discrimination in colleges. Once employment data were available, university officials conceded the point: there was discrimination against women. They argued, however, that the situation could not be corrected because there were no able candidates. More data were then compiled, demonstrating the extent of available competent women. University officials now requested guidelines for implementing the Order.

In October 1972, the guidelines were issued. Secretary Elliot Richardson reported satisfactory progress. In November, however, Pottinger left the Syracuse Conference for Affirmative Action in exasperation, saying that the government's program was "losing ground . . . to a growing rhetorical backlash from male faculty members and administrations." He added that the myth persists and that goals are thinly disguised

quotas: "All we can do is keep repeating what everybody should know by now, that you can't redress discrimination against some people by practicing it against others" (*New York Times*, November 30, 1972).

The arguments for improving the status of university women bear repeating. Many critics, such as President Bunzel of California State University at San José, claim that few women have been hired or promoted simply because few are qualified under the guidelines of "academic judgment." Yet the data collected by professional organizations in the past few years challenge this assumption and establish realistic bases for reasonable, affirmative action goals in hiring qualified women.

Among the universities required to reassess its assumptions about woman was the University of Wisconsin. A fact-finding study commissioned by the University's chancellor produced notable results. In the sciences, it was found, the percentages of qualified women in 1967-69 were far greater than was generally supposed and *far higher than employment rates of women in academic science departments*. For example, the percentages of women among all those holding Ph.D.'s in those years were: 26.1 in psychology; 20-20.5 in molecular biology; 21.4 in biochemistry; 22.6 in bacteriology; 23.0 in anatomy and histology; 18.9 in anesthesiology; 13.4 in botany; 13.4 in psychiatry.¹ In 1969, women constituted somewhere between 18-22 percent of the total faculty in higher education, with a large proportion

¹ Material distributed by Bernice Sandler, executive associate, the Project on the Status of Women, American Association of Colleges (AAC).

concentrated in the lower ranks. It becomes clear, then, that there were proportionally more trained, qualified women in the sciences than were employed even in *all* fields of higher education—and thereby the gap in the sciences between qualified women and women in high-level jobs is greater still. These are facts that should explode the myth that women and science do not mix.

By contrast, the Wisconsin report found the percentage of women who had earned the highest degrees in mathematics in the top graduate departments remarkably low—only 5.5 percent. The figure reflects recent findings that girls are conditioned to avoid success in “male” subjects when they are at an especially impressionable age in high school. Until their junior year, girls do as well as boys in mathematics, sometimes better. After that, they show a sharp decline in their scholarly achievement and a growing interest in social affairs. By the end of high school, women are at an “enormous” disadvantage. Studies by David Riesman, Ellen and Kenneth Keniston, and Patricia Graham demonstrate these patterns.

With the Wisconsin data, one may begin to understand the impetus behind the professional women’s movement. In January 1970 the Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL) filed the first complaint against a university to be made under Executive Order 11375. Since then, the National Organization of Women (NOW) and the Professional Women’s Caucus (PWC) have filed over 350 complaints against colleges and universities. Women at a number of colleges are forming new groups in order to build strong and valid cases. For example, the Association of Women in Science was chartered recently by a number of scientists, which include Gertrude Shloer, a microbiologist at Mt. Sinai School of Medicine, CUNY. Women are becoming more and more aware of the extent of discrimination against them, as Bernice Sandler reported to members at the October convention of the American Association of Colleges, and angry women are filing suits in increasing numbers. In the

sciences alone, seven organizations of 30,000 women are suing the National Health Institutes for appointments.

Similar studies in other disciplines support the Wisconsin report findings in the sciences, maintaining that more qualified women are available for most academic jobs than male incumbents would like to believe. In 1972, the American Psychological Association (APA) surveyed nearly 5,100 women members; of this sample 57 percent (2,903) held Ph.D.’s, and 8 percent (425) held Ed.D.’s. A job survey of this group revealed that only 5 percent (283) were employed in basic research; the largest group, 28 percent (1,451) were employed as clinical psychologists; the second largest, 24 percent (1,248), were teachers. Almost all were concentrated in low-prestige occupations and positions. Only three-quarters of the APA women responded to the questionnaire, and not every woman psychologist is an APA member. Thus, the number of qualified women who are potentially available for academic work or upgrading is over 3,000, at a minimum—and the employment figures of women on the faculties of academic psychology departments do not reflect these figures.

In the field of sociology, according to Alice Rossi’s 1970 report to the American Sociological Association, 2,345 men were employed full time in 180 sociology departments, compared with 300 full-time women. Of the full-time women, 27 percent were full-time lecturers and instructors, 14 percent assistant professors, 9 percent associates, and 4 percent full professors. As in the national pattern of distribution, women faculty members in sociology were concentrated at the lowest, most undesirable levels, including women with Ph.D.’s and ten or more years of experience. High attrition rates among women students in graduate sociology departments were attributed to “the negative influence of the structure of typical graduate schools.”²

² Alice S. Rossi, “The Status of Women in Grad-

The Rossis mention other discriminatory practices in sociology that keep women "underqualified." Those employed on subprofessorial levels, even with a Ph.D. and years of experience, cannot apply for grants as sole principal investigators, while an assistant professor with a new Ph.D. and no prior research can do so.

Women are concentrated in social work, but even there only a small percentage rise in rank. At the University of Chicago, for example, only 2 percent of all professors in a 1968-69 survey were women; more than one-half of this total were in social work, that is, 6 of the 11 women professors at Chicago were concentrated in sociology's low-prestige departments. Formerly, in schools of social work, as in schools of education, women were deans. In administration in both fields, however, recent trends have been to replace women with men.³

In social work, education, and nursing, and in the modern language departments, too, a greater number of women is found than in other academic disciplines. In 1969, 37 percent of the modern-language faculties in the United States were women. However, of these only 33 percent worked full time, which means that two-thirds of the women then employed in modern-language departments were theoretically available for more desirable full-time jobs.

Of those women employed full time in modern languages, most held lower ranks than men and taught on the lower levels. In this group, 39 percent of the women were in the community colleges, sometimes comprising half the modern-language faculty in a single two-year school. By contrast, on graduate faculties merely 12 percent of the national total were women, and only 8 per-

cent of this total number taught graduate courses exclusively.

It may seem that 37 percent is a high rate of employment in modern languages, considering the present low status of women in higher education. In *this* field, however, it is not. Because of the large number of women potentially available for appointment in the field, the low rate of employment is more destructive than in most other disciplines. Among graduate students, according to James A. Davis,⁴ the figure for women studying modern languages in the early 1960s was 69 percent, of which 65 percent were in English. By 1969, Florence Howe (MLA) reported that only 55 percent of the graduate students in modern languages were women and even fewer were in Ph.D. programs. Many were "cooled out" before entering a long training program with no hope of a job at the end of the line. Others gave way under a pattern of discouragement by male professors. The testimony of many women bears witness to this pattern. Professor Howe maintained that the high percentage of male professors in graduate schools indicates to female students that women cannot "make it" to the top.

The concentration of women in the lower academic ranks at lower salaries is a serious economic aspect of discrimination against academic women. A pattern of nonpromotion and slow promotion is revealed in the 1969 data of the American Council on Education (ACE), which reported that 63 percent of all faculty women earned less than \$10,000, while only 28 percent of all faculty men were in that bracket. Another study of 1969 salaries showed that female instructors earned \$410 less than men, and female professors earned \$1,119 less than their male colleagues.⁵ In the ACE study of ranks, 21.9 percent of the male respondents

uate Departments of Sociology, 1968-69," paper, delivered on September 3, 1969, before the American Sociological Association; quoted by Peter Rossi, in "Statement and Resolutions of the Women's Caucus," *American Sociologist*, February 1970.

³ E. Alden Dunham, *Colleges of the Forgotten American* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970). Alan Pifer, speech, November 29, 1971.

⁴ J. A. Davis, *Great Aspirations: The Graduate School Plans of America's College Seniors* (Chicago: Aldine, 1964).

⁵ U.S. Department of Labor, *Handbook on Women*

were associate professors, while 15 percent of the female respondents were associate professors; 24 percent of males and only 9 percent of the females were full professors. The percentage for tenured women in all ranks was 38 percent in contrast to 49 percent for males. At Berkeley in 1970, for example, only 2 percent of the full professors were women.

Assuming a woman is able to find a job, she starts on a more or less equal footing with men. However, more men are promoted than women, and many women spend their entire careers in the bottom ranks, no matter what their professional contributions. Professor Sidney Hook, one of the more outspoken critics of "affirmative action," claimed that HEW enforcement agents did not understand how the university merit system worked. He explained that individuals are promoted by recommendation of their peers, and for a variety of reasons, sometimes for administrative service. Hook was especially troubled by the government's lack of understanding that in some situations a merit raise due to a woman might instead be offered to a man who could threaten to leave for a better-paying position. Professor Hook would have us believe that women who do not engage in academic pressure or cannot readily leave a location are not as worthy of merit raises and promotions as men—even if those women serve loyally, publish regularly, receive prestigious fellowships, and occupy administrative posts.

Other academics would have us believe that promotions are always based on academic merit and that, because women raise families, they do not stay on jobs long enough for promotion. Still others claim women do not publish enough or do not measure up in other ways. These critics fail to take into account that many women who found jobs before having children have been forced out by punitive maternity leave regu-

lations. Some untenured women, as in the case of a Brooklyn College woman, are demoted on their return to work. At New York Community College, a woman returning to her previous job level had to begin earning tenure credit all over again. These practices are now illegal, but the superstitions about women that engendered them are still widely held.

A national study on the job drop-out rates of women Ph.D.'s and their publication records, conducted by Helen Astin, answers the conventional objections about women. Astin proved that women's lack of job continuity and professional contributions has been grossly exaggerated. She showed, in fact that, as job candidates, women have more stability and promise than men. In *The Woman Doctorate in America*,⁶ she demonstrated that of the group of women Ph.D.'s studied, 91 percent were still working eight or nine years after receiving their Ph.D., 81 percent worked full time, and 79 percent had worked without interruption. Almost half were still on their first jobs, and 30 percent had changed jobs only once. As for publication, 75 percent had published, and 10 percent published considerably. The percentages for women in all categories were better than those for men.

Helen Astin's study also cleared the married woman with a Ph.D. of the charge of her alleged irresponsibility; "married women Ph.D.'s who were employed full time published slightly more than either men Ph.D.'s or unmarried Ph.D.'s." More than half the women studied by Astin were married and had families, though the percentage of childless women was twice that of the general population.

These national studies, many of them published in professional journals, unfortunately do not reach the average male professor or the general reader who insist on perpetuating antique myths—that qualified women are not available in the academic labor force, will not remain on their jobs owing to mar-

Workers (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969).

⁶ Helen Astin, *The Woman Doctorate in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

riage or family obligations, and do not publish. Within the academy, many dismiss such evidence on the ground that national statistics do not prove that, in individual departments in specific universities, qualified women in general or individual women with appropriate credentials have been victimized by sex discrimination. A number of these critics demand that, before they will be stirred into action, individual cases of discrimination must be proved. But the problem is that proof requires specific data, which many of these critics interpret and control.

Evaluation of a candidate's experience to determine entry-level salaries are almost exclusively subject to male judgments. In last year's job market, for example, a woman's dossier contained this statement: "Mrs. — though a woman and older should be as well received as a younger man." But "the dossier of a forty-year-old man asserted that one should hire this man; his distinguished career record (army, public relations) 'has been a better preparation for the university than uninterrupted schooling could have been' " (*MLA Newsletter*, September 1972). Salary records are closely guarded secrets in most universities, but even when discrepancies between men's and women's salaries are revealed, authorities insist that *their* estimates of merit are the only legitimate ones.

While national statistics demonstrate that patterns of discrimination against women are a national practice, the data required by HEW to develop specific corrective programs in individual colleges have been withheld by university officers. With the threat of cancellation of federal contracts and as a result of political pressures, such universities as Harvard, Michigan, Columbia, and Cornell have moved toward compliance over the protests of their faculties and are now developing techniques for assembling the information on hiring and personnel practices.

Over a 20-month period, the City University of New York refused to submit voluntarily full information and affirmative action programs. Recently, however, agreement

was reached that CUNY would supply information, provided the names of individual staff members remained anonymous. HEW will no longer act on individual CUNY cases, which are now to be handled by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

Meanwhile at CUNY, the Advisory Committee on the Status of Women, appointed by the university's chancellor, amassed data in preparation of two reports. The reports, one assumes, will have official sanction and will lead to an internal corrective program. Although the first report, in open hearings that were held last spring, has been released, the second, which contains exact data and recommendations, seems to be reserved for exclusive circulation. Its contents, according to Project Director Katherine Klotzburger, demonstrate discrepancies in hiring practice in a number of disciplines and departments. The patterns at CUNY, she maintained (in a speech, November 18, 1972, before the Women's City Club), are those of the nation. She referred to patterns of keeping women at bottom ranks; of concentrating women in community colleges, women's and former women's colleges, or in "women's disciplines"; of offering lower salaries to women than to men for similar job functions, and of limiting women's advancement opportunities. Yet, so far, no corrective program has been announced.

The CUNY Women's Coalition (CWC), an organization of about 700 women representing 16 campuses, anticipating a compromise between HEW and CUNY officials in the matter of enforcement, has assembled data from college catalogues, personnel print-outs, faculty lists, and other published materials. With these data, and with the full understanding that catalogues and lists are often inaccurate, CWC filed charges against CUNY with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Knowledgeable interpretations based on first-hand experiences of department practices accompanied these data.

Not surprisingly, the CWC data reveal the same patterns of discrimination found in the report of the chancellor's committee and in various national surveys. In some cases, however, the picture may be far more grim. New York is a city of graduate schools where the number of qualified women is higher than elsewhere in the country and interviews with graduating students are more easily arranged. Yet discrepancies between male and female appointments, ranks, and unit distribution, even within the same discipline, are more glaring in New York than on the national scene as a whole.

For example, the visibility of women in different English departments within the University differs widely from one unit to another. Yet all CUNY units have access to the same graduate labor pools, to the same bank of lecturers and part-time women with Ph.D.'s currently employed in CUNY English departments, and to the same national organizations and universities where local and out-of-town recruitments are made. One cannot account for the disparate treatment of women at different CUNY units on the ground that qualified women are "unavailable." For example, at Bernard M. Baruch College, which is a four-year school where the Ph.D. is required of women for positions with rank, more women, both in number and in percentage, are employed in the English department than at Bronx Community College, a two-year school that has lower job requirements.

This is not to say that the record of Baruch College is a good one. In 1971 its English department (formerly a part of CCNY's English department) employed a total of 39 women; only two were tenured, and only one had earned all tenure credits at Baruch, facts that reflect the history of prejudice against women at both CCNY and Baruch until 1965. Of the 39 women in Baruch's English department, approximately 12 worked full time during the 1971 period studied. There were no women professors or associates; the 12 full-time women were as-

sistant professors or lecturers. Thus, with a total staff of about 80, nearly half of whom were women, about 15 percent were full time, about 2.5 percent were tenured, and none had obtained senior rank.

At CCNY the English department reflects the same tradition of discrimination that has prevailed at Baruch. Although female students began to attend City College during World War II (when there were not sufficient male students), the department has maintained its discriminatory policy with few exceptions. CCNY statistics for 1971 showed a department of 104 members, 22 of whom were male full professors, 17 male associates, and 24 male assistants. In contrast, no woman was a full professor, 4 were associates (the only tenured women in the department), and 11 relative newcomers were assistants. Since 1968, only one woman (in remedial English) had earned tenure in the department, for although new women are hired each year, none is retained long enough to gain tenure. Thus, according to the study conducted by the CUNY Women's Coalition (CWC), 15 women of 104 faculty members held professorial ranks, yielding a percentage of 14.4—less than half of the modern languages' national average of available women. CCNY not only reflects historical patterns of discrimination but persists in the discriminatory practices of its founders.

According to national patterns, Bronx Community College should show better rates of hiring than senior units of CUNY, but it does not. In 1971–72, according to the CWC study, there was a total full-time faculty of 39. Of these, 14 were women, distributed by rank in the usual pattern: one professor, no associates, 5 assistants, 8 lecturers. Thus, at Bronx Community, women comprised only about 15 percent of the English faculty, and all but one were employed at the bottom ranks.

The Brooklyn College English department is nearly as bad. A coeducational senior college since its inception in the 1930s, Brook-

lyn College employed in its English department in 1971 a total faculty of 147. The women's number in professorial ranks had a pinhead and bulging midriff: 3 professors, 9 associates, and 7 assistant professors. A total of 19 women were in the professorial ranks, in contrast to 40 men. Only 27.5 percent of the total staff were women, of whom approximately 1 out of 4 was a full professor and 1 out of 2 an associate. Compared with national availability averages, Bronx Community, Baruch, CCNY, and Brooklyn nearly break the record for overt discrimination, both in numbers hired and retained in their English departments.

The evidence for prejudicial hiring and promotion practices in the English departments under examination should be conclusive. Yet some members argue it is not. They imagine that the large numbers of low-ranking women in community colleges, in former women's colleges, and new colleges somehow exonerate them of charges of discrimination. One is hard put to understand the logic of those who espouse equality of opportunity for qualified candidates, abstractly, but feel it need not be offered everywhere.

After months of negotiations with women of the Professional Staff Congress (CUNY's bargaining agent), and in the face of HEW's noncompliance finding of November 1970 and its finding for a Brooklyn College woman in 1971, CUNY officials shrugged their shoulders and kept their hands in their pockets. In June 1972, HEW gave CUNY ten days' notice to comply with employment information. CUNY refused, offering to surrender its government contracts rather than reveal confidential employment records. By the end of the summer, however, CUNY came to terms with HEW.

Universities will have at least five years to fulfill affirmative action goals. A show of "good faith," not actual recruitments of large numbers, will suffice to keep universities supplied with federal contracts—and a reasonable number of female appointees. But qualified women will be "unavailable" if

universities continue to keep openings secret or pick their candidates before interviews begin. Under the watchful eyes of academic women, the "good faith" of university men may have a chance to show itself. Without pressure, however, present practice forecasts the future: one need only cite the case of Joe Porter and Mary Gardner, told in the *Newsweek* issue of May 17, 1971. Young marrieds who had met in graduate school, the Porters had studied the same subjects, earned the same degree, and applied for jobs with the same qualifications, except that Mary was somewhat the better student. Joe received numerous offers—Mary received none.

What is needed for the improvement in the status of women is a fair chance for qualified women, not a system of quotas but supervised demonstrations of "good faith" in recruitment: positions announced, job descriptions and qualifications stipulated, papers and documents presented for applications, interviews—and reasons for hiring decisions filed for HEW's inspection and held against complaints from men or women who feel abused by "discrimination," or "reverse discrimination," which both are illegal.

I have faith in the studies that prove women make good candidates, and I believe it is time the competition was opened to public inspection with impartial judges watching the match. I have no faith in the judgment of chairmen who recently have been writing rejection letters to male candidates, blaming their rejections on HEW's requirement that women be hired. I believe that women and men recently hired won their jobs on the basis of equal qualifications.

It is to be expected in any era of change that those who must reconsider past practices will be troubled and will attack the instrument of change. It is understandable that HEW's desire for goals should be misinterpreted as quotas, for many university men still remember unfair quotas against Jews

of recent decades. They do not remember, because they never noticed, that many academic women suffered from those old quotas, too, as well as from the new "backlash." But I have heard of no case in any university in which men were dismissed in order to make way for women. As a recruit, no man owns the position he seeks; male candidates cannot "lose" positions they do not have. I do not believe that critics such as Sidney Hook or the Cornell professors who protested affirmative action in the *New York Times* (November 5, 1971, and January 6, 1972) fear displacement by women. I believe, as Alan Pifer does, that fantastic charges are "trotted out by the male academic simply to cover up his deep-seated aversion to having women as equal colleagues, as competition, and possibly even as superiors" (Pifer, in a speech, delivered November 29, 1971).

Despite HEW's efforts to show university men that "goals may not be rigid and inflexible quotas,"⁷ the critics continue to claim that they are. The concept of quotas is abhorrent to qualified academic women who have long been victims of that system. The Women's Equity Action League, women of the Professional Staff Congress (CUNY), and every professional women's committee, from MLA to ASA have spoken for high standards and fair hiring practices, goals, and timetables—not quotas. Such goals may be contrasted with actual quota systems developed for women students at such universities as New York University (University Heights campus), Yale, and other private as well as state institutions. Under those systems, the number of women admitted to coeducational programs is fixed and inflexible. A limited number of 200 first-rate women students each year were granted admissions at NYU (University Heights campus), skimmed from the top of high school classes so that underqualified male appli-

cants could be screened out. Although the purpose of coeducation was to upgrade the college where standards had been slipping for some time, the NYU quota system was designed to favor men rather than to assure the admission of the "best." Most critics of affirmative action have not been notable for opposition to sex quotas and to double standards in college admissions, despite the inequities revealed annually in American Council on Education surveys and despite the protests of women student groups and professional women who have repeatedly urged reforms.

Under an ideal affirmative action plan, the competition for each position would be *equal each time*; qualified women want that 50–50 chance. Pottinger agrees: corrective action means "men will simply be asked by their universities to compete fairly on the basis of merit, not fraternity; on demonstrated capability, not assumed superiority" (*New York Times*, December 18, 1971).

Assuming fair recruitment procedures are practiced according to HEW guidelines, there is, finally, the problem of choosing the best candidate among male and female applicants. How are we to know when a woman is better qualified than a man in question? Is it facetious to inquire how we have ever known a man was the better one? Eventually, women will sit on selection committees, and their opinions will be sought and valued. Meanwhile, men of good faith must learn from women. In the September 1972 issue of the *MLA Newsletter*, Professor Nancy Hoffman of MIT offered guidelines to men for recommending and evaluating women: avoid comments on her physical appearance, her marital status, and her feminist activities, if any. These guidelines can help those who wish to be helped. For the rest, Nancy Hoffman's conclusion is the most significant and the most difficult to achieve: "The need for consciousness-raising and for change should by now be apparent."

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⁷ Executive Order 11246, as amended, Title 41, December 1971.

Humanistic Socialism and the English Tradition

R. H. Tawney (1880–1962) is one of the most interesting socialists of Britain or any country. Hugh Gaitskell called him “the Democratic Socialist par excellence.” In his forthcoming book, R. H. Tawney and His Times: Socialism as Fellowship, Ross Terrill recounts Tawney’s life and sets out five key ideas in his political thought: equality, social function, citizenship, dispersion of power, fellowship.

We print here, with the publisher’s kind permission, a portion of the final chapter, “Tawney’s Importance,” which sketches the general traits of Tawney’s humanistic socialism. R. H. Tawney and His Times: Socialism as Fellowship, copyright © 1973 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College, will be published this fall by Harvard University Press.

Tawney’s socialism wears well because it is humanistic, which in the first place means it eschews historicism. Though Tawney was a historian and believed a sense of history essential to socialist politics, he saw socialism as a matter not of the movement of history but of the will of men.

He complained in “The New Leviathan” that not only conservatives and individualists, but collectivists too, envisaged society as an organism or a machine. The organism or machine was thought to be directed to a certain destination by a self-propelling force. The measure of a society’s health and success was the degree of perfection of the organism or mechanism, rather than the wishes and values of real-life people. This was true of Fabian collectivists and of Communists, and also of utopian socialists who projected a comprehensive ideal society.

There were times when Tawney’s humanism seemed to some fellow socialists an awkward piece of baggage to carry aboard the streamlined socialist locomotive. Yet in

retrospect it seems a key to Tawney’s achievement in sustaining an effective socialist appeal over half a century. Tawney was a *democratic* socialist because his socialism was humanistic, not because democracy seemed a good tactic, or a way of carving out a socialist position midway between communism and capitalism.

It is a commonplace that the democratic component of socialist theories which claimed to be democratic has had an uncertain career. Not only at the hand of Communists but also of Fabians like Shaw and Labour party intellectuals like Laski. But today it is arguable that the democratic character of socialism has become crucial.

In Tawney’s youth the natural appeal of socialism seemed to lie in its rationality, as against the irrationality of capitalism which had led Europe into World War I; and during the 1930s in its magic key of planning, to escape the disorder of capitalism which had produced the Depression. But in the 1970s, rationality is at a discount and plan-

ning is no longer the special badge of socialism. Instead, demands for participation, decentralization, the protection of diversity, preservation of humane intercourse amidst organizational and technical intricacies, all address afresh to socialist thought the democratic question it hitherto often found embarrassing or even a liability.

Socialism that is not democratic, that does not have "a human face," has little appeal in the industrialized countries. At the same time, given the current degree of disillusion with democratic forms, socialism that can achieve democracy at the basic levels of factory and neighborhood may have increased appeal among people who are not attracted by socialism as a metaphysic or as a gospel of economic planning. In a word, the appeal of socialism in industrialized countries today (unlike for many decades) may depend on whether it can prove itself *more democratic* than alternative systems. If so, Tawney's humanistic socialism offers clues.

One key to Tawney's humanism is the idea of history as an open-ended process. All three major streams of socialism in Britain, other than Tawney's own humanistic stream, seem to envisage a resting place for history when socialism is attained; Marxist, Fabian collectivist, utopian (as in William Morris's vision of the disappearance of politics). At first sight it seems that Crosland has Tawney's kind of open-endedness in his view of socialism and history. Yet looking back on what Crosland wrote in the 1950s (and on what Daniel Bell and other "end of ideology" prophets wrote in that decade) it appears that Crosland and Bell, eager to revise socialism, particularly to shear off what Bell called its "apocalyptic" trimmings, foreclosed political creativity by proclaiming the arrival of Western societies at a fixed post-ideological destination.

Viewed across the surge of political rebellion and theorizing of the late-1960s, Bell's "exhaustion of utopia" looks merely like the exhaustion of a "seduced" generation of ex-Marxists. Ironically, Bell's proc-

lamation of the end of ideology has all the marks of a frozen utopianism. Peter Sedgwick summed up a parallel point about "Croslandism." Fifteen years later it seems notable for its "sweeping rationalism" and for its "utopian vision of a world *controlled*." Bell and Crosland, deeply engaged in debating Marxism, came to seem enclosed in their own ideological straitjacket. Unlike Tawney, but like their Marxist adversaries, they discussed socialism in terms of the movement of history rather than in terms of the nature of man. It was this which enabled them to imply that the valley of politics, with its twists and turns, conflicts, moral issues, will somehow be left behind and a smooth administrative plateau attained.

George Lichtheim concluded that "Marx's humanism comes to appear utopian, while his political program is travestied by totalitarian regimes in the pre-industrial hinterland of the modern world." And if Marxism evaporates to an impossible ideal, democratic socialism is reduced "to the modest dimensions of an essay in economic planning." Yet these are not the only alternatives. Tawney's socialism neither leaps out of history to a fixed utopia, nor remains a mere essay in economic planning.

His socialism of right relationships among free and equal citizens keeps history open-ended and keeps men within history. Face to face with Marxism which, to follow Lichtheim for a moment, turned utopian because of disillusionment with Stalinism, Tawney asserted that socialism is for ordinary people here and now. If it means anything, there must be concrete political steps which can be taken toward it. Against the high priests of planning, especially "future-planning," Tawney spells out a never ending moral challenge to better social relationships, and to the creation by the people of their own patterns of social life by cooperative activity.

Tawney saw the industrial revolution as a continuing process, not an event in history. He did not think that once a Communist government industrialized a country it had,

by that act, created a new and finished type of society with its own values and its own solutions to the great questions of how men should arrange their common life. For the same reason he doubted that economic planning of the welfare state variety would itself deliver answers to all the problems and aspirations socialism had arisen to meet.

In terms of the varieties of socialist thought, Tawney's open-ended, humanistic emphasis can be located this way. Socialism as the rule of the proletariat may disappoint, because workingmen are no greater natural socialists than other men, and no matter how high they sit (to adapt Montaigne) they sit on the behind of their own human imperfection.

Socialism as the triumph of rationality may be exposed as a chimera, because it is no more rational for men to treat others as equals than to treat them as pawns, and because it is not certain that state officials will be more tightly guided by rational canons than private citizens.

Socialism as the ineluctable product of historical laws may become a casualty of 20th-century disillusion (and of the rebellion of free spirits), and seem a piece of intellectual imperialism no more to be honored than Adam Smith's idea of an invisible hand bringing wealth and harmony from the operation of the free market.

Socialism as an ideal, spun from the imagination, defiant of history and politics alike,

may evoke cynicism by the enormity of the abyss between its glistening shores and the muddy ground on which we presently stand.

But the possibility of socialism as fellowship remains a moral option at all points of history, in scarcity or abundance, town or country, so long as men's common humanity seems a sufficiently overriding concern for the institutions and incentives of society to be ordered so that people are within social reach of each other.

Some have puzzled about the fact that Tawney was radical in analysis yet moderate in strategy. But now we see that Tawney's moderation on questions of political method was not an uneasy compromise between competing extremes, but a direct result of a humanistic aspect of his socialism: respect for "Henry Dubb" as the man whom socialism is all about. Tawney was moderate because he claimed only what he knew could be delivered.

He was not one who would have liked to have been a conspiratorial revolutionary socialist, if only the need to oppose communism had not removed that option. He never became an anti-Communist out of the need to be safe and respectable, because he was a non-Communist out of a conviction that the Communist party did not respect the views and wishes of ordinary people. Discussing with a colleague the work of a young Marxist historian, Tawney urged on his colleague that here was a fine scholar of Tudor and Stuart England. The colleague, an anti-Communist, was resistant and said several times: "But he's a Communist, you know, he's a Communist." Tawney eventually enquired evenly: "Now is that a good thing or a bad thing?"

Yet if Tawney was not "a democrat by virtue of not being a Communist," he had no time for the British Communist party because of its readiness to abandon persuasion for coercion when necessary. The root of his caution about violent methods is a clue to the character of his political moderation. Tawney discovered on the fields of France that war was an awful thing, hated by the

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ordinary soldier. "One's like a merry, mischievous ape tearing up the image of God," he recounted of the Great War. "When I read now the babble of journalists about 'the sporting spirit of our soldiers' it makes me almost sick." Himself shot through the stomach during the advance on the Somme, Tawney was unimpressed by leftists who praised violent revolution but did not understand violence, and therefore, he felt, had no right to urge it on workingmen.

He got his views on war from his fellow soldiers, and his views on labor politics in large part from the people around Toynbee Hall and in Manchester, and the weavers, miners, and potters in his tutorial classes. Both sets of experiences made him the kind of moderate he was in political methods. It was the moderation of respect for the rank and file.

He was also moderate because he saw socialism as a way as well as a goal. There was no socialist destination qualitatively richer than the life of socialism which the labor movement could begin to create through concrete first steps toward socialist practices. Tawney viewed socialism as "principles" rather than "ideals," a conception probably derived from his Christianity. The man who sees an ideal state ahead asks, with St. Thomas, "We know not whither Thou goest; how can we know the way?"; but St. Thomas got from Jesus the answer: "I am the Way." Tawney said that the nature of socialism had to be discovered by taking steps along the socialist way. Although England was not yet socialist, for example, socialists could bear witness to socialism by declining "Honours" offered by a capitalist Establishment.

Does humanistic socialism mean simply principles of social morality? Should we say that Tawney was more of a Christian humanist than a socialist? I prefer only to say that the basis of Tawney's socialism was moral. In some ways Tawney does not seem a moralist. Since he thought mankind a speckled breed, he did not waste his breath appealing

for naked altruism. His socialism was not predicated on saintly conduct from the citizenry. The shape of socialism is structural; it does not require especially heroic types to make it work. On the other hand, the overall rationale of Tawney's socialism had to do with the quality of social relationships, and consideration of relationships brings us to morality.

Tawney thought inequality a profounder problem than poverty. It was a more characteristic mark of capitalism. Poverty was no greater under capitalism than it had been before. Poverty, a matter of conditions, hinders culture. Inequality, a matter of social relationships, hinders the spirit. It would be hard to find a stronger foe of poverty in his generation than Tawney. Nevertheless he did not think that poverty (short of destitution) need be degrading unless it was cheek by jowl with affluence. Inequality, on the other hand, was always degrading because it precluded human communication. So Tawney's socialism of right relationships had a moral root.

Tawney also held that ultimately a good society could not exist without good people. That did not mean that people had to be good *before* society could be good. On the contrary, Tawney said it was unreasonable to expect people to be good when, as under capitalism, they were treated not as ends but as means. He scorned moral exhortation directed at poor people and workers caught in the web of capitalist industry.

Tawney urged advance on two fronts at the same time: the shape of socialism was to be legislated; the dynamics of socialism were to be cultivated. The problems this raises come less from Tawney's theories concerning structures and conduct than from the largeness of the assumptions he made about the degree to which his own high standards were understood and accepted in society at large.

Again, Tawney was integrating a moral factor into the overall framework of his socialism. Socialist governments will not be able to accomplish great things by flicking a legis-

lative or administrative switch. That has been proved in China and the Soviet Union and must be truer of democratic socialist governments. During the 1920s, stress was placed, by Tawney and others, on the "growth of a social mind" and the "growth of new social tissue." The triumph of state power which came with the ideologies smothered this concern. Yet today the omniscience of political will is again severely in question. The difficulty of changing societies from the top alone is widely apparent.

In a fragmentary note about democracy Tawney wrote that "Democracy [is] a society where ordinary men exercise initiative. Dreadful respect for superiors. Mental enlargement. . . . Real foe to be overcome [is] fact that large section of public like pluto-

cratic government, and are easily gullible. How shake them!" Here is the point of his notion that only with good people can society itself be good. Tawney's genuine moral concern was a factor in his political realism.

The "end of ideology" theorists aborted the cut and thrust of democratic politics by positing a frozen condition of political consensus. They foreclosed political creativity, because they did not allow for (much less call for) the dialectic that ought to take place in a democracy between fundamental moral concerns and political policies. Tawney saw that the neglect of moral factors was ultimately weakening to a polity, and that a socialist theory built on a dialectic between moral and structural factors was the best kind. □

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No. 3-4

GYORGY MARKUS

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ERNST FISCHER

Georg Lukacs and the Theory of Reflection

ADAM SCHAFF

The Consciousness of a Class and Class Consciousness

AGNES HELLER

Von Der Armut am Geiste: A Dialogue by the Young Lukacs

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No. 1

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Benjamin R. Barber

Birthday-Party Politics

His past winter, while the rest of the country was marking off the troubled months with an inauguration, POW returns, and sky-rocketing food prices, adult New York, or a part of it, was occupying its days with a fornicating Marlon Brando, a million-dollar vase, and a birthday party for Norman Mailer—a movie, a pot, and a soirée. Each of these events involved names, money, promotion, “importance.” That is, prestigious stars whose names lent to the events a status that in turn enhanced their names; lots of money, relatively speaking (\$5.00 for a movie is as vogueishly outrageous as \$1 million for a pot, which is not much less astonishing than \$50.00 for a birthday party even when it’s Norman Mailer’s); self-promotion whose success seemed to depend primarily on shamelessness; and an aura of precedent-shattering “importance” wildly disproportionate to any actual impact on the life of our nation.

Take the movie, Bernardo Bertolucci’s *Last Tango in Paris*: it’s another cinematic tale about a menopausal male wrestling with his vacant middle years—this time egged on by his wife’s suicide and a decidedly anal affair with a sexy young girl. Not a bad movie, all things considered. There’s a little nudity, some splenetic cursing in the genital mode, and a brief bout with sodomy, hardly worthy of mention in the era of *Deep Throat*. Yet *Last Tango* swept into New York on a wave of publicity so irresistible that not even the senses of usually sturdy critics were left standing. Reservation-only tickets were on sale at \$5.00 a head and shows were limited to two per day thus guaranteeing “sold-out” houses for months. There were even critics who couldn’t get in, which seemed to convince those who did that *Last Tango* was more than just a good movie: it

was, said Pauline Kael, a “landmark in film history.” And so, “importance” creeps in. Why? Because the overblown sodomist (no pun intended) in the film is Marlon Brando? New York alone knows, because it has made *Last Tango* into an event whose significance bears no relationship to the film as film.

Or take the pot: an exquisite *krater* from the hand of the ancient master Euphronios. Nevertheless, there are quite a few pots at the Met, and none has drawn long lines or front-page headlines. The Euphronios *krater* is different: Thomas Hoving paid exactly \$1 million for it. Which quickly attracted the rival attentions of the *New York Times* and the Italian government, the latter quick to note the disappearance of a Euphronios *krater* from its Etruscan graveyard treasures. So, just as the movie becomes a *cause célèbre*, the pot becomes an international incident.

Or take the party, Norman Mailer’s fiftieth, one of those New York happenings that manages to vindicate all the worn middle-American stereotypes about big-city arrogance, impotent sophistication, and literary pusillanimity that seem too obvious to be true. Getting to be middle-aged has become a full-time occupation for educated American men, perhaps because many of them face their fortieth or fiftieth birthdays half-way through what they take to be their adolescence, not yet having quite achieved the potency of postpubescent maturity yet already up against the impotence of old age. It’s no wonder so many men ease timidly into their fifties. But Norman Mailer doesn’t ease timidly into anything. For Mailer has come to think of himself, in that peculiar New York way, as a critical American institution whose personal destiny is hardly to be distinguished from

America's public fate. No moonshots without Mailer's reinterpretations, no prizefights without Mailer's recreations, no political conventions without Mailer's restagings. Not that Mailer's literary mirrors haven't been brilliant, often more interesting than the events they are intended to reflect. But they have also distorted the self-image of the man.

And so, Mailer seizes on his fiftieth birthday and transforms it into an event: he rents New York's classiest tourist restaurant (the Four Seasons), sends invitations to several thousand people soliciting \$50 per couple, and promises to make every paying guest privy to "an announcement of national importance (major)."

It's an early February night, a chilly Monday. I am in a taxi, heading for the Four Seasons, guest of a legitimate invitee. Coming downtown I see a good deal of that other New York that rarely gets to East Side movies, hardly ever visits the Metropolitan Museum, and will never be invited to Norman Mailer's birthday party: unemployed black drop-outs sitting on side-street stoops, self-orphaned suburban run-aways peeping from ground-floor crashpads, harried waitresses from Tennessee and Kansas kept alive by a dimming faith in next week's open audition, underpaid teachers walking their guard dogs, wary cops only slightly less bitter than the minority populations they are supposed to protect, and God knows who's more scared of whom. . . . New York's Other America. But it's not their party. Because it's not really their city, the city that will pay \$50 to see what Mailer's dreamed up now, the city defined by the Colony Club and Chase Manhattan and the *New York Review of Books* and Elaine's and Lincoln Center and the *Village Voice* and Central Park South and, if he's a good looker like Lindsay, the mayor, and the *Times* and the Rockefellers and (the cab is pulling up in front of its tinted plate-glass facade) the Four Seasons.

Four or five hundred citizens of *this* New York have bought into Mailer's circus. For free many of them might not have come, least of all the masochistic press which seems almost pleased to have paid. The \$50 seems an irresistible magnet—like the price tags on *Last Tango* and the Met's *krater*. They are streaming in and it's only 10:30. Jimmy Breslin is

an early comer, which is how I find the swamped, undertended bar where a polite struggle for drinks will be waged all night. Mailer is across the room, receiving birthday congratulations, much more attractive in this avuncular role than he will be later as a pretend statesman. George Plimpton, whose presence certifies the evening as an event, has come early to stay late. Everyone here is apparently someone. The swarming photographers even eye me, weighing the odds, a wasted frame against a missed shot of someone who might turn out to be Alan Bates's brother or José Torres's new publicity manager. After all, Bates and Torres are here. So are Jacob Javits, Andy Warhol, Jack Lemmon, Sonny Rollins, Lady Jean Campbell, and Princess Egon von Furstenburg. And Charlie Mingus, Paul Desmond, Bobby Short, and what must be the entire staff of the *Village Voice*. And Paul O'Dwyer, possibly the only politician *not* running for mayor, and later Gene McCarthy. And Shirley McLaine and Rod Steiger and Murray Kempton. And Dotson Rader (remember Columbia in '68, Rader's *I Ain't Marchin' Anymore?*) who will be a heavy later in the evening. And of course Bertolucci, *Last Tango's* director. Self-promotions have a way of rubbing off on one another, producing a symbiotic static from which both derive energy—mirrors mirroring mirrors. (Three months later Mailer will devote eight lead pages of the *New York Review of Books* to some guardedly exuberant reflections on Bertolucci's *Last Tango*.)

Making it means being here, and the made are all here: the media, the *Voice*, literate prize-fighters, society dames, jazz greats, socially aware actors, hip politicians (tempered by prudence: Javits leaves when Mailer starts talking and McCarthy arrives when Mailer stops), and journalists. In fact, every journalist is a paying guest and every guest a potential journalist.

Nobody wants to appear too pleased at being present ("for \$50 ya gotta wait a half hour for a drink!"), but everyone is really tickled pink. ("What are we doing hear darling?" Giggles.) It's not just another New York party, it's an event. Like Bernstein's fling with the Panthers in an East Side living room; or the thing at Town Hall with Mailer up against the feminists where Jill Johnston of the *Voice* ended up making love (sort of) to some female friends on stage; or the preview screenings for

Last Tango where even the critics had to *know* somebody to get in. And here is Mailer at it again, another milestone in his lugubrious journey from private literacy to public buffoonery.

What did the invitation say? “. . . an announcement of national importance (major).” Important because Mailer says it’s important. Just as the crisis in the cities is “over” because Richard Nixon says it is over. But the announcement comes later. Curiosity, interest, drama have to build slowly on a foundation of clinking glasses and cocktail chatter. First the pushing and shoving around the bar, the nibbling at a dreadful buffet, and the craning necks and peering eyes searching out the packed house for *other* self-respecting celebrities whose presence will justify one’s own. Breslin is clearly the man to be drinking with, but Torres is the only one getting any drinks. An exchange in homely Spanish with the bartender, and his friends’ glasses are immediately refilled.

UNTIL NOW only snobbery has been in the air. With the approach of the announcement an atmosphere of impudence wafts in. The crowd won’t shut up. As if nobody really believes Mailer’s voice is more interesting than his own. And announcement or not, it’s supposed to be a party isn’t it? Jimmy Breslin is at the mike trying to introduce Mailer. Sensing the crowd’s dedicated narcissism, he starts yelling good-naturedly about how Mailer’s books will still be read a hundred years from now, which is more than he can say for anybody else’s books, so why doesn’t everybody pipe down and listen to Mailer. Breslin knows better than to expect a hush from this gathering, but the milling does subside some and Mailer takes the podium. His opening is uncertain, affably sloppy. He’s looking to grab his audience obliquely, deploying a joke or two like any after-dinner speaker. Something about how people are saying the \$50 contributions have been ear-marked for his vasectomy . . . (there is a lot of fiftyish male-menopausal humor here tonight—the middle-aged exhibitionist caught somewhere between genital bravado and fears of impotence).

Mailer’s on to something else now, something about no more pictures thank you because the flashbulbs make him feel too much like Nixon’s eyeballs . . . but it’s getting hard to follow Mailer over the rising chatter of a crowd that

appears already to have concluded that Mailer is probably too drunk or kinky or put-on or far-out to really say anything of national importance (major). Mailer demands silence, appealing winningly to the \$50 everyone paid to hear him. Voices ebb and he plunges into his announcement: “For once I have had a political idea that has nothing to do with myself,” he proclaims, as if this liberation from his ego might finally in and of itself produce a solution to the nation’s crises. He really *means* it. It’s not just an ego trip because, he remonstrates, “I am much too vain, incompetent, and stupid to give the kind of leadership my idea requires.” Which ipso facto makes it “the best Idea I have ever had.”

The crowd is listening again, drawn in by these antics. It’s a clever game, Mailer talking about how *good* his idea is without yet revealing what the idea actually is. “Hey, ya gonna run for mayor again Norman?” asks someone who has apparently missed the whole point about Mailer’s emancipation from ego. No, no! cries Mailer and launches abruptly into another joke. Dirty this time. And long. It’s about this amiable divorcée whose ex-husband wants to know how her new lover likes (in Mailer’s unparaphrasable prose) “sticking it up her worn-out old pussy.” In response to which she allows as to how her new stud likes it just fine “once he gets beyond the worn-out part.”

Snickers and overly-appreciative groans bounce knowingly around the room in a sound remarkably like the one that greets Brando in *Tango* when, leering at his own groin, he urges Maria Schneider to regard his organ as her happiness . . . her “ha-penis,” get it? But the laughter is uncertain and nobody knows what the hell Mailer is talking about. “The point is,” he’s saying, reaching desperately for some metaphoric semblance of continuity, “I want to get by your worn-out old brains with this new idea. . . .” Mailer seems on the brink of sexual bathos—if only we fifty-year-olds can get it up America will stop falling down—and is rushing on with vague passion about the growing dangers of totalitarianism, the need to combat the insidious powers of the CIA and the FBI . . . no, don’t get him wrong, it’s not the Press he’s defending, they deserve whatever they get . . .

People are looking at each other with that

speechless self-consciousness that denotes a common discomfort. Javits pushes a lady off his lap and leaves with an alacrity that suggests he wishes he had left ten minutes earlier. Mailer is moving toward the main moment, the essential announcement. Only it's awfully difficult to hear him. "We need" comes his voice, floating out over this increasingly indifferent sea of \$50 faces, "we need to get together here . . . get together into some kind of steering committee . . . to set up a foundation . . . some kind of foundation to investigate the CIA . . . to investigate the FBI . . . a citizen's CIA . . . a counter-FBI . . . to investigate the investigators. . . ." It's pretty noisy now ("What'd he say? Investigate the who? Ya mean *that's* the idea? For \$50, that's the idea?") and a certain postclimactic weariness sets instantly in. ("Ya know, I've been ta better Bar Mitzvahs than this.")

Not that Mailer's through. "I want questions," he's shouting, "not just *any* questions, I want *hostile* questions." He knows he's losing them: friends are looking pained and rivals are looking contemptuous while everybody else is looking for the exits. "Some one *challenge* me!" he demands. A jaded voice from the rear accommodates him: "How about paranoia Norman?" it says. That seems pretty hostile to me, but it's apparently too friendly for Mailer. He's still calling for questions. Dotson Rader, his studiously anachronistic black leather jacket capturing the center of the room, gets into a real question, an involuted political analysis even less clear than Mailer's announcement. It's all over now. Mailer's gonna investigate the man who investigates the man who . . .

What's left of the party picks up—moving back toward the bar and the kitchen. Mailer can't make out Rader any better than we can and he's suggesting a half-hour break to ponder his idea. "Then I'll be back to answer really serious questions." But this isn't the American Political Science Association taking a coffee break between phases of a survey research panel, and everyone knows Mailer won't be back. Dotson Rader sees his opportunity slipping away, and charges Mailer at the podium, his leather jacket quivering as he shoves home his points. Mailer listens and grins (at least *somebody* is *challenging* him, taking him seriously) and the indefatigable Press press in, hop-

ing for some private bit that might save their stories or justify their evening or redeem their lives.

George Plimpton knows Mailer won't be back. He is settling in with a few friends at a large table and making it *his* party. Breslin knows as well. He's back in the other room trying to get Gene McCarthy a drink ("fer Christ sake, give the Senator a drink huh?"). But he's not José Torres and the Senator has to wait, settling eventually for a Scotch in place of the Brandy he wants. The Senator looks terribly tired, tired of parties, tired of events, tired of politics; but then he's been fifty for quite a while, and he looked tired to me in 1968. It's time to go home.

The *New York Post* editor behind me in the cloakroom figures it's been a good party, which is all he ever figured it for in the first place so he's not complaining. But the papers the next day take the event much too staidly, too glumly, as if *Consumer Reports* had done a special number on Diesel generators. Yet at the same time they take the *idea*, the announcement, too lightly, like Little Orphan Annie had said something cute about pogroms. Mailer's follow-up news conference the next afternoon is apparently only a news conference. No \$50 come-ons. No dirty jokes. No free bar where you can't get a drink. The snobbery all went home with the guests. But the effeteness lingers still. The impotence of class and money and literacy in the face of real power in America. And the naiveté with which that impotence is disguised as charm and refurbished as style. The uselessness of adolescent rage in addressing real evil in America. And the arrogance with which uselessness is construed as virtue. The insensibility of good intentions in responding to real suffering in America. And the cheapness with which that insensibility mimics conscience and is allowed to posture as political action.

No wonder our children don't want to grow up. The best of the grownups, reaching fifty, seem only to want to be children again, wishing goodness into being, shooting down the bad guys with nothing more than a cocked finger, talking away their brother's tears with fables, glossing a hostile outside world whose realities are too grim yet to be countenanced—and having such a good time all the while. This is dropping out on a colossal scale, a

true *trahison des clercs* that leaves the solution of real political and economic dilemmas to those sorry semiadults who have somehow achieved all the hard realism and self-discipline of maturity without any of its saving wisdom or humility.

For all the talent and wealth and status, there was no hope for America at the Four Seasons that Monday night in February. It was birthday-party politics at its worst. □

Patricia Cayo Sexton

Organizing a Labor College

It might not speed us on our road to socialism, but it might nudge us a bit in that direction if the organizations we look to for leadership and enlightenment had names that were compelling or at least memorable. Take AFSCME DC 37, for example. What is it—a license plate? It is, in fact, a very fine union, but it has a name that, while describing its jurisdiction, can hardly be expected to shake the world. A few unions are better endowed, but not many. UAW—the name is short and has a certain symmetry. Teamsters—yes, for some people, the word at least suggests *something*. AFSCME, or alternately “State-County,” suggests nothing of the prodigious vitality of that union.

The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, District Council 37 is the New York City district (and the dominant one) in a union headed nationally by Jerry Wurf and locally by Vic Gotbaum. Both the union and the men are relative newcomers

to big-time unionism, and perhaps partly for that reason are outstanding among their peers, as judged by integrity and energy of leaders, loyalty of members, internal democracy, bargaining gains, and, not least, phenomenal growth in a jurisdiction (government) that seems likely to expand. State and local governments are now the fastest growing sector of the economy.

Something new at DC 37 is what may be the first accredited labor college (i.e., union-sponsored) in the history of American, if not world, unionism.* It will not be the last.

The college opened in the fall of 1972, only about two months after Bernie Rifkin, the union's education director, first talked with New Rochelle, the sponsoring college. The swift consummation of this brief courtship was possible because New Rochelle is small and maneuverable (also Catholic and headed by a woman, a nun), and because the union, any union, is the institution most likely to succeed in recruiting adults for education. It has a large and loyal membership, it is job-based, it has offices, staff, classrooms, a newspaper, regular meetings. These, plus a mission to teach people, yielded this new educational happening. Its opening was announced in DC 37's newspaper. Hundreds applied. The college started up with 153 students, 20 in the labor leadership training program (with instructors provided by Cornell's School of Industrial and Labor Relations), and 130 in the regular liberal arts program. About half these students pay their own tuition and half get full reimbursement. Since there are now about 500 applicants, the college will expand to about 180 next term, and perhaps one day to a top of about 2,000 students.

Students were chosen in an inspired way: by lottery. No politics, no elaborate testing, no admissions deans to make subtle distinctions, based on gross impressions. The names of the

* The claim needs a few footnotes: (1) The college was created and largely funded through DC 37, but it is technically the DC 37 campus of New Rochelle College, which runs the academic program. (2) Also, mainly as a result of Harry Van Arsdale's efforts, Empire State College (a school “without walls” and part of the New York State University system) has founded a labor college in New York City, but it is of a rather different genre, without walls or classes.

winners chosen by lot. Simple, fair, and enormously appealing to workers, who are more sceptical than most people of the "merit and ability" criteria of selection. To qualify for admission, students needed a high school diploma or its equivalent and the ability to write acceptable English. Applicants were given an editorial from the *New York Times* and asked to write their reaction to it. Results were as good, some staff members judged, as the writing of most competent college students.

Before finding New Rochelle College, the union had talked with some 15 other schools. None was interested enough to proceed. Colleges, slow enough in usual cases, are often especially thoughtful about admitting quantities of (a) workers, (b) minorities (of which there are many in DC 37), and (c) working adults, who rarely follow in the professor's academic footsteps.

In some cases, the problem was with college credit for life experience. The mature and experienced students at the labor college now get up to 30 hours of credit for what they have learned outside schools. In other cases, the need was for a college that would respond quickly to specific worker demands, such as studies in the allied health professions, social work, technical subjects.

New Rochelle was an active partner from the first. Tom Taaffee, at the invitation of Joe McMurray, then president of the College, had been given several years to develop the New Resources Program, through which the DC 37 students now earn their BA. The Program made the first contact—though the union had actively, and vainly, sought a college sponsor. The chief movers, on the College side, were Joe McDermott, director of the New Resources Program, and Tom Taaffee, who is now the full-time head of the DC 37 campus. Both worked with the full support of the College's new president, Dorothy Ann Kelly. "From the beginning," Taaffee says, "I thought of the New Resources Program as a possible path to a bachelor's degree for the working person." If institutions were given medals as people are, I would love to hang one on New Rochelle.

THE CURRICULUM of the college is still being shaped. Pushing and pulling on it are New Rochelle (which has an experimental, inter-

disciplinary approach) and some of the unionists (who seem to favor a more traditional academic and vocational approach). Either way, it may not matter much. What seems to matter is less the subject than the people who teach it.

The college, running on the trimester, offers a four-year liberal arts degree. Fully employed students can, however, earn a degree in less than four years by assuming an extra homework load and taking 36 credits each year. Students want homework, but most complain there is far too much of it.

On the whole, complaints are minimal, enthusiasm is maximal. Only about three people have dropped out, and attendance is almost perfect. Bogdan Denitch, who teaches a course there (as do Mike Harrington and Gus Tyler), calls it (and I quote) a "darling little college." An evaluator need not examine the outcome with fine instruments to see that the college works beautifully. Why? It is the institution itself, the intimacy of relations between staff and students. It is accountability and participation, and trust and loyalty. As those of us at universities know, institutional loyalty is almost a vanished attribute of college life. In this case the loyalty is based on the students' sense that the college and the union are "theirs," elected by their votes, paid for by their dues. Call it participation, involvement, or workers' control—but it's there, and it works, *just as it would in factories*.

The loyalty facilitates communication and learning, and the school becomes less institutional and impersonal, more like home, familiar, nonalien. The average age of students is about 40, so they feel more comfortable together than among younger students at evening colleges. When they have a gripe, they know to whom to complain—a steward, someone higher up in the union. But, as Bernie Rifkin says, "they feel they're not going to get screwed when they deal with the union."

Size is also important. No big bureaucracies, absentee administrators, clerks hidden away somewhere who won't give you the exam scores. All the makers of decisions are on the spot. The college is housed in an adequate but unprepossessing AFSCME building in downtown Manhattan. The building is not meant

to awe people or commemorate the powerful; it is modest and functional and allows people to sense their own authority rather than their masters'.

The cost of the college is not great, nor is it small: about \$33 a credit point, which is reimbursed to half the students after successful completion of courses. The money comes from the Union's Education Fund, a unique endowment that is administered solely by DC 37 and into which the city, by union contract, contributes about \$1 million a year for career upgrading.

The Fund is invested in some innovative ways—all to the purpose of career growth for city employees: a high school equivalency program, exam preparation, college reimbursement, and now the labor college. Under the reimbursement program, about 1,500 covered employees got tuition remissions last year, for whatever college they attended, up to \$450 per person.

The labor college grew out of the union's high school equivalency program and is the latest episode in the development of the career growth concept, an idea that desperately needs more application to private employment. Advancement in city jobs is based to a large extent on training, education, exams. After about 500 students got their GED (General Education Diploma) through the union program, people began to wonder, what next? Graduates could enter a community college, and more than a third did, but the need for a labor college was as obvious as it had been for a high school equivalency program. The union tried to work with colleges in the city, but it found they couldn't meet the special needs of a small group of workers. If the group was large, the college would say it needed two years lead time to get organized, and then wanted guarantees that the program would last three or four years. This necessity mothered the invention of the labor college.

The Union's high school equivalency program is reputed to be the strongest in New York City, with the lowest attrition rate and the highest percentage of students passing the equivalency exam. Its popularity is such that there has never been, in its four-year span, enough space to accommodate all those who apply.

THE EQUIVALENCY PROGRAM works so well because it has an immediate payoff: better jobs, more money. The union, in an unusual symbiotic relation with both workers and employers, offers its members upward mobility as well as a new kind of "class struggle." Few unions can do this because few private employers have a career upgrading system for unskilled and semiskilled blue- and white-collar workers.

The purpose of the Education Fund is to upgrade workers, not make them better employees; to make a typist a secretary, not a better typist. The city wants the union to train workers to do their jobs better, but the union declines, assuming that the city is more suited to that task. The union tries, however, to let members know that they are not in dead-end jobs, that they can move up. Morale of city employees has risen sharply because of it. A nurse's aide, seeing 400 others pass the Licensed, Practical Nurse exam, figures she can do it too. Then she may conclude that she, like others, can become a registered nurse. A family worker earns 30 hours of college credit and becomes a family assistant—a better job and more money. A family assistant earns 60 hours of credit and becomes a parent program planner—again, more responsibility, more money.

The union also acts to change the upgrading system, to redefine jobs and job qualifications, to get the city to make the rules more reasonable and flexible, to persuade it, for example, to let hundreds of people (who in the Union program were on the brink of getting a high school diploma) take an exam for senior clerk that only high school grads had been eligible to take.

A large part of the upgrading work consists of training people to take civil service exams. The city announces an opening for senior clerk and there are 10,000 clerks eligible to take the exam. The union offers exam training to those who want it. People are sometimes trained, in effect, to leave the union. A lot of time and money was spent training about 400 nurses' aides to become Licensed Practical Nurses, whereupon they were moved out of the union's jurisdiction.

All this adds up to a sizable educational enterprise. It may not be high drama, but it is the daily fare that makes life worth more to many thousands of people. In 1972, a grand total of

about 43,000 people took part in DC 37's education work.*

Enrollments are climbing as fast as the membership of AFSCME, which is currently over 600,000 nationally, and about one in six of these are in DC 37. Because AFSCME's jurisdiction includes virtually all government workers except those at the federal level and at local levels, teachers and some uniformed services (firemen, police, transit), it has a wildly heterogeneous membership, one that looks much like the IWW, the one big industrial union. Almost every occupation and ethnic group is present. DC 37, for example, has five

* This includes about 3,800 in traditional union education (about 1,900 in stewards' training classes and about 2,000 in out-of-town stewards' conferences). It includes about 5,000 in career training and upgrading (about 1,100 in high school equivalency, about 1,800 in training with the hospital corps, about 2,100 in exam preparation courses of various kinds, about 10,000 in a TV exam training program on income maintenance. It also includes about 8,000 in peripheral activities (travel, ballet, retirees' activities, summer camp, art classes).

major job divisions: clerical (about 28,000 members), school, except teachers (about 14,000), hospital (about 16,000), blue-collar (about 12,000), professional (about 15,000). The hospital workers, who came into the Union only six years ago, are among the most well-organized, partly because they are concentrated in only 20 large public hospitals, and partly because of Lil Roberts, their extraordinary leader. Almost all the hospital workers are women, and almost all are black and Puerto Rican. The most solid unionists are the blue-collar workers, who are mainly male and "ethnic" (Italian, Irish, etc.), and who have been around a long time and understand unionism.

The union is at its best, not in the classroom but at the bargaining table. Its relation to government gives it more bargaining leverage than unions in the private sector, and more influence in politics and the formation of public and employer policy. All things considered, it has probably done more to lift up the poor than programs specially designed for that purpose. It has raised wages, pensions, medical and dental care, though many public workers are still barely over the poverty line. It has trained leaders and organized people to influence their own lives. It has gone far in promoting career growth and job upgrading, the labor college being only the most recent effort.

Last but not best, DC 37 has Lillian Roberts, the number two person in the district. She is black, beautiful, able, articulate, tough but very human and womanly. She is the champion of the district's educational work and the person who conceived the idea of a labor college (also a medical school which she thinks the district should have one day). A one-time nurse's aide from Chicago, she is now the leader of the union's hospital workers. Vic Gotbaum, who stimulates so much activity by example, and Bernie Rifkin, who planned and pursued the college, call her the labor college's "secret weapon." I would add that she is one of the most remarkable women in American life (not to mention the labor movement)—and one of the most unrecognized.

In a sense DC 37 and Vic Gotbaum are now almost synonymous, so closely tied is the District's image and accent to his leadership. Reflections of that luminous image, and marks of its quality, are Lillian Roberts and a membership that is expanding in knowledge and capacity as well as in size. □

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Bennett M. Berger

A Fan Letter On Erving Goffman

You make a pass:

The initiator exposes himself to rejection and to the judgment that he is undesirable, which judgment anyone who keeps his distance is allowed to avoid; the recipient exposes herself to providing personal evidence of another's desirability without obtaining the relationship that is the usual safeguard of this admission. The solution is strategic tact. The initiator undertakes to be tentative enough and discourageable enough so that if he is to be rejected, this can be done delicately, by indirection, as it were, allowing him to maintain the line that no overture had been intended. And the recipient, when desiring to encourage an overture does so in a manner that can be seen as mere friendliness should the need arise to fall back on that interpretation. . . . An ambiguity thus results, but this does not derive from some lack of consensus, failure of communication, or breakdown in social organization, but from competent participation in the relationship game.

What is there to say about Erving Goffman after uttering some helpless gasps about his brilliance? I had the impulse recently to say to a group of sociologists we were bantering with: be good to him, he's the only genius we've got, and we ought to cherish him while he's still here with us. What is it that makes me feel so tender and protective toward this man, whose abrasiveness in print and in person is by now legendary, and which makes him fair game for

practitioners of the put-down for much the same reasons that movie hard-guys must occasionally contend with barroom toughs testing their macho?

I'm not sure I know the answers to these questions; I'm not even sure it would be useful to know them. But I think they have something to do with grace and with blessedness, with roughness in the service of delicacy and delicacy in the service of truth. Goffman makes me feel less alone as a sociologist; however temporarily, reading him replaces my usual sense of mild disaffection from most of my colleagues with an almost prideful sense of identification with the profession to which we both "belong." More than any social scientist I know who is constantly touching the subtlest and most intimate details of social life, Goffman's efforts to speak truly and precisely are least compromised by moral posturings, knowing leers, or other vulgar ego trips, and given the temptations of his material, that is itself a sort of moral triumph. Of all the "remarks" one might make after observing the eyes of a luncher civilly inattentive to the tits of a topless waitress hovering over his plate, Goffman says only, "When bodies are naked, glances are clothed."

Like Max Weber, Goffman, has a strong sense of decency and propriety, without any cognitive grounds for believing that his sense is any better than anyone else's. As you might expect, this generates a good bit of pressure—his moral feeling on his analytic efforts, his conspiratorial

This essay is occasioned, in part, by Goffman's most recent book, *Relations in Public: Micro-studies of the Public Order* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

sense-of-the-real on his cheerful disposition—which gives him that nice edge, the good-humored, bad-boy outrageousness which, when it breaks a rule of conduct that others maybe “knew” but weren’t sharply aware of, both instructs them in “the social construction of reality” and reminds them that there are still sociology teachers abroad in the land: passing by a group of old friends in a hotel lobby at a sociologists’ convention, he was once heard saying loud and clear, “If I can’t find anybody more important to talk with, I’ll come back and talk with you.” A jaunty terrorist with a confident voice reminding us that in this world’s bag full-to-bursting with banal sentiment, anybody who says something cruel and true can’t be all bad.

I mean I like his taste: lean, spare, severe, contained. He is constantly putting his scientific discipline to the test of emotionally volatile facts that would reduce most other writers to orgies of hortatory indignance or sonorous affirmation. The facts he deals with in his most recent book, *Relations in Public*, are the ones he has always dealt with, the stuff of elementary sociology: the fundamental units of social structure, selves, norms, roles, interaction between face-to-face individuals, the rules of “co-mingling” in public places. His preoccupations are with what anyone can see, but usually doesn’t unless he looks carefully and with fresh eyes; how greasy and creamy foods contaminate the hands but not the mouth, why elbows are the least “private parts” of the body, why “A person with carcinoma of the bladder can, if he wants, die with more social grace and propriety . . . than a man with a harelip can order a piece of pie.” Goffman writing about the surfaces of human contact reminds one of Gide saying, “The deepest thing in man is his skin.” But instead of Gide, Goffman, who wants to be regarded as a social theorist, quotes Herbert Spencer to set the theme of his book:

. . . the earliest kind of government, the most general kind of government, and the government which is ever spontaneously recommending, is the government of ceremonial observance. . . . This kind of government . . . has ever had, and continues to have, the largest share in regulating men’s lives.

Ceremonial observance governs. It is not for nothing that Goffman’s favorite sources in-

clude Emily Post and Amy Vanderbilt (for “manners,” like art, religion, and symbols of nationality, are part of the expressive culture, and offenses to even the most apparently trivial of manners may evoke feelings—and sanctions—as strong as those evoked by offenses to those nobler institutions), or that he is sometimes compared to novelists of manners who are concerned with revealing how people struggle with these social forms to get their self-work done.

In *Relations in Public*, ceremonial observance governs individuals as “vehicular units” going to and fro in the world and up and down in it, and as “participation units” (“singles” and “withs”) communicating evidence about who they are to unknown others. It governs the accounts and the apologies offered and received by offenders and offended when the engine of interaction develops knocks and pings, and requires remedial attention; it governs, too, the little supportive rituals without whose mercies “unsatisfactory persons would be left to bleed to death from the conversational savageries performed on them.” Goffman’s gifts are for describing how (not merely asserting that) “the individual stakes out a self, comments on his having done so, even while others are taking the whole process into consideration in coming to their assessment of him, which consideration he then takes into consideration in revising his view of himself.” I have seen people become fidgety when Goffman walks into a room, suddenly self-conscious that their apparently effortless sociability might reveal something unintentional.

With good reason. Goffman is interested in the history of the struggle to achieve that apparently easy order:

To walk, to cross a road, to utter a complete sentence, to wear long pants, to tie one’s own shoes, to add a column of figures—all these routines that allow the individual unthinking, competent performances were attained through an acquisition process whose early stages were negotiated in a cold sweat.

Goffman can often be found there at the negotiations, bearing neither deodorant nor dry towels nor any other comfort for the clammy; he is there appraising the quality of the perspiration, classifying its chemical composition, cataloguing the conditions of its secretion, sniffing the air to check the comparability of the aroma from one case to the next.

II

COMBINE THE BRILLIANCE with the disciplined detachment and the conviction about the *governing* character of interaction rituals, and comments are invited in these politicized times about where Goffman's political sympathies lie. Gifted thinkers are potentially valuable political properties, and Goffman has recently become the subject of considerable speculation among the realtors of the Left. It began a few years ago with some devaluation by Alvin Gouldner, who criticized Goffman in *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology* for his failure to deal explicitly with the political conditions of social interaction: how the greater power and wealth of some people give them greater access to favorable self-presentation; how the restrictions on significant political choice in capitalist society induce people to play self-demeaning image games instead of projecting their more wholesome selves.

More recent rejoinders have attempted to claim Goffman as a resource for the Left by pointing out his sympathy for the afflicted and the stigmatized, for underdogs like mental patients. They point to his implicit criticism of the degradation of human beings by established institutional routines, his exposure to analysis of the commercial exploitation of personal sentiments like love or sincerity, or his Kafka-like fascination for words such as machinations, chicaneries, contrivances, deceptions, disguises, collusions, plots, concealments, ploys, devices, simulations, ruses, stratagems, maneuvers, and cons (all of which recur throughout his text), and for the imagery of

secret hiding places, slots in bedroom walls . . . trap doors, panels that open to reveal stairways into caves, permanently locked rooms, hidden entranceways, bars on the windows and doors, sudden failures of the light, eerie sounds, concealed machines of destruction. . . .

Well, all right, Goffman's imagination is Kafkaesque; or Gothic. He doesn't much like institutional caretakers. And he probably doesn't care much for routinized inhumanity. But when a *New York Times* writer concludes his praise for Goffman with an all-together-now exhortation that Goffman join with him and others for the important political struggle ahead, he is simply not reading carefully. And when a writer for the *American Sociologist* concludes his defense of Goffman with the as-

sertion that he "should be read as a radical sociologist" he is inviting disappointment because live thinkers cannot be consistently depended upon to satisfy the claims of political constituencies. The conservative Edmund Burke supported the American Revolution; the aristocratic Ortega y Gasset, who hated and feared the rise of the masses, recommended the extension of higher education to them. Marx and Trotsky, the communist revolutionaries, had bourgeois tastes in art, and the anarchist Paul Goodman described himself late as a "neolithic conservative." If Burke, Ortega y Gasset, Marx, Trotsky, and Goodman, all of whom were explicitly involved in politics, cannot be depended upon to fulfill the expectations of partisan interests, this can even less be expected of Goffman, who has never to my knowledge shown any sustained interest in movement politics.

Let's take Goffman at his word: ceremonial observance governs. Certainly he knows that there are political meanings and consequences in such observance, and he has not ignored them. But it is clearly mistaken to infer from his occasional political feints and jabs any strong desire to aim a knockout punch for doctrinal reasons on behalf of the oppressed at any heavyweight establishment. Where he can be read politically, the evidence is in brief and edgy "remarks," and if, as Gertrude Stein is said to have said, "Remarks are not literature," then political remarks are not political positions. Goffman's political remarks are usually made not primarily for their political impact but in connection with some relatively abstract theoretical point which he is tempted to illustrate with a homely and cutting example. Thus when he implies that members of the Boy Scouts of America stash marijuana, he is less interested in "laying bare" the fact that these prides of the Lions Club smoke dope (and maybe commit others crimes), than in generalizing the fact that people suffer moments of alarm when in danger of being found out.

Or, when Grayson Kirk looks at the shambles of his trashed presidential office at Columbia University after the 1968 trouble, and piously cries, "My God, how could human beings do a thing like this?" Goffman's "political" response is to say that the real question is, "how is it that human beings do this sort of thing so rarely? How come persons in authority have been so overwhelmingly successful in conning those be-

neath them into keeping the hell out of their offices?" Score one against Grayson Kirk's naïveté, but don't jump to the inference that Goffman's sympathy is with the trashers, even if he does use "conning" instead of "persuading." His question, after all, is only a specification of "the Hobbesian question"—how is social order possible?—a favorite theoretical question that has consistently commanded not only Goffman's attention but the attention of the most conservative social scientists, for whom order itself is a fragile, precious, and mysterious achievement.

BUT obsessed as he is with the microstructure of social order, Goffman has none of the conservative's piety about Rules. He knows that some people profit more than others from a given set of rules for social order, and that some rules produce more inconvenience than they're worth,¹ and even that society can get along quite well with fairly high rates of rule-breaking. But neither does he have much of the radical's fondness for moral indignation over the injustice of rules or their application; as always, the attitude is clinical, detached, morally ambiguous. When a rule of conduct between two individuals is broken, "A bit of the definition of actor and recipient is threatened, as is to a lesser degree the community that contains both." But he says also that in many circumstances rule-breaking doesn't appreciably undermine the support that others give to the rules:

... in fact, pure self-interest should lead the individual to encourage others to guide their conduct by an image of what would happen were everyone to cease to support the rule, and while thus encouraging the others, he himself should quietly disregard the rule.

Thus is the categorical imperative disposed of; take *that*, Immanuel Kant! There is a little Nietzsche somewhere in Goffman, a moral adventurer less interested in the justice or injustice of the rules themselves than in what breaking them or abiding by them reveals about the risks to one's sense of self and personal order. It sometimes seems, for example, that even Goffman's well-known "sympathy" for mental patients and the insane is based neither on their

status as victims of family collusion or institutional barbarism, nor on a Laingian appreciation of the superior reality of schizophrenic modes. It is as if he were personally grateful to them for having taught him something about the rules of behavior normal people depend upon; as if those who reveal our rules to us by breaking them (and thereby putting us uptight) deserve our gratitude for instructing us in what we believe in and depend upon.² An *exquisite* morality: he *respects* the rule-breaking of the insane because he honors their deviance with the power to threaten meaningful existence.

Still, and however, it would be a mistake to infer from this sympathy for moral deviants any *generally* favorable predisposition on his part toward those groups who would make cultural or political capital out of such deviance. The Encounter movement, preaching openness 'n honesty and the appearance of intimacy among persons who are not intimates, turns out in Goffman's view to be little other than "social molestation." And he seems to derogate the antics of Yippies (apparently because they seem so smugly pleased with their status as mind-blowers) by reminding them that even "revolutionary decorum" must rely on "shared idiom"—telling them, in effect, that they're not so damned far-out as they are pleased to think.

Back again on the "liberal" side, Goffman has shown much interest in and sympathy for the modern Feminist movement. But that sympathy seems based less on the political justice of the women's cause than on the fact that the movement is genuinely of sociological interest for much the same reason the insane are: it threatens the traditional assumptions that govern orderly interaction between categories of persons—in this case between the sexes; and also because *his* interests are involved. At the 1972 meetings of the American Sociological Association Goffman and I were asked by a group of women to join them in a sit-in attempt to desegregate a hotel dining room that served only men at lunch. We went along. As we were

² Note how this constitutes a reversal of the Durkheimian principle in which punishment for crime is required in order to reaffirm collective values. A Dostoevskian like Goffman might reply that we reveal our gratitude to rule-breakers by punishing them ("for their own good?").

¹ Note, however, that he says "inconvenience" rather than "suffering."

sitting there at a large table with a group of women, I asked him if he was doing this out of principle or out of impulse. "Impulse," he said, then, "but once you do something, you've got to begin to think about it." And then, as if he had thought about it for a moment, suggested that the interests of liberated men were tied to the liberation of women they regarded as peers. *His* interests are involved, his sexual interests obviously, and his professional interests as well because to the extent that Women's Liberation successfully effects changes in the subtle definitions of female ascribed status, the movement will be affecting the rules of co-mingling, and it is Goffman's business to be aware of such changes.

Goffman asks his readers to accuse him of laconicity rather than morality, and he is usually at some pains to avoid being identified as a believer in this or that moral or political cause *for the reasons usually espoused in behalf of it*. As a maker of terse political remarks rather than a pleader of doctrinal causes, Goffman usually seems guarded against the possibility of being ideologically harvested by those political growers who for one reason or another think they have found in the words he has sown some ground for believing that he might be ripe for picking. Almost as if to ward off the Left, Goffman makes scattered references in *Relations in Public* to the problem of "crime in the streets," and it is clear that he is concerned about the high petty theft rates in big American cities which makes its streets and other public places unsafe to be in at certain times.

But Goffman talks about the unsafety of city streets not as a "social problem" to which one or another political solution can be brought to bear (more police, better lighting, welfare, methadone maintenance, etc.), but personally, almost as if his own bailiwick were being affronted. A phrase: "City streets, even in times that defame them . . ." suggests that his interest is more in the violation done to public *places* than in the direct injury done to individual beings. High rates of petty theft deny to the citizens of New York City one of the basic forms of public social organization: the marking of a space as one's own (a "stall") by leaving a piece of one's property there (a coat on a theater seat, a picnic basket in a park, a pair of sunglasses on a stretch of beach). Pub-

lic *places* are defamed, and it is as if their defamation were a personal insult to the delicate care he has devoted to studying them; the relevance of one of his analytic categories ("stalls") is weakened!

For whom is there political comfort in this analysis of crime in the streets? The Left? The Right? Not much for either; maybe a little more for the Right than the Left. Goffman loves the streets and loves to think analytically about the organization of public places; the streets are *his*, and their unsafety produces in him a sense of personal loss. But note what we may learn from him about the social sources of authentic political feeling: the streets *are ours*; he is correct. And our being deprived of their routine use can produce much the same feeling of threat to personal and social order (hence political anxiety) as any other rip-off of personal property, for example the way a burglary (regardless of the value of what is stolen) can threaten one's taken-for-granted sense of the sanctity of one's own home, then produce anxiety about the viability of elemental social order, and finally political fear and outrage.

Goffman's political remarks, then, are almost always cast in an abstruse theoretical frame from which no consistent political position can be inferred. The theoretical focus reduces the sizes of his potential popular audience, and insulates him against the current tendency for intellectual publics to demand political leadership from their teachers. It is as if Goffman needed the "distance" (dis-tance?) that theory provides. He won't pander; he won't talk down; he won't sloganize; he won't draw morally comforting inferences; he will not be banal. That, I suppose, is why he doesn't much like teaching, particularly not undergraduates.

To Our Contributors

- When sending manuscripts, please make sure that you do not send your only copy.
- And please also be sure to enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope.

—THE EDITORS

And why he will travel long distances (and sometimes even pay his own way) to do a colloquium for his peers, but will not give a public lecture except for a high fee.

III

AS IF TO KEEP reminding us that it is sociology, not politics, which really interests him, Goffman's writings are usually replete with endless classifications, and *Relations in Public* continues his love affair with kinds, types, sorts, modes, and ways. Thus, for example, we are treated to three kinds of offenses against the self, four sources of alarm, five types of accounts, six modes of violating personal territoriality, eight kinds of "preserves" of the self, ten differences between greetings and farewells (themselves subcategories of "access rituals"), 20 or so pages on the varieties of holding hands, and, in a glorious footnote, 24 conceivable defenses for running a red light. Nowhere a partridge in a pear tree.

Except for his general obsession with orderliness and precision, it's not entirely clear why Goffman bothers with all this. In addition to holding his political admirers at bay, it may be that his attempts at exhaustiveness with respect to the possible variations and conditions of the phenomena which get his attention express his desire to be regarded as a *theorist*—perhaps to avoid the reputational fate of Georg Simmel (with whose gift of insight his own is often compared): brilliant and all that, of course, but not really a theorist, i.e., not really systematic; as if the dutiful dullness of his typologies were somehow a *credential* for his seriousness as a thinker, the price he feels it necessary to pay to neutralize those who would derogate his achievement as *mere* brilliance.

This is a little more than idle speculation. I remember asking Goffman many years ago whether he thought it was possible to do a nonquantitative sociology that was not functionalist or systematic. His answer was typical Goffman: "Yes, but you won't sell it." Goffman has never been less than candid about his interest in selling it, and in reaping the optimal profit from his work. Unlike many intellectuals whose heads are full of exquisite Ideas About Human Behavior, Goffman has always taken pride in his wordliness, in his canny regard for plain and practical self-interest—reminiscent in

an odd way of socialist Bernard Shaw's well-known respect for money (remember Major Barbara's father, the tycoon Undershaft, grown rich on liquor and munitions, replying to the mission derelict who tells him that he wouldn't have Undershaft's conscience for all the money in the world: "I wouldn't have your money for all the conscience in the world.")³ He is said to be a skilled negotiator for contractual advantages with his publishers, and when he left Berkeley some years ago to take an appointment at the University of Pennsylvania (in a city that W. C. Fields said was closed the day he tried to visit it), I asked him why he wanted to do that. "For \$30,000 and one seminar a year," was his answer, which may not have been why he went but is surely an acceptable reason.

Goffman has always been interested in acceptable reasons. Social life (and that includes life as a sociologist) can be a dangerous game, and if one chooses to play riskily, as Goffman does, one might as well be good at it.

The individual can mark his freedom and his alienation by demonstrating an unaccepting relation to . . . expectations regarding conduct . . . but however skittish he might be about behaving properly, he nonetheless takes care to have some behavioral reply ready in any situation where circumstances have called him into question. He need not honor a rule of conduct that applies to him. He need not even provide virtual accounts, apologies, and excuses for his deviations. But at least he must be at pains to portray an advicable relationship to the negative judgment of him which results.

Goffman has to be good at it because he is a rule-breaker, and rule-breakers invite the vultures to gather. Being good at it means having defenses sufficient "to portray an advicable relationship to the negative judgment . . . which results." If he is judged crude or cruel for announcing that if he can't find anybody more important to talk with, he'll talk with you, the advicable response is that he is only articulating what people in fact do at conventions, and if the offended could but overcome their momentarily ruffled feelings, they might learn some-

³ In this respect Goffman is kin to other unique thinkers whose quirky incongruities put off some of those who otherwise admired them. Paul Goodman's patriotism angered and surprised some of his America-hating radical friends. Stendhal offended some of his bohemian heirs by believing that a creative artist's first responsibility was to have an adequate income.

thing important. If, after an expensive dinner in a fancy restaurant, he is judged crass for asking a waiter in a voice for all to hear whether dessert will "cost extra," the advocable response is that it's all right to give his dinner companions the opportunity to think twice about whether they want to overpay for a sweet after having already eaten an overpriced dinner.

I think that Goffman's enamor of orderliness and precision may be his way of portraying an advocable relationship to the negative judgment of those social scientists who would derogate the kind of thing he does brilliantly as "soft," merely insightful, merely humanistic, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. I don't mean to suggest that he is calculatedly cynical about this, but Goffman is as skilled a player of the sociology game as he is a student of the power of social organization (including the organizations of social science) to strip a person of almost everything he or she is; and the robes of empirical rigor and logical exhaustiveness are sufficiently regal to induce the barons of social science to see that even underneath the purple this particular emperor has very fine clothes indeed.

AT THE BEGINNING of *Relations in Public*, Goffman asserts his "seriousness" as a thinker by saying that his aim is to establish the study of interaction practice as a field in itself rather than as a grab bag of empirical illustrations for other fields. There is a problem. Goffman can't establish a field all by himself; no single scholar can. He needs students and disciples and co-workers for that. But Goffman is at a disadvantage here because his important gifts are not easily transmitted, not easily taught to others in the way, for example, that the gifts of sociologists like Lipset or Lazarsfeld are. A second-rate imitator of Lipset or Lazarsfeld can still do decent and useful work because they have technical skills to teach. Goffman's gifts are more subtle. His strength is not simply his fine ethnographic eye (there are lots of careful ethnographers) but the exquisite moral sensibility that goes with it; not simply his "insight" (there are lots of keen observers around) but the delicacy of his management of it, his persistent abstention from the heavy hand. Goffman almost never winks at his readers or elbows them in the ribs. He and they are part

of the humankind he describes, and he is never superior to his materials. Goffman's gift is a gift of grace, a blessing, and a burden that no teacher can be *expected* to transmit successfully to his students (although sometimes this happens), however severe he is in his demands on them (and Goffman, who is by reputation a notoriously severe grader, once said that he gave As only to students who taught *him* something—which is not a bad criterion).

Because he cannot always bestow his most important gift on his admirers, "Goffmanian" is not always an approbatory adjective. It tends to mean two things and describe two kinds of sociologists. First of all, it means attention to the microstructure and meanings of small, routine actions that most people are unaware of most of the time. Second, it means ethnographic rigor in the exact description of such behavior, for the "insights" are presumably generated by faithfulness to phenomenological detail.

. . . the important thing about criminals—and other social desperadoes such as children, comics, saboteurs, and the certified insane—is not what they do or why they do it. . . . The importance of these strays is . . . in the contrastive light their situation throws on what, in doing what we do, we are doing. A radical ethnography must take ordinary persons doing ordinary things as the central issue.

The quotation has both Goffmanian insight and rigor. Criminals and children; comics and saboteurs; perspective by incongruity. Not that they are all alike or all the same, but that their desperation reveals the nature of our serenity (or complacency); not that it is "necessary to look into the darkness of their souls in order to learn about the darkness of our own," but in order to transform the sunny familiar country of ordinary persons doing ordinary things into a fluorescent stage on which Smiths and Joneses do very strange things indeed, like tip their hats and say "pleased to meet you."

But without Goffman's own fine sensibility and disciplined taste, "Goffmanian" insight and rigor are each vulnerable to a peculiar form of vulgarization. There are those who admire Goffman for his sensitivity to nuance but who ape his style of "insight" for undignified reasons: to be arch, knowing, sophisticated, one-up. They are the ones who wink, elbow you in the ribs, snicker disdainfully at the human comedy

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edited and with an
introduction by

IRVING HOWE

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Some of the most perceptive political and social thinkers in the United States illuminate critical issues: the role of youth in American radical politics, the nature of the diverse forces loosely characterized as the New Left, the extent of their influence on modern life, their relation to other governments, their possible shape in the future. To these controversial, often bewildering matters, *Beyond the New Left* is a much needed, fascinatingly written guidebook; and in its concern for the future of democracy and its clarity of vision, it provides the authentic properties of a first-rate magnifying glass held over hitherto confusing matters.

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they earn their livings observing. They are the smartasses.

Then there are the solemn ones who admire his ethnographic rigor but sometimes forget about the payoffs (i.e., fresh truth, new understanding) of such attention to detail. The danger here is that the rules of rigorous ethnographic practice can degenerate into one more set of barren methodological strictures interesting and original thinkers sometimes seem fated to bequeath to their less gifted heirs. An interesting and original thinker like Paul Lazarsfeld left to the survey research institutes of the world an intellectual style that C. Wright Mills characterized as "abstracted empiricism." And, like those "rigorous" quantitative sociologists who choose their studies in order to demonstrate the power of their research technologies, "rigorous" ethnographers may produce the most pedestrian accounts of "ordinary people doing ordinary things" with the smug satisfaction that they have been "phenomenologically true" to the data, content with the achievement of having not prematurely imposed any preconceptions of their own. They are the qualitative abstracted empiricists.

Like everything else, rigor has its price, and in the marketplace of science the point is always not to pay too much for it. Goffman is a careful and discreet merchant, and he has enough confidence in the high quality of his goods that he can afford to be candid and modest in the methodological claims he makes for them. But the pedantic "A radical ethnography must take ordinary persons doing ordinary things . . ." buys trouble. For one thing, the study of ordinary people doing ordinary things is, among anthropologists, not radical, but the most traditional kind of ethnography. But anthropologists, who do their field observations in faraway places with strange-sounding names, can rely on the *unfamiliarity* of ordinary Islanders doing ordinary things, in order to sustain the interest of Mainland readers. It is probably this constraint (the need to be interesting and fresh) which best accounts for the fact that the dominant tradition of urban ethnography among sociologists has been the study of exotics, either "deviants" such as criminals, prostitutes, and homosexuals, or else "inside jobs" on straight occupational milieus which are not directly visible to general observation from the outside.

But to go still further out, and make interesting the study of *really* ordinary people doing *really* ordinary things requires a more daring exoticization of the familiar. It requires nothing less than the risk of rendering strange and problematic the very assumptions and routines which make ordinary social life possible and worthwhile. It requires the courting of anomie; a glimpse of the Void; a Faustian flirtation in which the Renaissance Devil is replaced by postmodern diagnosticians of madness. Goffman, of course, in the company of some others who call themselves ethnomethodologists or phenomenologists or existential sociologists, is doing precisely this, and he deserves our gratitude; for, by taking these risks, he is helping to bring the image of sociological man (heretofore pretty dowdy) up-to-date, and to make him recognizably kin to the image of man that has long been prevalent in modern art.


Gratitude may not be enough; the costs he bears are very high. Goffman's prose is often melancholy, almost French; in pursuit of *le mot juste*, his brilliant excursions often end with a shrug, a twisting of the corners of the mouth through closed lips, an upturned palm of power-

lessness. If resignation is ever beautiful, it is beautiful here:

The most disruptive thing a well organism can do is to acquire a deadly contagious disease. The most disruptive thing a person can do is fail to keep the place that others feel can't be changed for him. . . . The manic gives up everything a person can be, and gives up too the everything we make out of jointly guarded dealings. His doing so . . . reminds us what our everything is, and then reminds us that this everything is not very much.

What a remarkable way to end a book! What a remarkable thing to say for a man who has devoted a whole career, an *oeuvre*, to this "not very much." Is he being piously modest? Fashionably Zen-ish? I think not. I think it is the old role distance working in him, telling us that however "important" a figure his works enable him to become, he will never lose the outsider's lurking knowledge that it is all some grisly game to which his gifts just happen to have been brought at the right time and in the right place; the role distance which is obliged for the deviantly successful out of loyalty to all the beautiful losers who never made it. □

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The Ethical Problems of Brain Manipulation

Psychosurgery and electrical stimulation of the brain are among the most dramatic of new technologies for controlling human behavior. To explore the social and moral implications of such technologies, the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences in Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y., has established a behavior control research group, which, in December 1971, held the Conference on the Physical Manipulation of the Brain. The following edited transcript of the conference discussions has been issued as a Special Report by the Institute. Since the conference was held, concern about abuses in psychosurgery has grown, leading to demands that the procedures be more carefully limited, or even banned.

A list of participants at the conference appears boxed, on pages 365 and 367.

GAYLIN: The Institute has convened this conference to introduce the ethical and value issues into the technical discussions of psychosurgery and electrical brain stimulation. We would like to find out from those of you involved in these fields four kinds of information. *First*, what kinds of techniques of psychosurgery and electrical brain stimulation are now being employed, what are they used for, and how well do they work? *Second*, what techniques are on the near horizon, and where is present research heading? *Third*, if you had unlimited time, talent, and funding at your disposal, what do you think would be *desirable* long-range research; or if not desirable, what is your prediction about the long-range developments? *Fourth*, what is the rationale for undertaking these

long-range developments? What are the worthwhile goals for psychosurgery and electrical brain stimulation?

In all these topics, we are interested not so much in scientific exposition as in a social and moral interpretation. What are the moral dilemmas your present techniques raise? What opportunities and dangers do you see on the horizon? What are the urgent imperatives? About what generally accepted moral assessments do you feel uneasy? What procedures should there be for responding to the value question—regarding codes, legislative decisions, peer review, educated sensitivity of the practicing surgeons and physiologists?

DELGADO: There are two ways to control behavior: one is through the environment, the second (our subject) is through the

brain. And in the brain we have mainly three types of controls: (1) mechanical, through surgery, (2) electrical, through brain stimulation, and (3) chemical, by placing drugs inside the brain (I'm not talking about drugs taken by mouth, only direct application of chemicals in the brain). Then, there is a fourth type of control, the effect of the environment on the electrical and chemical activity of the brain. Through the environment, we *are* really modifying the structure and substance of the brain electrically and chemically.

Experimental research of the brain may change the classical question of philosophy, which was, What is man? This is perhaps the residue of the Aristotelian conception of the soul. The question rather than, What is man?, should be, What kind of man are we going to construct? Through sensory inputs, and through brain manipulation, we are really constructing and modifying the materials that form the neurological basis of man. We have the power and the knowledge to understand how "man" is constructed inside the working brain, and to manipulate these building blocks that construct man. This conception may be dangerous because it changes the conceptions of freedom, identity, and integrity. This is an important question to which we should address ourselves.

LONDON: On the one hand, you're telling us about the immediate potential of the technology of brain implantation and about the philosophical implication—the practical philosophical implication—that we can define man as a constructible entity. On the other hand, this technology by itself doesn't do anything; it only does things in interaction with the environment. In your own writing you make a strong point about the need to reconstruct man by essentially *educational, informational* means. There's a great distance between being able to control behavior via brain stimulation, even with the most elegant internal computers, and restructuring society, its educational systems and so forth, by educating children. Where

do you see the technology moving in the next 5, 10, 35 years? How do you see this technology progressing in such a way that it orients us toward that longer-range goal, and what are the dangers that you see in connection with that?

DELGADO: The main implication of brain research for education is that the research will make available unique information about the neurological mechanisms. Present technology may give us a new understanding about how education modifies children's brains. It is not possible, however, to educate children with electrodes.

This new knowledge may change the philosophy of our educational system, which is based on the sanctity of the individual, and on the assumption that an individual exists at the moment of birth. This belief may be questioned. We should also try to clarify the biological bases of the potentials of the individual and what effect they have on democratic beliefs. We are *forming* the individual; we are *constructing* his brain.

GAYLIN: Dr. Delgado, you said in effect that for the first time man has the capacity to enter into or to control the mind. I am not convinced that *communication* is less "entering into the mind" than insertion of an electrode. I'm not sure that we are more into the mind when we're into the brain with a cannula or an electrode than we are with an emotion.

DELGADO: You're absolutely right. Sensory inputs have intracerebral correlates that were unknown in the past but may be investigated in the present. In the past, the brain was considered an unreachable entity, but today we can look at the working neurons. We need to understand man from his cultural outside and also from the inside of his central nervous system. We need a convergence between both approaches.

ORLOV: Do you really believe that we should try to restructure society and reeducate man in this fashion? Save a lot of money

by putting electrodes at \$1,000 each, into the brains of children?

DELGADO: Let me repeat what I've said. We cannot educate children with electrodes. The answer is, No. However, the information obtained about learning, memory, emotionality, etc. may be used to restructure a different kind of education, and therefore to create a different kind of child. I'm not satisfied with the way in which our present civilization is behaving. I do not believe that we must be slaves of natural chance. Up to now, man has been structured in a natural way by nature. And the results are that we are full of flaws. We should improve the society in which we live.

EHRENSING: I'm asking about your [Delgado's] concept of freedom. First, what happens to the concept of informed consent in the context of asking what kind of man *we* want to construct? And second, do you see any validity in or a future for the ideal of freedom?

DELGADO: Freedom is only a relative concept. Are you free to speak Chinese, or Russian? . . . Not unless experiential inputs modify our brain and give us that freedom.

EHRENSING: I'm defining freedom very broadly as self-determination.

DELGADO: No, this is the wrong notion. I would like to redefine freedom as the use of our intelligence within frames of reference given by culture and by experience. We are a conglomerate of cultural values, with the symbols determined by culture and experience. Therefore, we are limited by the building blocks at our disposal; we do not invent these building blocks, they are given from the outside and they change the structure of our brain. Education provides a frame of reference for each child.

CHALKLEY: I was thinking of the devices man has approved for the treatment of violent behavior in the past, including pain, torture, imprisonment, institutionalization, surgery, external electrical stimulation of the brain, chemotherapy, and psychotherapy.

Now would you rather try ESB or decapitation? The principal reason, I'm sure, that hanging was in use for so many years was that torture was more expensive.

ORLOV: Dr. Chalkley, that's a very flashy answer, but I don't really think it helps the problem. What are the unintended and unanticipated consequences of the work Dr. Delgado and others are doing? I might come up with the conclusion: . . . full-steam ahead! But what *are* they? Or what might they be?

CHALKLEY: The basic question, I hope, is essentially one that Dr. Delgado is asking: how can you best get information to the child? And you answer this by going into the brain and discovering how it reacts.

VAUGHAN: I agree with Dr. Delgado's emphasis on the need for an understanding of brain mechanisms in our thinking about the problems of society. We must beware, however, of assuming that a human infant is more of a tabula rasa than he is. The human brain has a particular genetically determined structure providing it with certain capacities that unfold during the course of interaction with the environment, both external and internal. We go too far in believing this structure can be modified when we talk about changing the definition of man, asking ourselves what kind of man we would want to construct.

This caution applies to psychosurgery in the following way. Although as therapists we may know in a particular case what we want to accomplish—relieve pain, stop seizures, induce a schizophrenic to acceptable modes of behavior. With the physical manipulation of the brain we usually accomplish a great many other things as well, and some of these are undesirable. As scientists we don't think of the brain any more as a mosaic of centers and structures having to do with rather specific aspects of behavior and experience. Rather, it is a closely integrated system in which certain systems have an extraordinary overlap and interde-

pendence of functioning. Narabayashi, for instance, does amygdalectomies on children with unacceptable behavior. His papers state that afterward the children behave better and that there seems to be no intellectual deterioration. But what about other side effects? To what degree can we predict the consequences of this or that lesion, given our present, or indeed foreseeable, scientific knowledge?

EDGAR: I think Dr. Delgado has said several times that one should not use electrodes to educate children but merely to find out what goes on in the brain as a consequence of other forms of education. Is that a technical limitation or an ethical position?

DELGADO: It's both ethical and technical. *Ethical*, because we should not influence the brain in such a way that the individual lacks capacity to react, and *technical*, because by brain stimulation we cannot provide information.

PRIBRAM: I must correct the notion that you don't put information into the brain when you stimulate it. You put in information in two senses. If I put an electrode in the lateral hypothalamus and then stimulate that only at certain times when the animal is in a certain setting, I'm putting information into that animal's brain just as much as I'm putting it in the computer. And that's terribly important because that means that

Conference Guests Included:

HENRY K. BEECHER, M.D., Henry Isaiah Dorr Professor of research in anaesthesia, emeritus, Harvard University, author of *Research and the Individual: Human Studies*, and Fellow of the Institute.

EDGAR A. BERING, JR., M.D., chief, Special Program Branch, Collaborative and Field Research, National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke.

DONALD T. CHALKLEY, chief, Institutional Relations Section, Division of Research Grants, NIH.

JOSÉ M. R. DELGADO, M.D., professor of neurophysiology at Yale University School of Medicine, whose experiments in electrical brain stimulation have received wide discussion and whose book *The Physical Control of the Mind* raises many of the issues discussed at the conference.

VERNON H. MARK, M.D., director of the Neurosurgical Service at Boston City Hospital and associate professor of surgery at Harvard Medical School; in *Violence and the Brain*, written with Frank Ervin, M.D., Dr. Mark discusses and assesses some of the major techniques and uses of psychosurgery.

KARL H. PRIBRAM, M.D., professor of psychiatry and psychology, Stanford University Medical Center, a neurosurgeon and neurophysiologist interested in social biology, and author of *Languages of the Brain*, which sets out a theory of the neurophysiology of behavior.

GARDNER C. QUARTON, M.D., director of the Mental Health Research Institute and professor of psychiatry at the University of Michigan.

THEODORE B. RASMUSSEN, M.D., director and professor of neurology and neurosurgery, Montreal Neurological Institute, McGill University, a pioneer in neurosurgical treatment of behavior disorders associated with epilepsy.

WILLIAM BEECHER SCOVILLE, M.D., clinical associate of neurosurgery at the University of Connecticut Health Center and associate clinical professor of neurosurgery at Yale University Medical School; president of the International Society of Psychosurgeons.

WILLIAM H. SWEET, M.D., professor of surgery at Harvard Medical School and chief of neurosurgery at Massachusetts General Hospital.

—ethically, I wouldn't do it—but practically, I certainly *could* educate a child by putting an electrode in the lateral hypothalamus and then selecting the situations at which I stimulate it. In this way I can grossly change his behavior. That's within the range of possibility.

LONDON: If I understand correctly, Dr. Delgado was suggesting that by the exploration of the brain through the techniques he's outlined elsewhere, we can learn more and can enhance our current routine techniques of education. By routine, I mean those not involving physical penetration of the brain; the aim is rationally to program man who's already being programmed, who now is being programmed chaotically without conscious planning. Dr. Delgado doesn't speak for the situations in which he is ethically unwilling to put electrodes into the brain to educate.

SWEET: The innovator of manipulative techniques in *man*, seeking to apply the information that his colleagues in the *animal* laboratories have learned, quickly comes up against the realization that these gentlemen seem to forget about the animals that die. This is understandable. When something goes wrong with that experiment the animal is discarded and forgotten; he remembers the successful animal that has given him the information he was looking for.

Why don't we now consider where we stand on electrical stimulation of the brain at focal points, as contrasted with the kind of stimulation the brain receives when the individual sits and reads a good book? I would say that the situation is analogous to playing a piano with a carpenter's hammer or having a concert artist sit down at the keyboard. As far as my own willingness to work on human beings is concerned, I'm prepared to implant electrodes in the human brain only when the individual is in a serious, approaching what I would call a desperate situation from the standpoint of relief of pain on the one hand, or when his behavioral

manifestations are so gravely at variance with accepted behavior that society probably can't allow him to move freely. Or the individual himself may recognize that he's about to be, or may well be, in that situation. Now it seems to me that our technical abilities at the present time are like those of a skilled craftsman who's trying to repair the sounding board on a concert grand piano when there's a giant crack in it. In that situation, you'd throw the sounding board away and get another one. But we don't do this in man. We try to repair this terribly damaged human brain and see if we can make it operate better.

CALLAHAN: Could you perhaps say something about psychosurgery as such?

SWEET: I would say that psychosurgery is seeking to move forward in a far more cautious and critical fashion than that which characterized the tremendous wave of enthusiasm for this tactic of making lesions in the human brain in psychosis and behavior disturbances back in the '40s and early '50s. Now I think most of us have a much better idea as to the need for study of many more aspects of the whole individual before an operation. Furthermore, we are technically able to perform a much more precise and limited kind of destruction. And we are making a more intensive effort to find out what happens after the procedures than was the case two decades ago.

SCOVILLE: With all due respect to Dr. Delgado, I'm closer to being in sympathy with Dr. Sweet. I work almost wholly on humans, and we are more aware of the disastrous effects that sometimes occur in neurosurgery.

I think that the present techniques for making surgical lesions will be replaced with chemicals—chemical lesions. The fractional psychosurgical lesion is a transitional stage in developing chemical alterations and, of course, possible electrical stimulation tech-

niques. In light of the need for developing better techniques, I too want to congratulate José Delgado.

DELGADO: I would like to emphasize that my position is not aggressive but conservative. I think that electrical-stimulation technology is more conservative than surgery. What I'm hoping is that instead of destruction, as Dr. Scoville said, we could perhaps place, not a lesion, not even a chemical lesion, but a modification, a *pharmacological* modification of the brain function.

BEECHER: I think Dr. Sweet has enor-

mously simplified the ethical problems here by his insistence that he will work only from the therapeutic point of view. It seems to me that once you deal with the desperate need for therapy of some kind, you can try various things that would more or less be unacceptable in other controls. It's important to keep that in mind.

ORLOV: I'd like to ask Dr. Sweet and Dr. Rasmussen, assuming that the technical problems were in fact solved and that you could with good consciences as doctors be satisfied with the results that you would get with your patients, are these techniques in

Conference Participants from the Institute Research Group Included:

DANIEL CALLAHAN, director of the Institute, moderated the Conference.

K. DANNER CLOUSER, associate professor of humanities and philosophy at the Milton S. Hershey College of Medicine, Pennsylvania State University, specializing in medical ethics, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of medicine.

HAROLD EDGAR, associate professor of criminal law, Columbia University Law School, specializing in law and the life sciences.

RUDOLPH EHRENSING, M.D., assistant professor of psychiatry, Louisiana State University Medical Center, interested in the behavior problems of adolescents.

JAMES R. GAVIN, III, a biochemist at the National Institutes of Health interested in the social aspects of science.

WILLARD GAYLIN, M.D., clinical professor of psychiatry, College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University; president of the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences; director of the Behavior Control Research Group.

BRUCE HILTON, associate for publications, Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences.

PERRY LONDON, professor of psychology and

psychiatry at the University of Southern California, whose book *Behavior Control* surveyed the entire field; Dr. London practices clinical psychology.

ROBERT MICHELS, M.D., director of training, and associate professor of psychiatry at the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University; secretary of the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, and codirector of the Behavior Control Research Group.

ROBERT NEVILLE, associate professor of philosophy at the SUNY College at Purchase, and associate for the behavioral sciences at the Institute; staff director of the Behavior Control Research Group.

ANN ORLOV, editor for the Behavioral Sciences, Harvard University Press and Fellow of the Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences.

HERBERT G. VAUGHAN, JR., M.D., professor of neurology, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, whose special research is the development of a visual prosthesis through electrical stimulation of the brain.

PAUL WEISS, Heffer Professor of Philosophy at Catholic University of America, whose book *Man's Freedom* deals with the scientific control of man.

fact things that you think *ought* to be done? In other words, is this a research-direction for man that you think one ought to take?

RASMUSSEN: The human brain is much more epileptogenic than the animal brain. Whenever the brain is injured in any way, there's a resultant healing process, and a seizure tendency develops in a significant number of people. Now fortunately this is very directly related to the extensiveness of the scar. Nobody knows whether or not any of the patients with ingoing electrodes or instruments passed through the brain have ever developed seizures as a result of this—because nobody has asked this question. Literally thousands of people have had needles inserted. We pass ventricular needles into the brain for diagnostic purposes a number of times every day in every neurological center and we have pretty good evidence, from following these patients for other reasons, that a single penetration probably has one chance in a million of producing seizure tendency. The physician is always on the horns of a therapeutic dilemma! He can't do anything without taking some risk. The physician is always in the position of weighing the risks of what he's doing, the immediate risks and the long-range risks, with the possible therapeutic benefit—immediate therapeutic benefit, and the potential remote therapeutic benefit.

LONDON: Dr. Rasmussen raises a sort of Heisenberg principle of neurosurgery, if you will: when you put an electrode into the brain, from that point on you are of necessity exploring an abnormal brain. This obviously complicates the ethical issues. However, let's say that this can be circumvented. Yet I'm still troubled by two assumptions I think Dr. Delgado is making that have not been discussed.

One is the notion that the information we'll get from studying the biochemistry and physiology of the brain is somehow going to be significantly, perhaps vastly, more valuable than all the information we've acquired

over the years from more routine social and psychological observational techniques. I wonder if our enthusiasm about the knowledge the brain might give us might only be because we've done everything else for so long; and we're so clumsy at educating.

There's another side to it, which is the assumption that it would be preferable consciously to program man, and that it is deplorable that he is sort of randomly and chaotically programmed by our current lack of precise knowledge of the effects of our inputs into the nature of man—genetics, genetic recombination and mutation. The randomness of that system may not be unfortunate. And possibly the randomness and our lack of control over this system of informational input into the nature of man, this postgenetic rather than genetic random input, may also not be unfortunate.

VAUGHAN: Who decides what is an appropriate and justifiable physical manipulation? Can we assume that therapists, physicians, behavioral psychologists, and psychiatrists can make the choice as to the symptom or the behavioral change that is to be modified? Or should this choice in all instances be left to the individual? Under what circumstances do these two extreme alternatives have to be considered?

GAYLIN: Let us accept this as a basic premise: that we will always allow the individual an ideosyncratic response. That is true in almost every case. A person chooses to embrace and make a lover of his cancer: we allow him to do that. But that doesn't alter the fact that we consider the pursuit of various mechanisms for the treatment of cancer to be authentic and legitimate. But we now are talking about behavior control of various sorts and let's ask for some general guidelines as to where, whether the person wants it or not, we find it morally acceptable or reasonable, and where we are prepared to offer it if the patients do want it.

CLOUSER: How does one decide what is really therapy and what is actually recon-

struction? That would be a problem partially because the reconstruction would proceed from somebody demanding something, saying, I would like so and so. Then the question is, If a patient expresses the desire for some "reconstruction," do you say it's "therapy"?

NEVILLE: The concept of justification is ambiguous here. On the one hand, what we mean by the problem of justification is finding the criteria for deciding when to do what. On the other hand, what several people meant was, Who has the right to do what and who gives consent? Who ultimately gives control? Ordinarily, we think the scientists are in charge of the criteria and the patient or his family is in charge of the consent. These are obviously difficult to separate in the kinds of cases we are discussing. How are they to be related in the field of psychosurgery?

MICHEL: What occurs in clinical situations has less to do with informed consent than with the power of transference in the doctor-patient relationship. Patients will consent to absurd things while appearing to be informed about what they are doing.

But it seems to me there's another question: does a person have the right to informedly consent to anything that might be done to him? Suicide raises the question most clearly. Does the individual have the moral, legal, ethical, or social right to kill himself if he fully understands the nature and meaning of his act and weighs the consequences thereof? Our laws say no. Well, if you can't kill yourself, can you cut out 98 percent of your brain? Or 97 percent? Or 0.38 percent? Where is the line? If you can't kill yourself to relieve pain, can you destroy your essential humanity to relieve pain? What are the limits of essential humanity? Are there any? Does the concept mean anything?

NEVILLE: You're right in pointing out that the ultimate problem turns out to be not a medical but a political one.

CLOUSER: When we talk about justification

for procedures, we give a reason showing that it's to somebody's benefit. What I would find helpful—since I think it is impossible to have a general formula or some sort of a deductive way for deriving a justification for a procedure—would be to get from you people [the scientists] hints as to where you're suspicious of your own reasoning, where you've gone wrong or have suspected your own motives.

SWEET: I would like to get what your thoughts are about the validity of specific criticisms to which my colleagues and I have been subject in our own institution. The criticism goes: "These fellows [my colleagues and I] may get so they *can* stop murderous behavior in individuals. And we're afraid they will succeed, because then this information could be misused in other hands and lead to the performance of this kind of a pacification operation on those who are dissenting in society." Is this, then, a good reason for not seeking to learn how to control murderous behavior in those individuals who have demonstrable organic brain disease?

WEISS: Based on what you've said, it has become more and more clear to me that our basic question is whether what's happening today is different in kind and in degree from what we've been doing since the beginning of civilization. We've always controlled people from the outside; we've always tried to do something about abnormal behavior. Both Dr. Delgado and Dr. Neville voice the supposition that the brain is somehow "inner." But one could look at the brain and any other part of the body as outer. The brain is a *public* object; people work on it from the outside. As commonsense civilized men, all recognize that individuals have irreducible privacies, inexpugnable rights, that they are beings who are irreducible and unduplicable, and that the only question is, What do we do about their public dimension?

I think Dr. Delgado takes the public side to exhaust the whole of what a man is. Is

not a man more than what is available through public external determination?

PRIBRAM: What's your answer?

WEISS: I would say that there *is* a private being to man. We're looking for some way for him to express his private side in order to redefine what is to be publicly done to him. Are we asking him to tell us how his behavior is to be altered? This is not always the correct approach. We don't ask children whether they want to be educated; we don't even ask the parents whether they want to educate them. There are times when the state rightly takes over. There is a question, then, of assessing the value of the state versus the individual. It's not a purely political matter; it is also a problem of communicating what we actually know of men as they are. In every paper today it is affirmed that all men have a private integrity and a right to humanity. But as with the Ninth Amendment—which says that those rights not explicitly given to the U.S. government belong to the people—it is not said just what those rights are. We should ask, What is man? Our answer will tell us what his rights are.

MICHELIS: It seems to me that if you pose the problem this way, the rest of us kind of have to shut up while you tell us whether you think there is such a thing as a natural or platonic way of looking at the world or whether you want to adopt the notion that it's the court or some arbitrary device of society which defines its values; or whether it's some funny mixture. Once you've said that, we can't get any farther. I happen to think that it's the courts that decide, but I would like to kind of pretend that . . .

WEISS: I have noticed how cautiously all have moved *at the beginning*. Arguments are minute, careful, and judicious, and based upon evidence. But suddenly gigantic conclusions are brought out about ethics, freedom, rights, education. But they don't follow from the arguments given. Can we not start from those minute pieces of evidence

and see whether we can't force some kind of conclusions about man, what his exterior is, and relate this to his privacy? Then we can deal with these global issues.

GAYLIN: Professor Weiss raised what I do think is an essential question. He asked, Is there something substantively different about this method of modifying human behavior over traditional methods? I like the line in Dr. Sweet's paper, because of the implication, where he says, "it has been a rude surprise to many of us concerned with such patients to find that our procedures on them have evoked the most vitriolic criticisms we have met in our professional careers." To a psychiatrist at least, the fact that it could produce this much passion, this much vitriol, suggests that it seems substantively different. We may come to the conclusion that there is indeed a substantive difference between entering the brain and manipulating it artificially as distinguished from manipulating it with ideas.

LONDON: I couldn't agree more with Professor Weiss about the issues raised. But there is something about this new technology that is different from most of the issues of public versus private interests which have preoccupied men in the past. Unlike compulsory education, unlike vaccination, unlike the traditional domain of conflict between the state and the individual, the arena of discourse here is the executive apparatus of the individual. The issue which we are all explicitly joining is whether it's justifiable, and under what circumstances, to radically alter the nature of the individual.

DELGADO: I think that there is something new. One, we are dealing with the brain directly, circumventing sensory inputs. Two, we can experiment with classical mental functions, such as memory, understanding, will, etc. This was not possible in the past. Three, we can relate mental functions to chemistry and to neural structure. This also is new. Therefore, I think that today we have

new possibilities to study the brain technically, theoretically, and practically.

BERING: A very important point that has not been brought out is the difference between a surgical procedure on the brain and electrical stimulation of the brain. By stimulating the brain with electricity one can start and stop certain activities. The procedure is essentially reversible but a surgical lesion destroys part of the brain and is an irreversible, permanent anatomical change. If you don't like the result you're stuck with it and it can only be changed by making the lesion larger or another somewhere else. If in an aggressive person a lesion is made that renders him a very placid individual, you've actually changed this person. He isn't the same person any more.

NEVILLE: What images of man and society, or man in society, ought we to have, in light of any special factors of electrical stimulation of the brain or of psychosurgery? In some respects, the moral problems of these techniques are the same as those of any techniques that involve radical surgery. In other respects, they're the same as those of any kind of behavior-control devices. What issues are *peculiar* to these techniques (or to these plus chemical therapy)?

Certain issues come out of a *therapeutic* interest. In trying to cure someone or to make him better, how would you define health? Our discussion so far has often turned on whether or not there is a fixed nature to man, of what would be normal for man. Is there any privileged status for what man *previously* has been? In my view, we need an approach to defining health that would allow one to make all sorts of changes in a person's nature if one could show that this was *more valuable* than the previous state. The point then is how you decide between one value and another. That's the general social and philosophical problem.

That kind of problem is distinct from the sort that arises out of *society's interests* in controlling behavior, where there is not nec-

essarily a pretense to making the person better, but just protecting society from the person, or from certain aspects of his behavior. There seem to me three kinds of criteria against whatever alternatives there might be. One, the criteria of *efficiency*, on the one hand, and whether or not the technique works; two, the criteria of *social costs*; and three, the criteria of *respect* for the persons to be controlled. We would like to find, say, techniques for modifying criminal behavior that are most respectful of the criminals, so long as they're efficient and the social costs are not too great. The problem of decision-making here seems to me that of trying to fit these various criteria together relative to the alternatives of control techniques.

The brain, I think, should be conceived as a special environment for the person. Behavior-control techniques, especially these, seem to me to be altering the environment to make possible certain personal actions or certain personal continuities, careers, certain highly prized human emotions and the like. By conceiving of the brain as an environment that inhibits or fosters these human activities, we can conceive the techniques relative to the freedom and values of the person. The question has been raised of the privacy of the brain in the wider environment. There are lots of ways of defining privacy but it seems to me that in the social context, privacy is something that people demand for certain spheres of their life, and that society grants. Individuals and society may not always agree. Sometimes we would not like to have our brain be private, if, in fact, we can be freer, better, or cured of disease by intrusion.

I'm quite confused myself about the particular values used for defining what ought to be recognized as the private sphere. But it seems to me that the techniques we're discussing now raise two important practical questions. Modifying the brain, since it's the most intimate environment for our humanly prized emotions and thoughts, is likely to

have more pervasive effects than modifying certain other kinds of environment. There are all sorts of exceptions to this, of course; if you change a person's language system, that also has pervasive effects. But I suspect an argument could be made that changing the brain affects more basic things than changing one's language. The other point is that the environment in terms of which an individual is *prepared to cope* with infringements on his personality is more external than the brain. A surgeon operating on a person's brain has gone into the inside of his perimeter of defense, as it were, and the person can't cope with it very easily. So we need to be concerned with a need for an incremental adjustment of the person to whatever procedure is to be performed on the brain.

WEISS: I think there are two problems here. First, you have given us a social meaning of privacy, and you still haven't faced up to the question of whether there is any private, nonsocial, nonpublic meaning to it. The second is a very strange thought that you have about the brain as more "intimate." I don't know whether you have a kind of spatial image, that maybe the soul is at the center, the brain is closer to it, rather than the outside. But I can well understand a man saying nobody's closer to him than God. Right now, which is closer to me, this cup or you? *You're* closer to me, I'm *interested* in you. The supposition that somehow the brain is more intimate an environment than the others, I just don't see.

NEVILLE: I suppose the kind of image I had in mind was one of layers of mediations. The way by which external things affect a person is mediated finally and always through his brain. That is, the brain is the one mediation structure that cannot be avoided.

WEISS: I think you're mixing up a necessary with a sufficient cause. You can have the body as a necessary condition and therefore certain things can be done and pre-

vented by manipulating the body; but it doesn't follow to identify the body with the mind. I know I have a mind, but it's only a theory I have a brain.

NEVILLE: I have no stock in the geographical metaphor except in terms of ordering closeness of control techniques. But in the context of which kinds of manipulations of a person's environment could be ranked as closer to his person, it seems to me that no matter how we might communicate, short of telepathy, if someone moved a probe at the right place they would cut off all communication.

VAUGHAN: My experience as a neurologist is that people do consider the brain to be one of the areas in which the possibility of a surgical or physical procedure is most feared. Is there, within each of us, perhaps inborn, some fear that requires us to protect ourselves against encroachment upon the brain?

DELGADO: The inviolability of the brain is only a social construct, like nudity.

EHRENSING: I wonder if Dr. Sweet would care to comment on the quote from Dr. Neville's [paper]: "The famous case of Thomas, the engineer, patient of Drs. Ervin, Mark and Sweet, illustrates the point: when under the influence of calming electrical stimulation he consented to psychosurgical procedures for destroying certain brain cells, but when the effects of the stimulation wore off he refused consent. When was he in his 'right mind'? Fortunately, the staff persuaded him to give consent when he was not under the influence of recent stimulation. But then, perhaps he was under undue persuasive pressure." Could you comment on that at all? Does that present a particular ethical issue to you that you would care to share with us? And is that an accurate description of what happened?

SWEET: Yes, I think this is an accurate summary by Dr. Neville of that case report. The question you are raising seems to be this: how do we know that the patient is not under the influence of the electrical stimula-

tion in some minor way a month hence, and if he were under this influence would his consent not be in some way spurious? Is that the question you're asking?

EHRENSING: Somewhat. In a sense it's an example of a procedure eliciting the consent for the procedure.

GAYLIN: I think he's asking a broader question, because I know Dr. Neville is. He's asking what changed that man's mind. Isn't that the broader question? How free was that decision and did you have personally, as the surgeon involved, any questions about that?

SWEET: I think that the effort here would indicate that the process of giving informed consent can be a very complex one. Under these circumstances [in the case of Thomas], however, we felt that we were in a very strong position. This man consented to the surgical procedure when he was under the effects of this stimulation, when his behavior, in general, was far more socially acceptable; and then, at a subsequent time, when much of his other behavior was not socially acceptable, he was still amenable to this procedure as a consequence of the conversations he had at that time. I think we would have had a very serious problem if he had given consent only in periods in the poststimulation cycle when his behavior was calmer and more socially acceptable than usual, and if he had refused to do so when he was in a belligerent, fighting mood.

MICHELS: Let's say the general social attitude toward the procedure was positive and the patient, when disturbed and belligerent, wouldn't consent. When you stimulated his brain he seemed normal and during that phase, with your electrodes firing, he was willing to consent; but then you turned off the electrodes and he again wouldn't consent. Again, suppose the social attitude is strongly positive. What would you do?

SWEET: At that stage of the game I would assume that a good many of the present crit-

ics would be muted, if not silent, and I would reconsider the matter.

With the raising of the political dimension of the consent procedure, the floor was turned over to Dr. Pribram to present his position on a biological bill of rights. As an introduction, he commented on the revolutionary fervor of the 1960s, and on the counterrevolutionary interest in control posing the very problem for our conference. The revolutionary problem was not, he asserted, to promote irrationality over a moribund rationality. Nor is the counterrevolutionary problem to reaffirm the claims of reason. The problem for both is that reason itself has become disreason, a distortion of reason. Irrationality is something else again.

In order to secure a more rational public life, in the face of advances in life science and control technology, and in recognition of current political forces, Dr. Pribram proposed a new bill of rights to be appended to the present constitutional amendments.

The first right is that of equal opportunity. This is a redefinition of liberty. Opportunity includes both the right of each to take equal advantage of the physical and social environment, and the right of each to profit equally from its resources.

The second is the right to territory. This includes a right to property, but also a right to have a clean and safe environment in which to fulfill oneself.

The third is the right to integrity, meaning a reasonable guarantee of individuality and personal identity. It is this right that most of all bears on the dangerous implications of behavior control. Dr. Pribram suggested that the problem of privacy ought to be formulated in terms of the right to integrity.

The fourth of the basic rights is that of humanity. A reformulation of the right to happiness, this point stresses the need for us to come to terms with the positive content of the concept of humanity. With respect to biology, this includes a right to control one's longevity and procreation.

Dr. Pribram explained the right to adequate medical care would be understood as part of the right to integrity. Dr. Weiss asked

whether control over longevity includes a right to suicide, and whether control over procreativity includes a right to have as many children as desired, regardless of the population situation.

PRIBRAM: The right, yes. But it's not necessarily the wisest course to exercise the right. The beauty of a bill of rights is that the right of the individual becomes balanced against the right of his social group and his society by the legal adversary procedures that take place over the years.

WEISS: Then you're in conflict, aren't you, with those who say that you haven't the right to suicide, and that procreativity is a condition determined by the number of people that can be sustained. You can't just say here's a right, here's a right, here's a right. Someone else could come along holding up eight other rights against yours. That method won't work, you see. You have to tell us *why* these are rights. You have to *justify* your rights. There has to be a principle for them; that's how we would be able to adjudicate this question, by looking at what the principles are that make you put these down.

NEVILLE: Aren't you [Dr. Pribram] implying an operational ethical principle to apply in evaluating techniques for physical manipulation of the brain? You are saying that options are the fruit of complexity, not of simplicity. You suggest further that they're the fruit of an optimal range of complexity and that if one is either too complex or too simple one loses options; there is an optimal middle range in which the number of options is optimized, so to speak. Would you go on then to say that a physical manipulation of the brain is moral if it moves the complexity toward that optimal range, and that it's objectionable if it moves it in either direction away from it?

There's something appealing about that. I notice the neurosurgeons are concerned with the blandness that's created by some procedures. The diminution in complexity,

really, seems to be dehumanizing and for that there must be a very, very impressive gain in order to make that an acceptable cost. And when you read a book like *1984*, what disturbs you about it is the blandness of the creatures—not their being controlled. Am I reading you?

PRIBRAM: Very clearly. I haven't thought of it as optimal, however; I thought increase would always give us greater value.

SCOVILLE: It's a veering from superiority to mediocrity that we surgeons worry about. In other words, most of these people on whom we operate have many superior characteristics that are out of order, making them sick. The old-fashioned total lobotomy, as we call it, was simply a lowering to mediocrity. It made people easy to control and easy to handle but, God forbid, at what a cost!

We do many dangerous, disfiguring, destructive operations. Our criterion, for all its ambiguity, is that if the patient is rational and conscious we try to do an operation for which he is glad. The test comes three months later when you say, are you glad you had the operation? If he's glad he had it, we are glad. If he's not rational we hope that his closest relatives will be glad he had it. Though it's a simplistic explanation, this is my criteria.

GAYLIN: But you see you've been using the wrong criteria. Couldn't a seriously damaged, lobotomized patient be reduced to that very primitive acquiescent point where his definition of being glad would not be one you would be happy with? He might because of that reduced state be precisely the person who would tell you, "Yes, I am glad."

PRIBRAM: With mental cases, you generally shift to giving satisfaction to those who love them the most. What has disturbed me most in this whole meeting is that you've asked Dr. Sweet what he would have done if that chap on stimulation consented and without stimulation refused. I don't really give a damn what Sweet would have done,

because the reason I would go to Sweet is to know whether he could get the results with surgery that he got under stimulation; and then I would decide what I would do. Just because Sweet invented that procedure and got that result, I don't see why his opinion as to whether he would operate is any more important than any person's in the room.

CHALKLEY: I would just like to describe a somewhat more complex decision that recently was forced on a hospital that will be unnamed. They had a Parkinsonian case, who was 50 years old. She had had Parkinson's disease since she was 20, and she was brought into the hospital, together with her mother who was her legal guardian, because the Parkinson's was so severe that she was unable to take care of herself. She was put on L-Dopa and within 48 hours the symptoms disappeared completely. Within another 48 hours the mother, who was the legal guardian and the only one permitted to give consent, asked that they stop the treatment. The mother's argument was that the girl had survived 30 years in this condition, that a cure of her Parkinsonian disease would force her to come in contact with a civilization that she, to all intents and purposes, did not know and to which she had never adapted. She would face complete reeducation. This rather startled the hospital. They asked the daughter. When the mother was in the room she agreed with the mother and said that she did not want to be treated. When the mother was out of the room she begged them not to take her off the therapy. When they took her off therapy, they could not get a response. Now the legal responsibility lay with the mother. It was obvious that if the girl was left on L-Dopa, it would be destructive to the mother who had built her entire life around looking after the patient. The child was 50, the mother was 80. The decision was made: they went to the mother and said, "We are going to court and seek a judgment to allow us to keep your daughter in therapy." The mother withdrew the objec-

tions. But here you have a case where no matter what you did there was injury done.

GAVIN: Coming from a long line of pessimists, I see a few things that I have to express here. On the one hand, we have an available and increasingly more sophisticated technology, and this is paralleled by a rising alarm over *everyday* lives—not the pathologic kind that you read about in textbooks, but *everyday* lives. Now you combine this with recent conditioning of the public by the promises in popular magazines of this new molecular and brain biology, and you have a very frightening thing, namely, a kind of openness to the alternative of turning people into vegetables. Prisons are running out of space. Numbers of criminals are increasing every day. Notwithstanding the expertise of the neurosurgeons, I don't know that we can enjoy the luxury of the neurosurgeon making the decision whether to operate much longer. I think it will soon be out of their hands.

RASMUSSEN: If you want to make a bad decision instead of us, that's one thing. But you're not going to be able to change the effect of an operation by making a decision. You can say a surgeon can do it but you can't make him operate—ever.

GAVIN: You can always find some hack.

Further discussion began with Dr. Bering pointing out that the costs to human functions involved in brain manipulation must be weighed against the costs of not developing the techniques and employing them. With analogies drawn from the development and use of the cardiac pacemaker and the imminent development of a visual prosthesis, he indicated both economic and personal costs on both sides. He also pointed out the greater flexibility, in cost terms, of the electrical stimulation procedures because their effects for the most part are reversible—while psychosurgery is irreversible.

Dr. Bering noted that much of the difficulty in costing out these procedures is that their results are so poorly known.

Citing the controversial practice of amygdalotomy on hyperactive children, he said that we simply do not know the effects of this operation on the children's future capacities for learning.

MARK: I wonder if some of our ethical dilemmas aren't posed by the limitations of knowledge that we have about the kinds of cases we're dealing with. The word aggression and violence is really a very broad term. There are whole hosts of human conditions, some of which may be related to brain problems and some of which may not, which may engender aggressive or even violent behavior and to say that one kind should be treated medically, let alone surgically, presupposes a knowledge about the given individual. Now if we take out all the social aspects (i.e., the purely socially generated violence) and study only the brain-related violence, we're still faced with a tremendous dilemma because our information about the specific kinds of brain deficits, and how they're related to specific behavior, is still limited.

If we address ourselves to the hyperactive child and ask, as Dr. Bering has very correctly done, what is the eventual cost to this child in terms of his impairment of learning after the procedure is done, I think we also have to ask the question, What is the impairment of learning in this child because of his disease process? Certainly we can't begin to detect, evaluate, or measure the limitation caused by the operation until we have some idea as to what is the limitation caused by the disease. Are we in fact dealing with a disease process, and how is it defined? The neurology of behavior unfortunately is still in a rather embryonic state; our information and our ability to do meaningful neurological tests that will focus, for example, on various aspects of the limbic system are still very poor. We have very good methods of detecting lower brainstem problems and we have good neurological tests for specific problems at a cortical-thalamic level. But our ability to look at and test the limbic

system—in the broad functional sense—is extremely limited, even when gross pathology is present.

SWEET: The kind of patient Dr. Bering is discussing—the hyperkinetic child that is destructive of furniture, others, and himself—may have to be restrained constantly in a bed with all four limbs tied down so that this incessant tendency for destruction will not occur. Such a child is, of course, totally untestable in terms of any refined testing techniques as to his current potential. And we don't get useful information in terms of brain functions from the great majority of such people whom we would hope to improve somewhat by surgery.

Dr. Pribram and others pointed out that aggressiveness cannot be understood only in terms of brain modification variables. The social setting must also be taken into account. Dr. Pribram cited studies with cats and monkeys in which identical brain operations produced opposite kinds of behavior, where the distinguishing variable was the social relationship between the animals in the group or between the animal and the experimenter.

Dr. Vaughan then pointed out that the social-environment issue makes it virtually impossible to do an adequate evaluation of treatments. A patient isolated in a hospital, perhaps tied down, is not in a position to have his responses to a natural social environment observed. There is a further difficulty, which is perhaps even greater, in gaining the knowledge necessary for using a brain-manipulation procedure effectively and safely. We shouldn't operate on human beings until we have that knowledge. But experiments on animals would hardly parallel changes of human behavior and emotion. Dr. Vaughan then asked under what circumstances it would be appropriate to subject patients to an exploratory procedure. He then proposed an order of treatments according to reversibility and least potential damage to the psychological structure of the individual. First we should try psychotherapy

and drugs, the traditional psychiatric approaches. If these fail we could then consider some kind of direct brain manipulation. Before permanent lesions are made, however, trials should be made with methods of temporarily suppressing brain function, for instance through cooling or electrical stimulation. The problem with doing a reversible evaluation, Dr. Vaughan pointed out, is its expense in money, time, skilled people, and equipment. A quick lesion is a lot less trouble than a careful experimental trial.

Dr. Delgado, agreeing with Dr. Vaughan on the need for experimental justification for brain-modifying procedures, outlined the following five areas in which more experimental knowledge is needed. First, we need to know which parts of the brain are involved in various kinds of behavior. We know a little about this now, but need to know a lot more. Second, we need techniques to identify electrical and chemical events in the brain associated with the relevant kinds of behavior. Third, we need to know which areas of the brain are paired so as to produce or suppress activities. Fourth, we need to develop techniques for connecting these paired areas with feedback information so that undesirable behavior can be suppressed and desired behavior stimulated. Fifth, we need to find out what might be the secondary effects of manipulative procedures. Dr. Delgado expressed his belief that stimulation procedures are relatively safe, and that it is surgery that presents the problems. He said the greatest moral problem arises out of the fact that the techniques of manipulating the brain are relatively easy. It is easier to have an electrode implanted than to take a course in some subject.

MARK: Stereotactic surgery is one of the lowest-risk kinds of neurosurgical procedures in use and one of the easiest as well from a technical point of view. But it is still brain surgery and entails the same risks, even though they're much smaller, as other kinds of brain surgery. Furthermore, the technical aspects of doing stereotactic surgery, while fairly straightforward, are still time-consuming, and this puts it into a different category,

for example, from the frontal lobotomy operations done during the 1940s. The frontal-lobe operations were in the beginning very inexact. It was possible for a number of people, who were not surgeons, to do frontal lobotomies. One of them, as I understand it, did 16,000 frontal lobotomies, using what was euphemistically known in neurological circles as an "icepick."

PRIBRAM: Some did actually use an icepick on some patients.

EHRENSING: I bet not too many malpractice suits resulted from that.

VAUGHAN: Exactly. You've got a cooperative patient, that's one of the purposes of the operation.

MARK: I just wanted to emphasize that the problem of frontal lobotomies is not—from a technical point of view—the same as we're dealing with here in stereotactic surgery. It's very unlikely that stereotactic procedures are going to be done by people other than neurosurgeons. There is a very limited number of neurosurgeons in the United States, and as far as the number that does stereotactic surgery is concerned, it's even more limited.

LONDON: First I want to agree—urgently agree—both with what Dr. Vaughan and Dr. Delgado said about the problem that becomes apparent to all of us. It is evident that in many critical respects we know a great deal less about brain functions than we ought to know, or than we want to know, and the lack of knowledge makes the question of intervention very, very much more doubtful than it would otherwise be.

But the technology is getting easier and easier to use. And when you have the combination of easy technology and difficult acquisition of knowledge, you have deadly possibilities. The issue that arises is not how many fancy neurosurgeons there are who know how to use this technique; but the problem is the klotz factor in surgery. How many incompetents are there, or how many people who may be competent in other areas

of clinical surgery but are not aware of their limitation of knowledge in this area, who are not aware of the secondary effects of the intervention but realize that their technical skills are absolutely adequate for them to go through the technical motions of the clinical procedure? And that, as Dr. Delgado points out, is becoming an increasingly dangerous situation. Unless the rate of firm knowledge, and the standards for defining what firm knowledge is, can accelerate at the same rate as the improvements in the technology, the situation that will arise more and more often is very, very dangerous. This makes for good guidelines—much better guidelines than now exist—guidelines that are vital in three areas.

First, the scientific status: how do we evaluate scientifically the nature of specific brain functions? How do we know when enough is enough? What kind of experiments do we require of animals and what kind of leaps of faith must we then take after experimenting with animals before we dare apply the same techniques to human beings?

Second, what is the minimal diagnostic requirement that we can place upon the clinician for assessing the extent to which he is really dealing with brain dysfunction in a patient, and for the relative wisdom of cutting him open, whatever that may mean?

Third, once the diagnostic criteria are established, what is to be done inside the person's head, and who is to do it?

Dr. Chalkley was then asked what forms of public policy might be employed to represent controls based on answers to these and similar questions. He answered that the most obvious and forceful form of control is the law. Citing cases involving both malpractice and experimentation without sufficient consent, he illustrated various precedents for medical and experimental legal limitation. He pointed out, however, that the rules of precedent are not always binding. Furthermore, there are different precedents in dif-

ferent jurisdictions. And, finally, the judicial process does not come to bear unless someone files a suit.

Another form of public policy rests in the administrative and regulative bodies of the government, such as HEW and the Food and Drug Administration. There are, however, immense practical difficulties in overseeing concrete medical and scientific practices. In the review of grant proposals, funding agencies ordinarily count on the grantee institution to provide review procedures for the propriety of the funded research. But the review boards of institutions generally examine only whether the proposed research accords with the canons of good science; they do not raise sophisticated ethical issues.

The discussion then focused on the problem of consent. Two main questions were raised. First, who is to give consent? This is especially complicated in cases of mental illness. Ideally, the person to give consent is the patient after he is cured. A certain amount of guessing about what the patient would want if he were cured is always involved in proxy consent. A case was cited of a man who had attacked his wife with a meat cleaver. After diagnosis indicated that destructive lesions be made in his brain, his wife was asked for consent. She gave it, but under the circumstances, she would have consented to anything, likely even decapitation. Second, when is consent informed? It is hard enough to explain complicated abdominal surgery to a layman. Is it possible to explain brain surgery where the outcome is so equivocal? What exactly should a reasonable person know to be in a position to give or withhold informed consent?

Feeling that some of these very practical but abstract questions could be best addressed with references to particular cases, the final session of the conference was devoted to a case presentation by Dr. Mark.

MARK: At the present time, we [in the Boston City Hospital/Massachusetts General Hospital neurosurgical-neurological group] are only considering for surgical intervention those people with focal brain disease and violent behavior who have temporal lobe epilepsy, who would be, in fact, candidates

for surgical operation even if they didn't have violent behavior. We are, however, faced with the following specific dilemma. Patient Arthur P., 29 years old and an ex-Marine, has been showing episodic violent behavior of a particularly threatening and destructive kind. Arthur is six feet four and a half inches in height and weighs 267 pounds. He's built very much on the order of those huge tackles one sees on the Sunday television screen. He is an expert in both armed and unarmed combat. Just to give you an example of the kind of activity he engages in when he has his "violent attacks," he went into a rage when a judge in a county court said that he was going to confine him for three months because of repeated traffic violations. So he went into his cell, put his hand through a brick wall and took out the toilet bowl, *in toto*, ripping it out of the wall and shredding it through the bars. Another time he put his hands through the wall when he got angry at the Minneapolis Veterans Hospital, and so frightened his doctors and attendants that they refused to come into the room any more to see him. He also has injured people, usually in response to minor provocation.

This man has been studied extensively at various hospitals. He has spent a year at a hospital for the criminally insane. The patient has never had a history of a seizure, except for one very peculiar episode that occurred when he was 11 years old and in which he seemed to have done some very unusual things that he didn't remember and that didn't make much sense. He's been seen by a number of very competent neurologists, neurosurgeons, psychiatrists, and has received psychiatric treatment now for about six and a half years, of almost every variety. He's been on the most intensive anticonvulsant and antidepressant medical regime, with absolutely no help whatsoever for his behavior changes. He had numerous brain-wave examinations that showed borderline changes. Then a pneumoencephalogram was

taken, which showed that he had a distinctly and definitely abnormal left temporal horn with a dilatation of the lateral cleft and an irregularity of the supra cornual cleft. This pneumoencephalogram was repeated at a different hospital, and this confirmed the fact that this man had a very abnormal temporal horn on the left side. A neurological assessment by the head of neurology at Boston University was summarized by citing the fact that he felt that this man was a temporal-lobe epileptic even though he didn't have seizures. Then they attempted to do a much more thorough electroencephalographic demonstration of his problem; this showed cascades of "spikes" from both temporal areas via sphenoidal leads.

This man has gone back to the Veterans Hospital in Minnesota. They cannot contain him in psychiatric hospitals—neither state hospitals in Minnesota nor in the veterans' hospitals of the federal system. With all the management they've tried, they feel he is much too dangerous despite all the medication they've given him. At the present time they are trying to recommit him for life to the St. Peter Hospital for the Criminally Insane where he will be in permanent isolation, in a dungeon. He is very sensitive not only about the fact that he faces this kind of future, but also about the fact that he's going to be imprisoned with a group of people who he feels are morally quite different. We've followed him now for two and a half years with the question of doing temporal-lobe surgery. We have not done so up to this point because we are not sure of our diagnosis. We are presenting this patient, not for debate, but to bring out some of the moral and ethical problems surrounding the violent patient.

GAYLIN: I presume that because you're only considering violent people who have temporal-lobe epilepsy and would be candidates for surgery even if they did not show violent behavior, that he does not therefore fall into your category of an operable person.

MARK: At the present time he has never had a seizure.

GAYLIN: Right. So that if he showed no violent behavior the nature of his epilepsy would not warrant surgery.

MARK: Exactly. The fact is that we don't really feel he has epilepsy.

GAYLIN: Exactly. Because epilepsy is not a matter of the . . .

MARK: EEG interpretation. He is not an epileptic in any definition of the word that we presently use, although he certainly is close to it in terms of his behavior, and in terms of a number of other facets that he has.

SCOVILLE: What is this man's attitude toward seeking treatment? Is he asking for medical treatment or surgical treatment?

MARK: This man wants some treatment.

SCOVILLE: With your vast experience, Dr. Rasmussen, have you operated on people with grossly pathological behavior but without overt seizure formation?

RASMUSSEN: We have a fair number of patients with varying degrees of this kind of episodic aggressive behavior, associated with temporal-lobe seizures. But they've all had unequivocal temporal-lobe seizures. For some of them the reason for operating was really the behavior rather than the seizures. That is, the seizures were relatively unimportant.

MARK: This is a man sensitive to every little change in his environment. For example, when he tried to call Frank Ervin from Minnesota and couldn't get him on three or four different occasions, he called me up and said, "I wonder if you could get Frank Ervin. I'm sitting here in the airport in Minneapolis and I have a live grenade in my pocket and if he does not call me back at this number within ten minutes, I'm getting on the plane, going to Boston, going to his house on Kendall Common Road, blow him and his family and myself up." He responds to very small changes in his environment.

The more usual pattern of violence seen at the Boston Veterans Hospital indicates that trivial events would precipitate these rages. He would often be very distressed at his own behavior.

PRIBRAM: This means that epilepsy as such is irrelevant in this case. We are concerned with organic brain diseases.

MARK: This case would be establishing a precedent; I think that's the ethical issue.

MICHEL: The case history we're talking about here is not the case of Arthur P. but the case of Drs. Ervin and Mark—they're the principals. Anticipating an unfavorable reply from this committee at Mass. General, they come to us, a committee constituted in a different way, and get an alternate view to take back and use in the discussion in Boston. For me there are two questions. One is, What do we do to Arthur? The other is, Who decides what we do to Arthur? There's one sentence that I think was erroneous in the case presentation—I'd like to repeat it, I think verbatim. Dr. Mark said the committee of three distinguished Harvard colleagues, professors of psychiatry and neurology and surgery, was to review this, and that they "had absolutely no connection with the program." Do you mean that three distinguished physicians, colleagues, professors of the same medical school, who I presume know all of you personally, people you see in your daily rounds, have no connection with the program? That stretches my credulity considerably. It seems by electing to place the final responsibility in a court of physicians, you've created the web in which you are now struggling, trying to define the problem as epilepsy, a medical-scientific term, rather than in social-ethical ones. It seems a court of nonphysicians would be a much more appropriate court to make the final decision.

LONDON: The real issue is this: you have the capacity to go into this man's head, physically and directly. It is altogether plausible that doing so in an intelligent, careful

way will permit you to directly ameliorate his behavior. That capacity has absolutely nothing to do with epilepsy. It has absolutely nothing to do with an abnormal EEG. It's a simple technical fact. The man goes crazy. I'm talking now like a cop, or like a citizen who could get beaten up, or like an airplane pilot who doesn't like people walking around with live grenades. The man goes crazy all the time. He is a terrible potential menace to society and to himself.

You have a technology that permits you to address that directly.

In less than five years Dr. Delgado is going to make that technology so much easier that people without your sensibility and without your skill are going to be able to do that too. Then they're going to add two and two and get four, and say, "There's lots of people who act in lots of crazy ways and these doctors can't find anything wrong with their brain, their glands, or with their bodies; but they've tried every approach like drugs and psychotherapy and so on and so forth, and none of those things have worked. Now these doctors have very safe, potentially very effective, and very applicable techniques of going into the head. Why don't they do that?" That's what's going to happen. And you're cursed with ingenuousness, and the fact that you know that this capacity is developing in your own work. Your colleagues are understandably fearful of the responsibility that it engenders. So you come up with this kind of dilemma because they come up with what Dr. Vaughan quite correctly calls the specious requirement of a seizure, or a definition of epilepsy; but the problem has nothing to do with that. It has to do with the capacity and the behavior.

GAYLIN: You remember Dr. Delgado's caution to us. As the technology moves faster than the basic knowledge, we *cannot* wait for the basic knowledge because the

technology is going to outstrip it. Second-rate people will do what Dr. Mark and his colleagues won't. Therefore, while we're waiting for the basic knowledge, the urgency is to set up certain reasonable protections and guidelines.

PRIBRAM: A bill of rights.

GAYLIN: It seems to me that this is a constructive thing to come up in the meeting. It suggests that there's a possibility society can develop techniques for providing due process in cases that don't fit the old categories. The type of due process that we use for handling criminals and the type of due process that we use for commitment procedures may not exhaust the range of actions that society might wish to take to deal with problems involving value contradictions. One of the things that might come out of a study like ours is a way of designing alternate social institutions that could be used to make decisions in cases like the one Dr. Mark presented.

PRIBRAM: This is the case where you really need to go to the public. This is a social-policy decision, perhaps proximately being faced here by the surgeons, but in the larger sense faced by our whole society.

MARK: I agree that public participation in certain medical decisions is desirable as long as the public participants are knowledgeable and honest. I do not agree that the decision about a patient's treatment ought to be completely removed from the physicians charged with caring for the patient, nor do I agree that the seizures or other brain pathology is irrelevant to the patient's abnormal behavior. On the other hand, if a violent person has a normally functioning brain—then he doesn't need therapy—be it surgical or medical. If an individual with a normal brain is criminally violent, he should have legal rather than medical attention. □

LETTERS

The New Conservatives

Editor:

Although you were kind enough to invite me to do so, I have no wish to comment in detail on Rose Coser's review of my book, *The New Chastity*; some sorts of criticism are discussable, but Mrs. Coser's is not. She neither undertook—as the canons of proper criticism dictate—to analyze what I had in fact written nor to join the issue, which happened to be the articulated ideology of the Women's Liberation movement, that I set out to raise. It might have seemed somewhat anomalous, in a journal of socialist discussion, to come upon so fierce an expression of the philistine notion that ideologies are irrelevant to movements, but one has grown used to anomalies . . .

Another essay in your spring issue is, however, discussable, and it is on that one, "The New Conservatives" by Joseph Epstein, that I hope you will permit me to make a few observations. Now, without entering into any dispute over his terminology—for as Mr. Epstein's own efforts at a certain complexity on the matter testify, such terms as "conservative" and "liberal" have been muddled past all help and so to talk about them has become unutterably fruitless—I think Mr. Epstein fully justified in pointing to and locating a gathering tide of dissenting opinion with respect to what is the majority sentiment of the intellectual community. Moreover, he is on the whole, though not in every instance, correct in ascribing the origin of this dissenting impulse to disillusionment with both the ideas and the results of 1960s leftist activism. His conclusions, however, do not seem to me at all consonant with the description of the phenomenon that he himself offers. He does not, as he seems to imagine, carry further any real political discussion: that is, he does not open it out to that place where disagreements, if any, between himself and the so-called "new conservatives" might be aired and delineated. On the contrary, in the end he merely succeeds in bringing all questions full circle: that is, to the place where despite his response to the actual substance of their actual arguments, those whom Mr. Epstein has elected to call opponents are to be criticized *a priori* (if not indeed *ad hominem*). They are to be held accountable, we discover, not for untrue assertions or mistaken inferences but for adopting postures which he wishes people would not adopt.

What actually is his main indictment of the "new conservatives"? It seems to concern not so much what they have said as what, from Mr. Epstein's point of view, they have failed to say. In their disenchantment with what they regarded as the heedless, arrogant, and often merely anti-American excesses of left-liberalism in the 1960s, Mr. Epstein tells us, these intellectuals have swung to a point of excess of their own on the other side—to "Couéism" or "Rotarianism." One need not go at any great length into the particular examples he finds to document this characterization—Irving Kristol's remark that the average American probably feels no more powerless today than in the past; Daniel P. Moynihan's, that while Americans are ideologically conservative, in practice they are liberal; or Norman Podhoretz's, that McGovern's resounding defeat was not attributable to "social meanness." In a less contentious climate these examples might speak for themselves, both as remarks obviously found growing in a different and infinitely more interesting field than that into which Mr. Epstein has so wilfully transplanted them, and as observations the implied meaning of which is not quite so self-evident as Mr. Epstein seems to think. Would Mr. Epstein say that Americans *do* feel more powerless? Or that they have not in fact, despite a tendency to certain old-fashioned rhetoric, lent their largely ungrudging support (legislative and, what is more important, financial) to an ever-widening network of social-welfare measures for something like 40 years now? Or that their refusal to vote for McGovern while yet they elect a liberal Democratic Congress does not bespeak something at least a bit more complex than a wish to back off from social progress? One suspects Mr. Epstein's true objections are not against the need to describe American society in terms less wholesale and careless than those the left-liberals had offered us with such assurance in the 1960s but rather against the inconvenience—emotional and intellectual—of its public expression.

In any case, of course, the real matter for discussion is not so much Mr. Epstein's substantiation of the indictment he makes as the indictment itself. The New Left is dead, says Mr. Epstein, and the Democratic party "in shambles," "done in by its own divisiveness." To continue in a course of leveling one's fire at the ideas, attitudes, and programs of one's fellow, left-liberal intellectuals, then, is only to lend aid and comfort to the enemy. Because the enemy (read, for convenience, Richard Nixon) too, is a critic of such ideas, attitudes, and programs. This point of attack is an all-too-familiar one, the stuff in fact from which popular fronts have always been erected—whether with Stalinists, Cold Warriors, or black nationalists. The "new conservatives" emerge from Mr. Epstein's scrutiny as people subject to condemnation for failing to close ranks with the army of their fellow intellectuals. Daniel P. Moynihan, for instance, is invited to ponder on sleepless nights not whether his proposal for an income strategy to replace a services strategy was a good idea (a question on which Mr.

Epstein, for the purposes of his analysis, himself remains staunchly silent) but whether in the end he did "the cause" more harm than good by proposing it. After the sad record of the late 1960s one is surely entitled to a certain amazement that such an invitation should be issued by one intellectual to another. Movements, particularly radical movements, impose this sort of demand upon their members and fellow travelers. But that, I should have thought, was precisely one of the reasons that movements are inimical to a certain kind of intellectual seriousness.

I might cite a few examples of my own from Mr. Epstein of the unfortunate effect on the capacity (once considered essential for a healthy intellectual life) for detached and critical analysis worked by the felt need to "line up." One example, minor but significant, might be his curious use of the word "facade" for the liberalism of the Johnson administration. In the name of what does he of all people sideswipe the authenticity of Johnsonian liberalism, particularly in view of the fact that it is just their critical attitude toward some of the results of the Johnson program for which he takes the "new conservatives" to task?

Another more important example is his discussion of the idea of "the limits of social policy."

... it is one thing to say that on certain brutally tough social problems we don't as yet have any convincing solutions; quite another to say, as those who talk about the limits of social policy imply, that none exist or are likely to be found.

Mr. Epstein is, of course, free to use the language as he pleases; but if he wishes to use a phrase from the pen of Nathan Glazer as a shorthand symbol, he is not free to misrepresent the attitude symbolized by the phrase. And as adumbrated in Glazer's essay "The Limits of Social Policy," the idea bears no important resemblance to the possibilities explored by Mr. Epstein in the above quote. For Glazer the phrase announces the need to distinguish between those social problems which are amenable to solution by official public policy and those which are not. It is, we need hardly say, a good deal easier to lump things together than to sort them out and distinguish among them. Yet the latter task, no matter how difficult, happens to be the major responsibility devolving upon intellectuals worthy of the name.

The responsibility to sort out and make distinctions is related to another and even higher responsibility of intellectuals, and that is, to make the results of one's efforts known, even should it prove painful and costly to do so. Mr. Epstein's own efforts to understand the views of the men he has singled out for criticism must surely have yielded more intelligent results—for Mr. Epstein is normally a most intelligent critic—than those he offers in his essay. One cannot, for instance, believe that reading Moynihan on the blacks could seriously have produced the assertion that Moynihan merely finds their plight to be grossly inflated. Is that how Mr. Epstein—or any honest and perceptive reader

—would understand the sentence, quoted by him, "Some things are getting better, others worse"?

No, I am afraid that the gramophone record—to borrow Mr. Epstein's interesting borrowing from Orwell—is on the other player. For in the end all Mr. Epstein's indictment adds up to is that people may no longer criticize any of the ideas popular among left-liberals—no matter what the idea or what the grounds of criticism—without risking the charge that they are the servants of evil reaction. It has never ceased to be a prime political tactic to identify those who criticize one's ideas or positions not just as opponents but as bad people. Such methods as applied to the life of the mind, however—and to the community whose very definition is that it is committed to that life—tend to breed the one most deadly intellectual disease: self-righteousness.

It is one thing, as Mr. Epstein might say, to speak of something so fine and grand as "the alleviation of social pain"; it is quite another, if one is at all a serious intellectual, to get into the business of bestowing moral credit on oneself and withholding it from others on no other recognition but the catch in one's throat.

MIDGE DECTER

ROSE LAUB COSER replies:

It seems that, for once, Midge Decter is almost speechless. I shall be equally brief:

1. It is precisely because ideologies are "not irrelevant" to movements that I undertook to explain what the women's movement is all about, a matter totally ignored in Decter's book.

2. What she wrote about is not ideologies (my emphasis), and not even the "articulated ideology," whatever that is, of the woman's movement, but one extreme ideology among several of different shadings. *Pars pro toto* may be an effective—though dated—art form; when used for the purpose of reasoning, it is both illogical and inaccurate.

3. A philistine is defined by Webster as one who is "an active or passive opponent of progress or progressive ideas."

JOSEPH EPSTEIN replies:

What points in Midge Decter's letter can be argued with profit? As I count them, four.

1. Midge Decter questions my "curious" use of the word "facade" to describe the liberalism of the Johnson administration. I used that word because it seemed appropriate to describe an administration that forfeited its domestic program to pursue the war in Vietnam. To the extent that Vietnam came to dominate the Johnson administration, consuming all its energies and in the end bringing it

down, to that extent can its liberalism on the domestic front be fairly called a "facade."

2. Throughout her letter Miss Decter implies that my attitude toward the new conservative intellectuals has to do with their criticism of the liberal-left offering "aid and comfort to the enemy"—the enemy in this case being Richard Nixon. In fact, I do not believe that intellectuals ought automatically to view their government as the enemy. I do think, however, that historically a healthy distrust has not proved entirely misplaced. As a collectivity, the new conservative intellectuals have shown very little such distrust, and even less printed criticism, of the Nixon administration. Could it be because they felt that to do so would be to lend aid and comfort to their enemy: the liberal-left?

3. Miss Decter remarks that in my discussion of Daniel Moynihan's proposal for an income strategy I remain "staunchly silent" about my own position. My silence is not really as staunch as all that. On the basis of my own brief experience as director of an antipoverty program in the South in the mid-1960s, I would tend to favor an income strategy, provided it be sufficient in amount to make a dent and that the many administrative complications involved in handling such a program could be satisfactorily worked out. In the best of all possible worlds, I would favor a combined income-and-service strategy. Mr. Nixon, at least before Watergate, in his budget proposal promised the worst of all possible worlds—the income strategy having been defeated, his budget proposals argued for a drastic reduction in service programs anyhow. Miss Decter appears to feel that all this doesn't matter, that the only thing I need concern myself about is whether or not I think Moynihan's proposal a good one. A political proposal such as an income strategy is not, however, like a novel, to be judged on its intrinsic merit; its consequences in the world have to be taken into account. As I suggested in my essay, the main consequence of Moynihan's proposal appears to have been to supply the Nixon administration with the intellectual argument to disband a number of already existing service programs.

4. At a number of places Midge Decter remarks that my main indictment of the new conservative intellectuals seems "to concern not so much what they have said as what . . . they have failed to say." Elsewhere she notes that I hold them accountable "not for untrue assertions or mistaken inferences but for adopting postures which he wishes people would not adopt." In part, she is correct in both instances. Part of the new conservative intellectuals' prestige derives from their own former liberal standing—or, to eliminate that label for a moment, from their concern with matters of social justice. Nathan Glazer in the conclusion of his essay "On Being Deradicalized," for example, noted that "if we are ever to mount a successful assault on our problems," intellectuals must argue with and ultimately strip the New Left radicalism of "the pretension that it understands the causes of

our ills and how to set them right." Not alone in this essay by Nathan Glazer but in much of the writing in *Commentary*, even in that of Irving Kristol who styles himself as involved in "the enterprise of conservative reform," it is also implied that the conservative criticism is to be the entering wedge for a more serious reform. Once radicalism was out of the way, in other words, the assault on our social ills would begin. Miss Decter, then, is correct in saying that a major burden of my essay is taken up with criticizing the new conservative intellectuals for adopting postures I wish they would not adopt. As the years go by, as their journals become more predictable, as they appear to have become more tightly locked into fixed positions, feeling themselves embattled on all sides, growing increasingly intolerant of the least criticism, I at least begin to sense that the social justice aspect of the new conservatives has become just that, a "posture," and little more. As such, it seems eminently suitable for criticism.

Finally, throughout the thick pile of Midge Decter's prose there runs the heavy lint of innuendo. Along with allusions to my moral defects, there is mention of popular fronts, fellow-traveling, and much else. I hope Miss Decter will understand my not bothering to respond in kind to this sort of thing. □

How to Help

Editor:

I have received your fund appeal and would like to send you something, but right now things are bad with me, so I just can't. But is there anything else I might do to help?

E. J., Boston

The Editor replies:

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